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The convergence effect: challenge to parsimony

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AshleyRichard K., The Political Economy of War and Peace. London: Frances Pinter; New York: Nichols, 1980.
BeerFrancis A.Peace against War: The Ecology of International Violence. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1981.
de MesquitaBruce BuenoThe War TrapNew Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Robert C. North and
Matthew Willard
Robert C. North
Affiliation:
Professor of Political Science atStanford University, Stanford, California.
Matthew Willard
Affiliation:
doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, Stanford, California.
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Review essay
Information
International Organization , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , Spring 1983, pp. 339 - 358
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1983

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References

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18. See Rapaport, Anatol, “A Probabilistic Approach to Networks,” Social Networks 2 (1979/1980): 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Modelski, George, Principles of World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 232, 270–72Google Scholar, refers to “layered networks.”

19. See Haas, Ernst B., “Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), p. 242CrossRefGoogle Scholar: “The existence of structure must be demonstrated…not prespecified.”

20. See, for example, Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Choucri and North, Nations in Conflict.

21. See Almond, Gabriel and Powell, G. Bingham Jr, System, Process and Policy: Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), chap. 2Google Scholar.

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25. Riker, , Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 12.Google Scholar; Snyder, and Diesing, , Conflict among Nations, p. 349Google Scholar; Cyert, and March, , Behavioral Theory, pp. 99, 124Google Scholar.

26. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, “Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War,” International Studies Quaterly 25 (12 1981), p. 566Google Scholar.

27. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict.

28. As a revised edition of the book, now in progress, may demonstrate.