¹ For studies of China's participation in the United Nations system during the Maoist period of 1971–1976, see the following: Bissell, Richard E., “A Note on the Chinese View of United Nations Finances,” American Journal of International Law 69 (07 1975): 628–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bettai, M., “La Chine aux Nations Unies et le désarmement,” Revue Beige de Droit International 10 (1974): 563–88Google Scholar; Chai, Trong R., “Chinese Policy Toward the Third World and the Superpowers in the UN General Assembly 1971–1977: A Voting Analysis,” International Organization 33 (Summer 1979): 391–403CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feeney, William R., “Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations,” Asian Survey 17 (09 1977): 809–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “The PRC and the United Nations, 1971–75,” Current Scene 14 (02 1976): 1–15Google Scholar; “The Participation of the PRC in the United Nations,” in Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications, ed. by Hsiao, Gene T. (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 104–34Google Scholar; Focsaneanu, L., “La République Populaire de Chine à L'ONU, problémes politiques et de sécurité,” Annuaire François de Droit International 20 (1974): 115–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kim, Samuel S., “The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: A Preliminary Analysis,” World Politics 26 (04 1974): 299–330CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Behavioural Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy,” China Quarterly, no. 72 (12 1977): 713–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “The People's Republic of China and the Charter-Based International Legal Order,” American Journal of International Law 72 (–04 1978): £317–49Google Scholar; “China and World Order,” Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy 3 (05 1978): 555–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; China, the United Nations, and World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Lichtenstein, Natalie G., “The People's Republic of China and Revision of the United Nations Charter,” Harvard International Law Journal 18 (Summer 1977): 629–47Google Scholar; Stoessinger, John G., “China and the United Nations,” in Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications, pp. 97–103Google Scholar; and Tche-hao Tsien, “Conception et pratique du droit international public en Republique populaire de Chine,” Journal du Droit International, no. 4 (1976): 863–97Google Scholar.

₂ See GAOR, 26th Sess., 1996th plenary meeting (26 November 1971), paras. 133, 136; GAOR, 26th Sess., A/C.1/PV.1847 (9 December 1971), para. 95; UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.2084 (11 November 1975), p. 18.

³ For example, the ratio between the number of resolutions adopted and the number of roll-call or recorded votes during the 29th Session of the General Assembly in 1974 was 158 to 55. The major flaw in Chai's voting analysis lies in his methodological assumption that Chinese politics in the General Assembly can be objectively described and analyzed by counting yes, no, and abstaining votes (and ignoring “nonparticipation in the vote”) without comparing such voting behavior with other kinds of behavior in the Assembly. See Chai, “Chinese Policy.”

⁴ For an elaboration of this point, see Kim, , China, the United Nations, and World Order, pp. 73–82Google Scholar.

⁵ For illustrative examples in which China defined a superpower in motivational and behavioral terms, see UN Doc. A/8536 (24 November 1971), p. 3 and GAOR, 26th Sess., 1995th plenary meeting (24 November 1971), para. 40.

⁶ UN Doc. A/32/PV. 13 (29 September 1977), p. 56.

⁷ For my elaboration of this argument, see “Normative Foreign Policy: The Chinese Case,” International Interactions?, 8, nos. 1–2 (1981): 51–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ For a complete English text of the speech, see UN Doc. A/34/PV. 11 (27 September 1979), pp. 63–92; a full Chinese text is published in Renmin Ribao (hereafter cited as RMRB), 29 September 1979, pp. 5–6, emphasis added.

⁹ See UN Doc. A/35/PV.9 (25 September 1980), pp. 26–46.

¹⁰ These comments are taken from the official transcription of Deng's 5 January 1979 interview with American journalists in Peking, as published in Beijing Review (hereafter cited as BR), no. 2 (12 01 1979): 17–18Google Scholar, emphasis added.

¹¹ New York Times, 17 January 1980, p. A3.

¹² RMRB, 8 June 1980, p. 4, emphasis added.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ See New York Times, 8 December 1980, pp. Al, A7.

¹⁵ See Feeney, William R., “Chinese Global Politics in the UN General Assembly,” in Hsiung, James C. and Kim, Samuel S., eds., China in the Global Community (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 144Google Scholar.

¹⁶ For a comprehensive study of China's changing relations with African countries, see Ogunsanwo, Alaba, China and Africa 1971–1980 (London: Allen&Unwin, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Legally, it would have been easier to argue that China's first use of force in launching a “pedagogical war” against another independent country, notwithstanding Vietnam's prior invasion of Kampuchea (China's protectorate), was a prima facie case of “aggression” as defined by General Assembly Resolution 3314 adopted on 14 December 1974.

¹⁸ RMRB, 19 June 1980, p. 6, emphasis added.

¹⁹ For China's response to the Havana Summit Conference, see “The Non-Aligned Movement Continues to Advance,” editorial. RMRB, 14 September 1979, pp. 1,4.

²⁰ See Chai, , “Chinese Policy,” p. 403Google Scholar; Kim, , “Behavioural Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy,” p. 740Google Scholar; China, the United Nations, and World Order, pp. 158–61, 494–96.

²¹ Both the Soviet Union and China joined the majority of 114, while Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United States cast 4 negative votes, with 26 member states abstaining and 8 member states absent. For details, see UN Docs. A/34/791 (11 December 1979), pp. 1–7; A/C.l/34/PV.5C (30 November 1979), pp. 41–52, 76–83.

²² For increasing Soviet use of the hegemonism frame of reference in criticizing Chinese foreign policy, see Kapchenko, N., “The Threat to Peace From Peking's Hegemonistic Policy,” International Affairs (Moscow), no. 2 (1980): 66–77Google Scholar; “Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance with Imperialism,” International Affairs (Moscow), no. 3 (1980): 45–57Google Scholar.

²³ See “In Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the Fatherland Liberation War of Korea,” editorial, RMRB, 25 June 1980, p. 1.

²⁴ On 25 August 1972, China (the PRC) cast its first veto, on the Bangladesh membership question. On 10 September 1972, China cast its second veto, on an amendment to a three-power draft resolution on the Middle East question (S/10784). The Chinese refused to regard this latter as a veto, and its impact was considerably diluted because (1) it was a nonsolo veto; (2) it was on an amendment, not on a draft resolution; and (3) the original draft resolution itself was vetoed by another permanent member (USA). Between 23 November 1971, when PRC made its debut in the Council, and 30 April 1980, the veto record of the Big Five is as follows: 21 by the United States; 12 by the United Kingdom; 9 by the Soviet Union; 7 by France; and 2 by China.

²⁵ See United Nations Chronicle 17 (April 1980): 42.

²⁶ UN Doc. A/C.1/31/PV. 5O (2 December 1976), p. 6.

²⁷ For a detailed discussion and analysis of the preparatory process leading up to the convocation of the 10th Special Session, see Sohn, Louis B., “Disarmament at the Crossroads,” International Security 2 (Spring 1978): 4–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ See RMRB, 30 May 1978, pp. 2, 4, and 9 June 1978, p. 5; Peking Review (hereafter cited as PR), no. 22 (2 06 1978), pp. 5–13Google Scholar and no. 24 (16 June 1978), pp. 22–24; UN Docs. A/S-10/PV.7 (29 May 1978), pp. 53–81; A/S-10/PV.27 (30 June 1978), pp. 104–117.

²⁹ PR, no. 24 (16 06 1978), p. 23Google Scholar, emphasis added.

³⁰ Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report–People's Republic of China (hereafter cited as FBIS-PRC), 11 August 1980, p. Al.

³¹ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sweden), Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1975 (Stockholm, 1977), p. 121Google Scholar.

³² China decided not to take up its reserved seat at the first session of the CD, which opened in Geneva on 24 January 1979. When the second session convened on 14 June 1979, China's reserved seat remained empty, and when the session ended on 14 August 1979, China complained that the superpowers still dominated the proceedings of the CD and that “the role of the CD is very questionable.” However, China informed the Secretary-General on 10 December 1979 that it would participate in the CD in February 1980.

³³ See UN Doc. CD/PV.53 (5 February 1980), p. 24.

³⁴ See the Working Paper China submitted to the CD, in UN Doc. CD/102, pp. 2–3.

³⁵ For the positions taken by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France on the no-first-use principle at the SSOD, see UN Docs. A/S-10/PV.5; A/S-10/PV.26;A/S-10/PV.27;A/S-10/AC.l/4;andA/S-10/AC.l/30.

³⁶ For this line of reasoning, see Commentator, “The Current Danger of War and the Defense of World Peace,” Hongqi (Red Flag), no. 11 (1979), pp. 53–58Google Scholar and Youwei, Chen, “Why Recall the Year 1939?” RMRB, 16 07 1980, p. 7Google Scholar.

³⁷ See Special Commentator, “The Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination,” RMRB, 11 January 1980, p. 7.

³⁸ See Chu, Wu, “America's New Nuclear Strategy,” RMRB, 23 08 1980, p. 7Google Scholar.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ See Lewis, John Wilson, “China's Military Doctrines and Force Posture,” in Fingar, Thomas, ed., China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 197Google Scholar.

⁴¹ General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974; General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974; and General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974.

⁴² The Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly adopted on 16 September 1975 an omnibus resolution–General Assembly Resolution 3362 (S-VII)–spelling out a broad set of NIEO implementation guidelines for the UN development system.

⁴³ For a detailed analysis of China's engagement in NIEO politics from its inception through mid 1977, see Kim, , China, the United Nations, and World Order, pp. 242–333Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ This metaphor was used by Ambassador Huang Hua in his speech before theAd Hoc Committee of the 6th Special Session. See GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Ad Hoc Committee, 10th meeting (18 April 1974), para. 15.

⁴⁵ See the 1979 New Year editorial in RMRB, 1 January 1979, p. 1.

⁴⁶ See Sigurdson, Jon, “Technology and Science–Some Issues in China's Modernization,” in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 476–534Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ For analyses along these lines, see respectively Copper, John Franklin, China's Global Role (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Pollack, Jonathan D., “China's Potential As a World Power,” (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, P-6524, 06 1980)Google Scholar; and Clark, Ian, Reform and Resistance in the International Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 139–42Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ For an elaboration of China's policy toward the UNDP during the Maoist period, see Kim, , China, the United Nations, and WorldOrder, pp. 315–28Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ UN Doc. DP/SR. 629 (26 January 1979), p. 8.

⁵⁰ For details, see UN Doc. DP/GC/Jan. 79/CRP. 1 (18 January 1979), p. 2.

⁵¹ UN Doc. DP/SR.629 (26 January 1979), pp. 8–9.

⁵² One of the major reforms introduced in the UNDP's organizational and procedural matters in the early 1970s was to replace the former, ad hoc, first-come-first-served method with “country programming,” a method of dividing up the bulk of UNDP's predictable resources over a five-year cycle (1972–1976, 1977–1981, 1982–1986, etc.) on a country-by-country basis, with smaller allocations (about 15% of total resources) for regional, interregional, and global programs.

⁵³ The UNFPA program is designed to help China (whose population is now estimated at 975.23 million, or about one-fourth of the world population) by introducing new technologies and advanced equipment needed in such population-related activities as basic data collection and analysis, population dynamics and policy formulation, maternal and child health, human reproduction and contraceptive research, contraceptive production, and population publicity and education. For details, see UN Doc. DP/FPA/1 I/Add.22 (14 May 1980), pp. 1–11.

⁵⁴ See UN Doc. A/C.5/34/SR.3 (25 September 1979), pp. 4–6. For background information, see Report of the Committee on Contributions, GAOR, 34th Sess., Supplement 11 (A/34/11).

⁵⁵ Report of the Committee on Contributions, GAOR, 34th Sess., Supplement 11 (A/34/11), Annex IV, p. 49Google Scholar, emphasis added.

⁵⁶ In striking contrast, Chinese trade, scientific and other delegations were visiting the United States at a rate of about 140 groups a month in late 1980 and there were nearly 5,000 Chinese scholars and students studying in the United States in 1980 as against the 1978 projection of 500.

⁵⁷ See Li Qiang's major policy speech before the plenary session of the 11th Special Session of the General Assembly in UN Doc. A/S-l 1PV.7 (29 August 1980), pp. 16–27.

⁵⁸ For a careful delineation of three models of international political economy–this paper follows the descriptions of the three models–see Gilpin, Robert, “Three Models of the Future,” International Organization 29 (Winter 1975): 37–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁹ For a superb normative analysis of the problems and prospects of the North-South negotiations, focusing on the deadlock of the 11th Special Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1980, see ul-Haq, Mahbub, “Negotiating the Future,” Foreign Affairs 59 (Winter 1980/1981): 398–417CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁰ For a valiant theoretical attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the term “market socialism,” see Muqiao, Xue, “Planned Adjustment and Market Adjustment,” RMRB, 13 10 1980, p. 5Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Ye Jianying at the meeting in celebration of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the PRC declared: “At present, the four modernizations constitute the pivot of our political life.… The work of every district, every department and every unit, right down to every single individual, as well as the credit due to it, will be judged by its direct and indirect contribution to modernization.” See “Comrade Ye Jianying's Speech,” BR, no. 40 (5 10 1979), p. 23Google Scholar.

⁶² See UN Doc. A/C.4/33/SR.27 (28 November 1979), p. 21.

⁶³ See “The Big Borrower Cometh,” Economist (London), 17 05 1980, p. 13Google Scholar; Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 25 04 1980, pp. 85–87Google Scholar, and New York Times, 18 April 1980, p. Dl.

⁶⁴ China Business Review (November-December 1979), p. 36.

⁶⁵ See China Economic Report 1 (10 1980), p. 3Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ In accepting the Chinese data and publishing them in its latest annual development report, the World Bank added the following explanation: “The GNP per capita figure of $230 reported for China is based on the official estimate of ‘net material product’ released by the Government, plus an allowance for depreciation and for services not covered by that concept. These data were received only recently, and analysis to assure that the data are reasonably comparable to those of other countries has not yet been possible.” See The Bank, World, World Development Report 1980 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1980), pp. 111, 158CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁷ On 16 November 1971, the Governing Body of the ILO decided by a vote of 36 to 3 with 8 abstaining to recognize the government of the PRC as the representative of China, but the PRC refused to respond, without official explanation, until mid 1980.

⁶⁸ New York Times, 29 October 1980, p. A5.

⁶⁹ UN Doc. A/34/PV.35 (16 October 1979), pp. 48–50. See also editorial, RMRB, 1 June 1980, p. 1.

⁷⁰ UN Press Release ICEF/1472 (30 May 1980), p. 2.

⁷¹ For Kissinger's view, see White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 1049–1096Google Scholar. It is generally conceded that Brzezinski had successfully overcome Cyrus Vance's opposition in developing a closer strategic cooperation with Peking during the Carter administration. His banquet toast in Peking in the summer of 1978, “We recognize–and share–China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony,” was greatly appreciated by his Chinese hosts as being a “realistic” assessment of the current international situation.

⁷² See Fa, Yan, “On Disarmament Issues,” Hongqi, no. 11 (31 05 1980): 45–48. The quoted statement is at p. 48, emphasis addedGoogle Scholar.

⁷³ New York Times, 19 January 1981, p. A14.

⁷⁴ It is interesting to note in this connection that the comprehensive Chinese-English Dictionary (Hanying cidian), which was compiled by the Chinese-English Dictionary editorial committee of the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute during the period beginning in 1971 and ending in the summer of 1978, defined menhu kaifang zhengci as “‘Open Door’ policy (which U.S. imperialism once foisted on China to secure the same privileges as the other imperialist powers)” (p. 464).

⁷⁵ See RMRB, 7 June 1980, p. 8, and 9 June 1980, p. 8.

⁷⁶ For a detailed analysis of Chinese legal practice during the Maoist period, see my “The People's Republic of China and the Charter-Based International Legal Order,” American Journal of International Law 62 (04 1978): 317–49Google Scholar. For an analysis of Chinese legal practice in the postMao era, see my “Normative Foreign Policy.”

⁷⁷ For a discussion of the contending approaches to world order, see Falk, Richard A., “Contending Approaches to World Order,” Journal of International Affairs 31 (Fall/Winter 1977): 171–98Google Scholar. See also Farer, Tom J., “The Greening of the Globe: A Preliminary Appraisal of the World Order Models Project (WOMP),” International Organization 31 (Winter 1977): 129–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Falk, Richard A., “The World Order Models Project and Its Critics: A Reply,” International Organization 32 (Spring 1978): 531–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁸ This statement is taken from a June 1979 address on foreign policy delivered by Vice Premier Ji Pengfei, Director of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, to an audience of Chinese diplomats in Peking, appearing in Chung Pao (Hong Kong), translated in FBIS-PRC, 18 March 1980, p. U4.