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The Suez Canal Dispute: A Case Study in Peaceful Settlement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Robert O. Matthews
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Extract

If the United Nations system is to outlaw the unilateral use of force, except in cases of self-defense, it is clear that some provision must be made for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for peaceful change. In the past, peacekeeping operations have often succeeded in restoring a fragile peace. Yet collective actionall too frequently has been limited to a restoration of the status quo ante. Indeed, states have usuallyfailed to accept any collective responsibility to deal with the grievances that initially led to the outbreak of hostilities. If peace is to be maintained over any extended period of time, peacekeeping operations must not, asAmbassador Arthur J. Goldberg recently warned, “be a sofa to provide a comfortable respite from efforts atpeaceful settlement” but instead should “be a springboard for accelerated efforts to eliminate the root causes of conflict.”

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Articles
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International Organization , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , Winter 1967, pp. 79 - 101
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1967

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References

1 Statement made in the Special Political Committee, December 14, 1965, United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 4748, p. 2.

2 Act of Concession of the Viceroy of Egypt for the Construction and Operation of the Suez Maritime Canal and Appurtenances Between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, Cairo, November 30, 1854, in The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956 (Department of State Publication No. 6392) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 1Google Scholar.

3 Act of Concession of the Viceroy of Egypt, and Terms and Conditions for the Construction and Operation of the Suez Maritime Canal and Appurtenances, Alexandria, January 5, 1856, in ibid., pp. 4–9.

4 Convention Between the Viceroy of Egypt and the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, Cairo, February 22, 1866, in ibid., p. 15.

5 Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, N.J: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), Vol. 1, p. 177Google Scholar.

6 Circular of January 3, 1883, cited in Hurewitz, Vol. 1, p. 197.

7 See Hurewitz, Vol. 1, pp. 202, 263–265.

8 Article I. The text of the Convention Between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, Constantinople, October 29, 1888, can be found in The Suez Canal Problem, pp. 12–20.

9 See Hurewitz, Vol. 11, p. 100.

10 Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty, in respect of the United Kingdom, and His Majesty the King of Egypt, cited in Watt, D. C., Britain and The Suez Canal (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962), p. 35Google Scholar.

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12 See Britain, Great, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 531 (07 26–10 29, 1954), pp. 816–820Google Scholar.

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16 For the full text of Nasser's statement on August 2, 1956, in which he rejected the invitation to attend the London Conference see The Suez Canal Problem, pp. 47–52.

17 Britain and France argued that the Canal Company was endowed with public international personality which gave it immunity from nationalization; they also declared that the international character of the Canal or its waters provided a right to operate the Canal through an international agency such as the Suez Canal Company.

18 Ibid., p. 236.

19 See ibid., pp. 327–330.

20 See the letter from UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to Egypt's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi, dated October 24, 1956, found in Wint, Guy and Calvocoressi, Peter, Middle East Crisis (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1957), pp. 138–141Google Scholar.

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23 Ibid., pp. 555–556.

24 Ibid., p. 519.

25 As reported by Robertson, Terence, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (London: Hutchison, 1965), p. 89Google Scholar.

26 The New York Times, August 3, 1956, p. 1.

27 Eden, p. 480.

28 Reported by Robertson, p. 121.

29 Hurewitz, J. C., in a commentary on Robert Strausz-Hupé's “The US and the Middle East,” in Thayer, Philip (ed.), Tensions in the Middle East (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 21Google Scholar.

30 As stated by SirCorea, Claude at the first London Conference, in The Suez Canal Problem, p. 143Google Scholar.

31 See the statement of Australia's Prime Minister R. G. Menzies in his letter to Nasser of September 7, 1956, in ibid., pp. 309–310.

32 Ibid., p. 139.

33 Lloyd, Selwyn, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Security Council Official Records (11th year), 735th meeting, 10 5, 1956, p. 7Google Scholar.

34 Article 1, paragraph I. Italics added.

35 Corbett, Percy E., “Power and Law at Suez,” International Journal, Winter 1956–1957 (Vol. 12, No. 1), p. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Julius Stone argued in a similar manner that in such circumstances a minimal regard for law and justice in inter-State relations might require the use of force in due time to vindicate diese standards, and avoid even more catastrophic resort to force at a later stage.

(Aggression and World Order [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958], p. 43Google Scholar.)

36 Tripartite Statement of August 2, 1956, in The Suez Canal Problem, p. 35.

37 Robertson, p. 86.

38 Statement issued on August 12. See The Suez Canal Problem, pp. 47–52. The only other state which declined an invitation was Greece.

39 See ibid., pp. 288–289.

40 Quoted by Menon in ibid., p. 239.

41 Quoted by the Iranian representative in Security Council Official Records (11th year), 737th meeting, 10 8, 1956, pp. 12–13Google Scholar.

42 Sec Robertson, p. 87.

43 See The Suez Canal Problem, pp. 327–330.

44 Robertson, pp. 96–97.

45 Ibid., p. 108.

40 Statement made by Eden in the House of Commons on September 12, as quoted in his memoirs, p. 538.

47 Quoted by Robertson, pp. 111–112.

48 Corbett, , International Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 8Google Scholar.

49 UN Document S/3645.

50 UN Document S/3654.

51 UN Document S/3656.

52 Robertson, p. 141.

53 Originally contained in the draft resolution submitted by France and the United Kingdom (UN Document S/3671) and adopted by the Council in Resolution S/3675.

54 Quoted in the United Nations Review, 11 1956 (Vol. 3, No. 5), p. 59Google Scholar.

55 Security Council Official Records (11th year), 742nd meeting, 10 13, 1956, p. 7Google Scholar.

56 Eden, p. 568.

57 Robertson's study is based on personal interviews with many of those actors most closely involved in the dispute. According to Robertson the story of the collusion is substantiated by Pineau and other French leaders.

58 Murphy, Robert, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1964), p. 382Google Scholar.

59 Iklé, Fred Charles, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 143Google Scholar.

60 Ibid., p. 157.

61 See Pruitt, Dean G., “Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action,” in Kelman, Herbert C. (ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), pp. 400–401Google Scholar.

62 Murphy, p. 384.

63 Eden, pp. 497–498.

64 Fisher, Roger, “Fractionating Conflicts,” Daedalus, Summer 1964 (Vol. 93, No. 3), pp. 920–941Google Scholar. In effect this was what the Secretary-General was trying to do. It is clear from his letter to Fawzi that he was attempting to isolate technical questions from the political struggle.

65 Iklé, p. 52.

66 Richard Neustadt, in die recent Radner Lectures at Columbia University, argued that Anglo-American misunderstanding did not result as much from a failure to communicate as from an inability to comprehend each other's “rules of die game,” which led in turn to the mutual misperception of each odier's point of view.

67 See Deutsch, Morton, “Trust and Suspicion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 1958 (Vol. 2, No. 4), pp. 265–279CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68 Jackson, Elmore, Meeting of Minds (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), pp. 137–145Google Scholar.