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The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

John R. Oneal
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, and National Fellow, 1989–90, at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California.
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Abstract

Mancur Olson's theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early years of the Cold War, but the association between economic size (gross domestic product, or GDP) and defense burden (the ratio of military expenditures to GDP) has declined to insignificant levels. Two influences are shown to be important in producing this change: the increased pursuit of private goods by Greece, Turkey, and Portugal and the growing cooperation among the other European allies. Since cooperation in the military realm has not provided the Europeans with credible means of self-defense, it appears to be a consequence of the general growth of interdependence in Europe during the postwar period. NATO is still essentially a uniquely privileged group producing a relatively pure public good. Accordingly, the theory of collective action continues to provide valuable insights into the operation of the alliance.

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Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1990

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