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The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 August 2003

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Although international relations scholarship emphasizing the role of social constructs such as norms and culture has established a beachhead in the area of security studies, it has yet to take on another bastion of the rational materialist approach: studies of coercive international bargaining. Scholarship in this area, ranging from the work of Thomas Schelling to James Fearon, has long argued that bargaining outcomes reflect the material costs and benefits faced by participants in negotiations. Participants can influence outcomes, these models assume, only through tactics such as credible threats and side payments that reshape the material context of negotiations.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1999