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2. Wendt, Alexander E., “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. Our approach differs from Wendt's own solution to the agent-structure problem, which imports structuration theory from sociology.

4. Stephenson, William, “Concourse Theory of Communication,” Communication 3 (06 1978), pp. 21–40Google Scholar.

5. Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth A., “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 491–517CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. Ibid., p. 510.

7. Ibid., p. 509.

8. We recognize that nonmicroeconomic kinds of formal theory exist, but microeconomics gives us the most widely used and successful formal approach. For the sake of brevity, we will henceforth refer to formal theory with no qualifier, but “microeconomic” should be understood.

9. For example, see Young, Oran R., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975)Google Scholar; and de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

10. For example, see Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

11. Raiffa, Howard, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 21Google Scholar.

12. Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 109–23Google Scholar.

13. Raiffa, , The Art and Science of Negotiation, pp. 219–21Google Scholar.

14. Axelrod, , The Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 124–41Google Scholar.

15. For example, see Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O., “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Oye, Kenneth A., ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 247Google Scholar.

16. Axelrod, Robert, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” American Political Science Review 80 (12 1986), pp. 1095–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17. Ibid., p. 1096.

18. Young, , Bargaining, p. 391Google Scholar.

19. Haas, Ernst, “Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (04 1980), p. 361CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. The formal approach is consistent with, but not identical to, realist interpretations of the international polity. Unlike realists, formal theorists admit actors other than nation-states and maximands other than power. See Snidal, Duncan, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” in Oye, , Cooperation Under Anarchy, p. 35Google Scholar.

21. Nye, Joseph S., “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371–402CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Ibid., p. 372.

23. Hopkins, Raymond F., “Interests and Regimes: The Subjective Dimension of International Politics,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1987Google Scholar.

24. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 25Google Scholar.

25. Russett, Bruce, “International Interactions and Processes: The Internal vs. External Debate Revisited,” in Finifter, Ada W., ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983), pp. 547–53Google Scholar.

26. Ibid., p. 553.

27. Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of World Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar.

28. For example, see Hermann, Margaret G., “Leader Personality and Foreign Policy Behavior,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods (New York: Sage-Halsted, 1974), pp. 201–34Google Scholar.

29. Mandel, Robert, “Psychological Approaches to International Relations,” in Hermann, Margaret G., ed., Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986), p. 252Google Scholar.

30. Ibid., pp. 262–67.

31. See, for example, Stephenson, William, The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953)Google Scholar.

32. See Brown, Steven R., Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980)Google Scholar; and Brown, Steven R., “Q Technique and Method: Principles and Procedures,” in Berry, William D. and Lewis-Beck, Michael S., eds., New Tools for Social Scientists: Advances and Applications in Research Methods (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1986), pp. 57–76Google Scholar.

33. Stephenson's Q methodology as used here should not be confused with the Q factor analysis used in the past by scholars such as Rudolph Rummel and Bruce Russett. The latter type of analysis lacks the grounding in human subjectivity which is the essence of Stephenson's Q.

34. Q methodology can also be used in nonlinguistic settings, with subjects asked for their reactions to anything from pictures to smells.

35. See, for example, de Mesquita, Bueno, The War Trap, pp. 20–23Google Scholar.

36. The differences between Q and R may be highlighted through reference to the excellent study of the world order concerns of scientists and technologists carried out by Haas, Ernst, Williams, Mary Pat, and Don Babai, in Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar. These authors use standard R techniques, especially open-ended interview questions, in “mapping the cognitive terrain on which current thinking and action is developing” (p. 8). While their work resonates with an interest in subjectivity that is similar to ours, we would argue that it is hamstrung by their use of R rather than Q methods to map this terrain. In Q, we classify respondents according to how they themselves structure their own orientation to a concourse through reference to the universe of statements that can be—and are—made within it. In contrast, Haas, Williams, and Babai develop a classification based on respondents' answers to questions contrived by the survey designers, who must also code the responses. Their typology is ultimately based on responses to just three interview questions (pp. 82–83). Because their three questions clearly do not capture the concourse as a whole, they cannot claim to have modeled the structure of this concourse. Nor are their questions in any sense representative of the concourse; rather, their selection is guided by their prior interests and expectations. Moreover, the resulting taxonomy is less than crystal clear, producing 36.9 percent “eclectics” who fail to fit any of the preconceived types.

37. Indeed, Q can be used to determine if an individual is instrumentally rational. See Brown, Steven R., “The Structure and Form of Subjectivity in Political Theory and Behavior,” paper presented at the meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, 1985Google Scholar.

38. For a discussion of the “good reasons” approach, see Toulmin, Stephen, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

39. Brown, , “Q Technique and Method,” p. 73Google Scholar.

40. The full list of statements is available on request from the authors.

41. Stephenson, William, “Applications of Communication Theory: Part 3—Intelligence and Multivalued Choice,” Psychological Record 23 (Winter 1973), p. 26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42. Our number of statements (thirty-four) is on the low side; most Q studies use forty to sixty statements. We decided to use this smaller number to lighten the cognitive burden on our respondents (many of whom were known to have a first language other than English). In order to do justice to the complexity of the Antarctic concourse, we also had to include a larger number of statements containing both factual and evaluative material (“compound” statements) than is standard. For example, our statement number 1 is “Krill is a much more important Antarctic resource issue than is either minerals or hydrocarbons, and therefore one should not be concerned with possible exploitation of these geological resources.” The use of compound questions and statements has long been regarded suspiciously in opinion research, but recent methodological work suggests that if analysts want to investigate complex attitudes, they have to ask complex (compound) questions. See Hunter, Susan and Sabatier, Paul, “Open-Ended Versus Closed-Ended Questions: Double-Barreled Items Are Part of the Solution,” unpublished paper, 1987Google Scholar.

43. Herein lies another substantial departure from survey research, which requires its interviewers to behave like automatons if the dreaded interviewer bias is to be avoided.

44. van Tubergen, G. Norman and Olins, Robert A., “Mail vs. Personal Interview Administration for Q Sorts: A Comparative Study,” Operant Subjectivity 2 (01 1979), pp. 51–59Google Scholar.

45. Questions are sometimes raised about the ratio of statements to subjects in Q studies, the contention being that a high ratio is required to allow sufficient degrees of freedom in the statistical analysis. Our number of subjects (twenty-three) might appear to be on the high side, given that we only have thirty-four statements. But recent technical work concludes that the ratio of statements to subjects is unimportant, in that a low ratio introduces no real biases. See Arrindel, Willem A. and van der Ende, Jan, “An Empirical Test of the Utility of the Observation-to-Variables Ratio in Factor and Components Analysis,” Applied Psychological Measurement 9 (06 1985), pp. 165–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “On the Ratio of Q Sorts to Statements,” Operant Subjectivity 9 (04 1986), pp. 96–98Google Scholar.

46. Beeby, C. D., “The Antarctic Treaty System as a Resource Management Mechanism: Nonliving Resources,” in Polar Research Board and National Academy of Sciences, Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986), pp. 269–84Google Scholar.

47. Principal components factor analysis followed by varimax factor rotation is the most popular technique.

48. Stephenson, William, “Scientific Creed, 1961: Abductory Principles,” Psychological Record 11 (Winter 1961), p. 10Google Scholar.

49. For a full explication and justification, see Brown, , Political Subjectivity, pp. 208–39Google Scholar.

50. Stephenson, William, “Q Methodology and Newton's Fifth Rule,” American Psychologist 34 (04 1979), p. 355CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51. This structure was produced as follows. First, we rotated the second factor of the original centroid solution (we can call this factor F2) against the first factor (Fl) to align with the midpoint of the orientations of two individuals who were employees of environmental organizations active on Antarctic issues. The resulting “environmental” factor (F2') produced high loadings for several other subjects. When we inspected the new factor 1 (F1') produced by this same rotation, it appeared to be defined by a concern with the preservation of the status quo in the Treaty System. This factor (F1') was therefore “purified” by rotating it against the third factor of our original solution (F3) in order to align it more closely with the orientations of two individuals who, given the governmental positions they occupied, would be expected to be strongly disposed to preserving the Treaty System status quo. Our second rotation yielded two new factors: Fl” and F3’. Because F3’ exhibited no significant loadings, it could be discarded, leaving just two factors of note: Fl” and F2’. These last two factors are reported in the tables and text as Fl and F2.

52. For the computational details, see Brown, , Political Subjectivity, pp. 239–47Google Scholar.

53. Wendt, , “The Agent-Structure Problem,” p. 339Google Scholar.

54. Haggard, and Simmons, , “Theories of International Regimes,” p. 511Google Scholar.

55. Scully, Tucker R., “The Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System: The Institutional Perspective,” in Polar Research Board and National Research Council, Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment, p. 408Google Scholar.

56. Comparability across individuals requires and assumes that the center category in the Q sort is equally indifferent across all the subjects involved.

57. Hopkins, “Interests and Regimes.”

58. Nye, “Nuclear Learning.”

59. Q methodology can in fact be used to distinguish between positions taken freely and positions subtly constrained by external agents. The analyst can act as a kind of critical theorist and administer multiple Q sorts to the same individual under varying conditions, with the intention of revealing to the individual the relation of his or her own positions to positions conducive to the interests of dominant actors.

60. As its name implies, varclus is normally used to cluster variables rather than individuals. But variables in R analysis are like individuals in Q analysis, which is why it can be used here to cluster individuals.

61. The first split produced a correlation of. 65. The lowest correlation produced by the second split was. 53; by the third,. 25; and by the fourth,. 21. This progression constitutes a good statistical reason to stress the results of the third split (which produces four clusters) and to move no further (for doing so produces no substantial decrease in intercluster correlation).

62. Hardin, Garrett, Exploring New Ethics for Survival: The Voyage of the Spaceship Beagle (New York: Viking, 1972)Google Scholar.

63. See the occasional journal ECO, published by Friends of the Earth International in conjunction with international meetings bearing on Antarctica.

64. Haggard, and Simmons, , “Theories of International Regimes,” pp. 510–11Google Scholar.

65. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation.

66. Ascher, William, “The Moralism of Attitudes Supporting Intergroup Violence,” Political Psychology 7 (09 1986), pp. 403–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 127Google Scholar.

68. See also Dryzek, John S. and Hunter, Susan, “Environmental Mediation for International Problems,” International Studies Quarterly 31 (03 1987), pp. 92–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69. See footnote 59.

70. Keohane, Robert O., “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Finifter, , Political Science: The State of the Discipline, p. 533Google Scholar.

71. Groom, A. J. R. and Taylor, Paul, eds., Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations (London: University of London Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

72. See Raiffa, , The Art and Science of Negotiation, pp. 205–17 and 254–55Google Scholar. A single negotiating text means that negotiations proceed through reference to a single set of propositions, usually composed by a third party or minor negotiating party. In contrast, positional negotiations usually begin with and then continue with each protagonist setting out its own position.

73. Cragan, John F. and Shields, Donald C., “Foreign Policy Communication Dramas: How Mediated Rhetoric Played in Peoria in Campaign ‘76,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 63 (10 1977), pp. 274–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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75. See, for example, Nutt, Paul C., “A Strategic Planning Network for Non-Profit Organizations,” Strategic Management Journal 5 (01–03 1984), p. 61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76. Another way of stating our point here is that microeconomics and Q work with different models of man or paradigms of personhood. Microeconomic man is a self-interested maximizer in possession of a well-behaved utility function. Q person is cognitively well organized, communicative, and potentially creative, with many possible rationales for action. Moon points out that research programs in the social sciences are largely defined by the model of man found at their “hard core,” to use the terminology established by Lakatos. See Moon, J. Donald, “The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives,” in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 131–228Google Scholar; and Lakatos, Imre, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs,” in Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, Alan, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91–196CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77. While a truncated Q methodology could be subsumed under microeconomics, it is also the case that Q could claim its own authority over microeconomics. Brown uses Q to test whether an individual is in fact abiding by the maximizing rationality of microeconomics. This is done by administering multiple Q sorts to the same individual under specified conditions (for example, self-interest, conceptions of the public interest, and anger) and determining how each correlates with the individual's expressed disposition to action. Brown concludes that the individual he examines is not an economically rational Downsian voter but, rather, an individual motivated more strongly by impartial (and some emotional) concerns. See Brown, “The Structure and Form of Subjectivity.”

78. See, for example, Searle, John R., Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

79. Gibbons, Michael T., “Interpretation, Genealogy and Human Agency,” in Ball, Terence, ed., Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and Renewal in Political Science (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 141Google Scholar.

80. Foucault, Michel, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977, edited by Gordon, Colin et al. (Brighton: Harvester, 1980)Google Scholar.

81. Our reference to Foucault and discourses raises a connection between our approach and the emerging field of discourse analysis in international relations research. Q methodology can be applied readily to discourse analysis. In fact, Q has already been used by a group of British psychologists to deconstruct and problematize taken-for-granted discourses about health, human rights, sexuality, and so forth. The methodology is the same as that we have outlined for the analysis of concourses. See, for example, Rogers, Rex Stainton and Rogers, Wendy Stainton, “Deconstructing Addiction,” paper presented at the annual conference of the Social Psychological Section of the British Psychological Society, 1988Google Scholar.