¹ Pruitt, Dean and Snyder, Richard (eds.), Theory and Research on the Causes of War, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 186.Google Scholar

² See Young, Oran R., The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Podell, Jerome E. and Knapp, William M., “The Effect of Mediation on the Perceived Firmness of the Opponent,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13 (12, 1969), p. 513.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also see Stevens, C. M., Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963)Google Scholar and Kerr, Clark, “Industrial Conflict and its Mediation,” American Journal of Sociology, 60 (1954), pp. 230–245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Eckstein, H., Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 8.Google Scholar

⁵ Barkun, Michael, “Conflict Resolution through Implicit Mediation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 8 (06, 1964), p. 126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ A distinction is frequently made among five types of third party intervention as follows: (1) good offices: the intermediary facilitates negotiation by providing a meeting place and/or transmitting messages, (2) inquiry: the intermediary investigates the facts underlying a dispute, (3) mediation: the intermediary presents specific proposals as possible terms for a settlement, (4) arbitration: b'y prior agreement the intermediary's decision constitutes a binding settlement, (5) adjudication: settlement through the procedures of the World Court. In this study, the term mediation is defined broadly to include all of the first three categories.

⁷ Meyer, Arthur, “Function of the Mediator in Collective Bargaining,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 13, No. 2 (01, 1960), p. 161. Quoted in Young, p. 36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ See Lall, Arthur, Modern International Negotiation; Principles and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 84.Google Scholar

⁹ Young, pp. 37–38.

¹⁰ Pruitt and Snyder, p. 186.

¹¹ Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 71.Google Scholar Also see Iklé, F., How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).Google Scholar

¹² Podell and Knapp, pp. 512–513.

¹³ These include the following: (1) Mediation is most likely to be effective with regard to conflicts arising from ignorance, misunderstanding, pride, and specific concrete issues. It is least likely to succeed when one party is challenging the very foundations and fabric of the existing international system. (2) In disputes involving issues of national security and ideology, mediation is both more necessary and more difficult. (3) Mediation is more likely to be effective if the protagonists are roughly equal in power. (4) The services of an intermediary will be more acceptable to the disputants in cases of extreme (e.g., nuclear) crisis.

¹⁴ Young, p. 80.

¹⁵ Three books which deal with the Confrontation and Sabah disputes at some length are: Brackman, Arnold, Southeast Asia's Second Front (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966),Google ScholarBoyce, Peter, Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy (Sidney: Sidney University Press, 1968),Google Scholar and Gordon, B. K., The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966).Google Scholar

¹⁶ This is an important point. As Confrontation wore on, the Malaysian government became increasingly convinced that peace with Indonesia would be impossible so long as Sukarno remained in power. On September 30, 1965, a series of events began in Djakarta, the origin and purpose of which is still the subject of controversy. Apparently the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in conjunction with certain leftist army units attempted a coup d'etat. A number of leading generals (several of them anti-Communist) were murdered in the most brutal fashion. The army reacted with a countercoup that left Sukarno nominally in power but with his political base on the left badly eroded. The army turned first upon the PKI, launching a nationwide blood purge of the party. Gradually Sukarno was eased out of power by General Suharto, the new military leader. Suharto and his colleagues (notably Foreign Minister Adam Malik) were clearly anxious to disassociate themselves from Confrontation. Under the new government, the dispute with Malaysia was gradually composed—at the price of a virtual Indonesian capitulation.

¹⁷ The reasons included: (1) a past history of friendly relations, (2) common membership in the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), (3) an apparent realization in Manila that resort to arms would probably be counterproductive, particularly in view of United States opposition to such a step, (4) a desire in Kuala Lumpur to moderate the dispute both in the hope that the Philippines could eventually be persuaded to drop the claim and for fear that a hard line on Malaysia's part would push Manila into the arms of Djakarta.

¹⁸ For the documents pertaining to the Manila conference, see Malaysia, Department of Information, Malaya-Philippine Relations 31st August, 1957 to 15th September, 1963 (Kuala Lumpur: n.p., n.d.).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 33.

²⁰ See the Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur) and Malay Mail (Kuala Lumpur), 05 26 to 06 4, 1964.Google Scholar

²¹ Straits Times, June 21, 1964.

²² Malaya-Philippine Relations, p. 14, and Straits Times, September 16, 1963.

²³ Malay Mail, April 16, 1964.

²⁴ Straits Times, April 22, 1964.

²⁵ See Malaysia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia's Case in the United Nations Security Council (Kuala Lumpur: n.p., 1965), p. 80Google Scholar and Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates (Dewan Ra'ayat), 10 14, 1964, p. 2358.Google Scholar

²⁶ The motivations for the trip did not all concern international politics. As Roger Hilsman notes, the assassination of President Kennedy had taken place only a few weeks previous and it was thought that Robert Kennedy might benefit from an assignment which could take his mind off the recent tragedy (Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation [New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967], p. 408).Google Scholar

²⁷ Malay Mail, January 22, 1964, and February 5, 1964.

²⁸ Straits Times, January 21 and 22, 1964.

²⁹ Malaysia Ministry of Information, News Release, PEN 2/64/115 (INF), 2/13/64.

³⁰ Interviews with Samad Ismail, Editor of the Malay Mail, August 8, 1967, and with Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid, Lecturer in History at the University of Malaya, October 25, 1967. See also Starner, F. L., “Malaysia's First Year,” Asian Survey, 5 (02, 1965), p. 115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³¹ See Far Eastern Economic Review, January 17, 1963, February 21, 1963, and May 2, 1963.

³² Straits Times, May 29, 1963.

³³ Ibid., May 7 and 8, 1965.

³⁴ Ibid., May 31, 1963. Apparently a Singapore politician, Mrs. Leon-soh, laid the principal groundwork (Malay Mail, May 29, 1963, and an interview with an official of the Malaysian Ministry of Information, November 15, 1967). President Macapagal may have helped convince Federation leaders that Sukarno was sincere in his desire for a meeting. By Manila's account, the idea of a Sukarno-Tunku meeting was first broached by Macapagal during a three-hour stopover by Sukarno in the Philippines on his way to Tokyo for what was announced as a vacation (Straits Times, May 30, 1963).

³⁵ Straits Times, May 29 and 31, 1963.

³⁶ ibid., March 13, 1965.

³⁷ Ibid., April 27, 1965.

³⁸ Ibid., May 3 and 7, 1965.

³⁹ Ibid., January 21, 1963.

⁴⁰ Ibid., April 6, 1963.

⁴¹ Malay Mail, June 4, 1963.

⁴² Ibid., September 19, 1963.

⁴³ Straits Times, November 18, 1963.

⁴⁴ Ibid., February 26, 1964 and Malay Mail, February 27, 1964.

⁴⁵ Malay Mail, June 19, 1964.

⁴⁶ See note 15.

⁴⁷ Straits Times, April 30, 1966.

⁴⁸ Young, pp. 91–92.

⁴⁹ Ibid., ch. 2.

⁵⁰ Inis Claude, , Swords Into Plowshares (4th ed. rev.; New York: Random House, 1971), p. 239.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Young, pp. 103–105.

⁵² Or it just may be the exception that proves the rule. In the Sabah dispute the issue does not arise because both the protagonists, Malaysia and the Philippines, were “aligned” in a manner similar to Thailand.

⁵³ For a development of this argument see Ott, Marvin, “The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign Policy Toward Indonesia and the Philippines: 1957–1965” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1971).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Holsti, K. J., “Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behavior and Some Figures on Procedures,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (09, 1966), p. 290.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁵ Lall, p. 100.

⁵⁶ Claude, for example, cites the ability of a mediator to provide an escape from the “psychological dead-end” that can prolong and exacerbate disputes out of proportion to the substantive points at issue (Claude, pp. 220–221).

⁵⁷ Holsti, p. 285.

⁵⁸ For example, see Claude, p. 229.

⁵⁹ For example, see Young.

⁶⁰ Holsti, pp. 286–287.