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Economic structure and international security: the limits of the liberal Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Barry Buzan
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Warwick, Coventry, England.
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Abstract

The theory that a liberal international economic structure is associated positively, and a mercantilist structure negatively, with international security is widespread. But the case in favor of liberalism, and the case against mercantilism, are both one-sided, and the whole attempt to link economic structure to international security anyway overestimates the influence that economic structure has on the use of force. Political and military factors provide explanations more convincing than economic ones for the propensity of states to resort to, or refrain from, the use of force. Liberal and mercantilist structures each have both positive and negative impacts on the use of force, but these impacts become important only when they are complemented by noneconomic factors governing the use of force. Hence security grounds cannot be used convincingly either as a reason for maintaining the current liberal system or as a reason for opposing a shift toward a more mercantilist structure of international economic relations.

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Copyright © The IO Foundation 1984

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