¹ Many aspects of the discussion may be relevant to understanding demand for other international collective goods, such as global environmental protection, basic scientific research, international income transfers, etc.

² For a thorough discussion of the concept of collective goods, see Mishan, Edward J., “The Relationship between Joint Products, Collective Goods, and External Effects,” Journal of Political Economy 77 (05 1969), pp. 329–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ For an excellent elaboration and guide to the literature consult Buchanan, James M., The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.), 1968.Google Scholar

⁴ Bohm, Peter, “Estimating Demand for Public Goods: an Experiment,” European Economic Review 3 (06 1972), pp. 111–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Brubaker, Earl R., “Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule: What Does Experimental Evidence Show?” (Mimeograph), Madison, Wisconsin, 1974.Google Scholar

⁵ A person who wouldn't give even a penny to a UN peace and security fund, or to research on cancer, if he thought that he was the only one in the world who was going to do it, might be more than willing to contribute a significant percentage of his income, if there were adequate assurance that a fund sufficient to finance a reasonably effective program would accumulate.

⁶ Douty, Christopher M., “Disasters and Charity: Some Aspects of Cooperative Economic Behavior,” American Economic Review, 62 (09 1972), pp. 580–90.Google Scholar

⁷ Issues related to a broadly construed cost-benefit analysis of voluntary private contributions to international order might include: international peacekeeping as the prerogative of states, peace and security as every member's business, efficacy of negotiations by elites, exacerbation of tensions over control, fiscal and political irresponsibility, amelioration of conflict, expression of desire for international order, frequency and intensity of resort to violence and military spending, and impact on societal development. For detailed treatment of these issues see Padelford's, Norman J.The Financing of Future Peace and Security Operations Under The United Nations, (Mimeograph), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 10 15, 1962Google Scholar; and his Private Support of the United Nations; (Mimeograph), 10 26, 1962Google Scholar; Stoessinger, John G. et al. , Financing the United Nations System (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964)Google Scholar; and Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Strengthening the United Nations (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).Google ScholarPubMed

⁸ The incentive effects of alternative terms under which collective goods are offered to individuals are considered in Bohm's superb analysis.

⁹ Because governments may be able to restrict contributions by their citizens, a pledge stated in terms of the percentage of individuals participating may be especially vulnerable to subversion by a recalcitrant government. Until the international administrator gains some experience in anticipating the probable breadth and intensity of contributions, it may be expedient to state a threshold simply in terms of a target for a total.

¹⁰ Excluding demand for national security programs which may rise even more rapidly.

¹¹ Relative to other commentators. For all we know, the estimate may have been an understatement of the underlying willingness to contribute.

¹² Bloomfield, Lincoln P., Letter to the New York Times, February 25, 1962.Google Scholar

¹³ Stoessinger, p. 261 and Padelford, , Private Support of the United Nations, p. 29Google Scholar. It seems likely that Padelford contributed heavily to the pertinent sections of the Stoessinger book (see its forward).

¹⁴ Larus, Joel, Liquidating the UN's Peacekeeping Arrears (New York: Center for International Studies, New York University, 1968).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Bureau, U.S. of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 07 1972), p. 306Google Scholar. The data do not include contributions in kind which also may have been sizable.

¹⁶ Stoessinger, , pp. 256 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Wainhouse, David W. et al. , National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, vols. 1–5, (Washington: 1970)Google Scholar. The method of aggregation is necessarily quite crude. For example, expenditures for various periods appear to have been totaled with no adjustments for changes in the general level of prices.

¹⁸ For thorough discussions of factors affecting the size of governmental contributions, see Stoessinger and Wainhouse, vol. 2, chapter 4.

¹⁹ Established under agreements reached between Israel and its neighbors in July 1949, UNTSO was to report violations of cease-fire and armistice arrangements.

²⁰ A notable exception to the Soviet Union's legendary opposition was its airlift of soldiers and supplies at the outset of the Congo operation. See Wainhouse, vol. 2, p. 137.

²¹ Gallup Management Research, Inc., Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 65, United Nations, (Princeton, N.J.: 11 1970), pp. 9–11.Google Scholar

²² Eighty-nine percent of those with incomes of $15,000 or more answered “yes.”

²³ As quoted in New York Times, September 20, 1973, p. 2.Google Scholar

²⁴ At the somewhat more abstract level of public general declarations (lip service?) there appears to be a remarkable consensus, in fact virtual unanimity, on the need for strengthening the UN. For one noteworthy example see the joint communique issued in Moscow on May 29, 1972 by Soviet and American governmental leaders.

²⁵ Working Group of 15 on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the UN established by General Assembly Resolution 1620 (XV) of April 21, 1961.

²⁶ France, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Arab Republic, and the US.

²⁷ Bulgaria, the USSR, and the UK.

²⁸ Brazil, Canada, China, India, and Mexico.

²⁹ UN Document A/4971.

³⁰ UN Document A/5790.

³¹ Argentina, Ceylon, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Norway, Rwanda, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Chad, Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Brazil, Congo(Brazzaville), Iceland, Iran, Spain, the Philippines, Upper Volta, Nepal, Congo(Leopoldville), and Nigeria.

³² The USSR, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Central African Republic.

³³ Canada, Chile, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Cambodia, Syria, the US.

³⁴ In 1971 the report of a Presidential Commission stated, “a public drive to solicit private contributions to the UN would be most appropriate and feasible.” Report of the President's Commission for the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 47.Google Scholar

³⁵ Canada, Chile, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Cambodia, and Syria.

³⁶ Russett, Bruce M. and Sullivan, John D., “Collective Goods and International Organization,” International Organization, 25 (Autum 1971), 845–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar