¹ Cf. for example, Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 122–28 and 82–98.Google Scholar

² ibid., p. 69. See also Amitai, Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 45–93Google Scholar; and Lindberg, Leon N., “Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement,” International Organization, vol. 24, no.4, (Autumn 1970), pp. 691–708.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Kerr, Henry H. Jr, “Changing Attitudes Through International Participation: European Parliaments and Integration,” International Organization, vol. 27, no. 1, (Winter 1973), pp. 45–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ The financial support for the conduct of these interviews by Werner Feld came from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace which is hereby gratefully acknowledged.

⁵ Although interview guides were prepared for each meeting with the legislators they were not used in the presence of the interviewees since both American and European politicians are often suspicious of professors carrying casette recorders or notebooks. Following the examples of V. O. Key and Gabriel Almond, the interview guides were filled out as quickly as possible after the interviews had been completed. Thus we avoided inhibitions on the part of the respondents that may have been caused by taking notes in front of them and yet obtained data which were an improvement over unstructured conversations.

⁶ In February 1972 Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou called for the implementation of a “European Europe” and to proceed as quickly as possible with the creation of monetary and economic union. Cf. Kolner Stadt Anzeiger (Cologne) 12 02 1972Google Scholar. Similar declarations were made in the summer of 1973 by Chancellor Brandt and his Foreign Minister Scheel, Walter, Relay From Bonn, vol. 4, no. 135 (08 29, 1973)Google Scholar. The Christian Democratic members of the European Parliament which include the Christian Democratic parties of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, as well as the Conservative Party of Great Britain called for a “European Government” by 1980 during a meeting in October 1973. Agence Europe Bulletin (Brussels) 10 2, 1973.Google Scholar

⁷ Cf. Agence Europe Bulletin, 10 24, 1973Google Scholar, and Die Welt (Hamburg), 10 4, 1973.Google ScholarPubMed

⁸ For the impact of politicization on spill-over see Schmitter, Philippe C., “Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration,” International Organization, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1969), p. 166CrossRefGoogle Scholar. He believes that an increase in the controversiality of joint decision making is likely to lead to a “manifest redefinition of mutual objectives” and that the pursuit of the new objectives may involve an upward shift in either the scope or level of commitment to integration. This in turn could produce a shift in actual expectations and loyalties toward the new regional center. Nye, Joseph S. is more cautious. “Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model,” International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1970), pp. 823–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Nye believes that timing is a crucial element. Clearly, politicization involves more groups in the problem of integration and may increase the number of linkages among societal groups as well as lead to deliberate coalition formation. But there is also a risk that powerful political opposition in the member states will be mobilized which may make it impossible for low cost and quiet technocratic decision making to be effective in attaining integration goals. The final result may well depend on the degree of support that can be built up by legitimizing decision makers and our interviewees certainly fall into this classification.

⁹ There is a voluminous literature available on the role orientations of legislators regarding their relations with constituents. The seminal article, Eulau's, Heinz “The Legislator as Representative: Representational Roles,” in John Wahlke et al., The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962), is required reading.Google Scholar

¹⁰ European Parliament, Documents of Sessions, Report About the General Direct Election of Members of the European Parliament and the Resolution of the Socialist Party Group (Document No. 210, January 28, 1970). See also Agence Europe Bulletin, November 9, 1971, which reports that the President of the European Parliament had called for filing a suit against the Council of Ministers before the Community Court of Justice to force the Council to initiate the process of direct elections.

¹¹ Feld, Cf. Werner, “The National Bureaucracies of the EEC Member States and Political Integration: A Preliminary Inquiry” in International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications, Jordon, Robert S. ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 228–44Google Scholar, and Scheinman, Lawrence and Feld, Werner, “The European Economic Community and National Civil Servants of the Member States,” International Organization, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 1972), pp. 121–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Smith, Keith A., “The European Economic Community and National Civil Servants of the Member States–A Comment,” International Organization, vol. 27, no. 4 (Autumn 1973), pp. 563–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For similar evidence regarding the socialization process affecting executives and technicians of cross-nationally collaborating business firms within the Community, see Feld, Werner J., Transnational Business Collaboration Among Common Market Countries: Its Implication for Political Integration (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 40–51.Google Scholar

¹² Kerr, pp. 60–79.

¹³ The total number of deputies for all nine parliaments is 3,649.

¹⁴ It is interesting to note in this connection mass opinion on the effects of the Common Market on living standards. Forty percent, a surprisingly large percentage, “did not know” or did not answer. Forty-two percent considered them favorably, 18 percent unfavorably. See Rabier, Jacques-Rene, “Europeans and the Unification of Europe,” in Ghita Ionescu, The New Politics of European Integration (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 153–77, esp. pp. 170–1.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Despite the fact that the sample of parliamentarians is perhaps too small to draw general conclusions, the percentage given in table 2 for the distribution of responses by nationality correlate rather well with the mass opinion surveys made in September of 1973 under the direction of Jacques-Rene Rabier as reported in 30 Jours d'Europe, no. 186 (January 1974) pp. 11–17. In early 1973 occasional popular demonstrations against EC membership were observed in Copenhagen. These demonstrations may explain somewhat the responses of the Danish interviewees, half of whom considered EC decision making either “about right” or “too extensive.”

¹⁶ This appears to fly in the face of some of Inglehart's, Ronald findings in his mass surveys. See “Changing Value Priorities and European Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (09 1971), pp. 32–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar, inasmuch as his 25–34 age group is strongly pro-integrationist. However, it confirms the impressions of Feld as suggested in his article, “National Legislators and Political Integration in the European Community,” Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, vol. 6, no. 4, October–December 1972, pp. 11–14.Google Scholar

¹⁷ In view of the time limitation to which elite interviews are often subjected, the ambiguity of the term may have been a virtue rather than a drawback. Obviously President Pompidou and Chancellor Brandt do not agree on its meaning. (See Press Conference of M. Pompidou of September 27, 1973, Ambassade de France, Services de Presse et D'Information, F/73 76–78.)

¹⁸ One percent of income–7 percent of respondents; 3 percent of income–2 percent of respondents; 5 percent of income–10 percent of respondents. The same question was asked by Mennis, Bernard and Sauvant, Peter in “German Business Elites and European Integration” (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 07 1973)Google Scholar, mimeo. See also Rabier, “Europeans and the Unification of Europe,” p. 172, where a question about acceptance of personal sacrifice to achieve the unification of Europe is asked and 65 percent of the respondents appeared to oppose such sacrifices. (Thirty-four percent were unwilling, 22 percent not very willing, and 9 percent did not know or did not answer the question.)

¹⁹ See Schlesinger, Joseph A., Ambitions and Politics: Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 1–21, esp. p. 10.Google Scholar

²⁰ According to our respondents, the main sources of pressure have been the business community, organized labor (especially in Great Britain), agricultural groups (especially in France), and the European Movement.

²¹ Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 147CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Rabier, , “Europeans and the Unification of Europe,” p. 153–77.Google Scholar

²² Campaigns do not always change people's minds, but partisan swings in Britain indicate some campaign effects. Certainly some of the features of the 1968 campaign in France changed minds about voting. But events in France went beyond what we normally think of as campaigning. In the rest of Europe it is our general impression that the voters are more stable, frequently, than the governments. In those countries, and in the US as well, campaigns are useful because they reassure the already-convinced more than they convert former opponents. But no politician would argue that campaigns have no effect at the polls. First, they get out the vote. Secondly, even where electoral participation is high or semi-compulsory (as in Italy) campaigns can affect the individual candidate in a close race with members of other parties or, in some cases, affect his standing in panachage contests with his colleagues.

²³ In both 1970 and 1971 Jacques-Rene Rabier asked an identical question of cross-sectional samples of the populations of the Community nations. The results testify rather eloquently to the accuracy of our respondents' perceptions of their constituents. Rabier asked, “Are you for or against the evolution of the Common Market towards the political creation of the United States of Europe?” The level of disagreement or polarization in each country was moderate as in both years there seemed to be substantial support for the idea. However, in the 1970 poll there was a Community-wide non-response rate of 20 percent. In 1971 the non-response rate rose in every country but Germany. The overall pattern suggests an increasing unwillingness on the part of Europeans to commit themselves, one way or the other, to the idea of United States of Europe. The attitudes of parliamentarians are congruent with the popular reaction to the idea and it is not remarkable that they feel little electoral pressure to push for integration. The pressure simply does not exist within the electorate. See Rabier, , “Europeans and a United Europe,” p. 160, and L'Opinion des Europeens sur les Aspects Regionaux et Agricoles du Marche Commun, L'Unification Politique de l'Europe et l'Information du Public (Bruxelles: Commission des Communautes Europeenes, Direction general de la Presse et de l'information, 1971), esp. p. 50.Google Scholar

²⁴ Kornberg, Allan, Canadian Legislative Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 106, et. seq.Google Scholar

²⁵ The Danes seem to be an exception to the other nationalities. Two-thirds of the Danish respondents considered that mass opinion should very much be taken into account when making judgment about political integration and the same proportion stated that mass opinion has in fact influenced their attitudes toward the usefulness of political integration.

²⁶ See also Niblock, Michael, The EEC: National Parliaments in Community Decision-Making (London: Chatham House, Political and Economic Planning 1971), p.43.Google Scholar

²⁷ Alfred Jaeger, “Das Thema ‘Europa’ im Bundestagswahlkampf 1965” (Forschungsinstitut fuer Politische Wissenschaft und Europaeische Fragen an der Universitaet zu Koeln), mimeo; and DeVree, J. K., “Le Theme europeen dans les elections generales de 1967 du Pays-Bas,” (Europea Institute of the University of Amsterdam), mimeo.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Rabier, Jacques-Rene, “The European Idea and National Public Opinion,” Government and Opposition, vol. 2, no. 3 (04-07, 1969), pp.443–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for an excellent analysis of public opinion attitudes in the Common Market. See also Inglehart, Ronald, “An End to European Integration,” American Political Science Review, vol. 61, no. 1 (03 1967), pp. 91–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar, whose optimism regarding the process of integration, based mainly on attitude surveys of the younger generation, seems to disregard other, more salient factors.

²⁹ See Le Monde (Paris), 05 28, 1968Google ScholarPubMed, and Le Soir (Brussels), 06 2, 1969.Google ScholarPubMed

³⁰ European Community, 03 1971, no. 133, p. 12.Google Scholar

³¹ International Herald Tribune (Paris), 11 11, 1971.Google Scholar

³² See footnote 8. See also Die Zeit, 7 02 1974Google Scholar, and Hannoversche, Neue (Hanover) 15 02 1974 for the hassle over higher CAP food prices for 1974.Google Scholar

³³ See Time, 10 29, 1973Google Scholar, and Agence Europe Bulletin, 10 10, 1973 (editorial).Google Scholar

³⁴ The Times (London) 02 14, 1974.Google ScholarPubMed

³⁵ See The Times 10 11, 1973.Google Scholar

³⁶ Bericht der ad hoc-Gruppe fur die Prüfung der Frage Einer Erweiterung der Befügnnisse des Europäischen Parlaments “Bericht Vedel” Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Beilage 4/72.

³⁷ For example, the French UDR deputies Tribolet and Deloncle, former vice president of the EP. See also Politiken (Copenhagen) May 18, 1973, p. 2, where it is reported that a conservative Danish legislator declared that he would refuse to spend so much time in Strasbourg and thereby neglect his constituency.

³⁸ See Bebr, Gerhard, “The Balance of Powers in the European Communities,” European Yearbook, vol. 5, 1959, pp. 53–79.Google Scholar

³⁹ Niblock, pp. 78, 79.

⁴⁰ See Die Welt, 11 6, 1971Google Scholar. The failure of the working group led to the defection of one SPD Deputy (Klaus Peter Schulz) to the CDU. The SPD claimed that it merely wanted to delay action until the applicant countries (Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland) had become full members. Agence Europe Bulletin, 11 18, 1972.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Das Parlament (Bonn), 03 11, 1972, pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

⁴² Agence Europe Bulletin, 03 17, 1972.Google Scholar

⁴³ See pg. 452, supra.

⁴⁴ For a full discussion of these problems see Steed, Michael, “The European Parliament: The Significance of Direct Election,” in Ghita Ionescu The New Politics of European Integration (New York: Macmillan 1972), pp. 138–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Nassmacher, Karl Heinz, Demokratisierung der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, Europa Union Verlag, GMBH, 1972Google Scholar. The Vedel Report (footnote 36) suggests that the EP, during a transitional period, should have a power of “co-decision” with the Council of Ministers in such matters as the revision of the constituent Community treaties, the admission of new members, and ratification of international agreements. This power would be gradually increased to functional areas such as the CAP, taxation, etc. Co-decision would be more than consultation, but not really a definite veto. For additional suggestions see Thomas, Hugh, Europe: The Radical Challenge (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973), pp. 32–34.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Cf. Schlesinger, pp. 194–99.