¹ 94 percent of the people with insufficient calorie or protein intake lived in the developing countries of Asia (excluding the planned economies), Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. See the UN Preliminary Assessment of the World Situation (Rome, 1974)Google Scholar.

² Cf. National Academy of Sciences (Committee on World Food), Population and Food: Critical Issues (Washington D.C.: 1975)Google Scholar which stresses the role of economic and political variables, as do most of the articles in the special food issue of Scientific American (September, 1976). Francis Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins present an argument for the primacy of economic and political relations in establishing the poverty which produces hunger in “Food Self-Reliance” (mimeo), Institute for Food and Development Studies, 1975, and in their book, Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1977)Google Scholar. Griffin, Keith presents links between poverty and socio-economic structures in his books, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974)Google Scholar and Land Concentration and Rural Poverty (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976)Google Scholar. Sinha, Radha, Food and Poverty(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976)Google Scholar, explores both issues jointly. The Bariloche model attempts to demonstrate some alternate economic structures, capable of meeting minimal food needs, when more egalitarian distributions of wealth are posited. See Herrera, Amilcar O. et al. , Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American World Model (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, nd)Google Scholar.

³ The problems, in order of discussion, are global food shortages, instability, food imports by LDCs, low productivity and poverty, and malnutrition. See the introduction to this volume by Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala.

⁴ Through most of the post-war period, until 1972, food supplies were generally in excess both of effective international demand and global “reserve requirements.” Prices for grains were extremely stable, and international prices were below the support prices for American agriculture—requiring export subsidies through most of the 1950s and 1960s. Importers were advantaged, both by concessional sales (primarily for LDCs) and by the competition among major exporting countries in offering attractive credit. For a discussion of the problems of coordinating action to avoid further depressing prices and prohibiting “unfair” market development efforts, see Bard, Robert L., Food Aid and International Agricultural Trade: A Study in Legal and Administrative Control (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1972)Google Scholar.

⁵ See, for example, Levinson, F. James, Morinda: An Economic Analysis of Malnutrition Among Children in Rural India (Cambridge, Mass: International Nutrition Policy Series, 1974)Google Scholar, which also provides some discussion of the nutrition literature. For a good case study of the economic and political dimensions of one particular famine, see Roberts, R., Famine in Russia 1891–92 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁶ Reutlinger, Shlomo and Selowsky, Marcelo, Malnutrition and Poverty: Magnitude and Policy Options (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins for the World Bank, 1976)Google Scholar.

⁷ Reutlinger and Selowsky project 1975 levels from a 1965 data base. The estimate in the text assumes a calorie income elasticity of 0.15, and the following rates of annual per capita growth in income (operating over the 1965–75 period): Latin America—3 percent, Asia—2 percent, Middle East—6 percent, and Africa—2 percent. Cf. pp. 26–32.

⁸ Ibid. pp. 30–1. For a fuller discussion of undernutrition, see Austin's essay in this volume.

⁹ Seevers, in this volume.

¹⁰ The literature on reserves suggests the meaning of “over most weather and price fluctuations.” Based upon historical patterns of shortfall (by implication in the present system price increases), one can calculate the quantity of grain needed to cover some desired percentage of deviation from trend. Many people writing on reserves argue for coverage of about 95 percent. See, for example, Easton, David, Steele, W. Scott, Cohen, Jared L., and ReVelle, Charles S., “A Method to Size World Grain Reserves: Initial Results,” in Analysis of Grain Reserves, (Washington, D.C., USDA/ERS, 08, 1976)Google Scholar. The grain could be physically stored (e.g., standard reserve proposals) or come from changes in the consumption of wealthier customers (e.g., the reallocation of grain from livestock sectors of market-oriented exporters in 1973/4). Mechanisms for insuring the transfer can include price (with import insurance and subsidization for poorer LDCs) or pre-established release rules. See Johnson, D. Gale and Sumner, Daniel, “An Optimization Approach to Grain Reverves for Developing Countries” in Analysis of Grain Reserves, pp. 56–76Google Scholar.

¹¹ Seevers, in this volume.

¹² For a general discussion of the factors affecting nutritional adequacy, see Levinson, especially pp. 1–12. Griffin, Political Economy, discusses the general economic factors affecting poverty and production in rural areas. Recognition of underemployment (rural and urban) as a basic cause of hunger, albeit from a different perspective, is found in Mellor, John, The New Economics of Growth (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976)Google Scholar. A discussion of the obstacles to helping the bottom 40 percent in agricultural projects is found in Lele, Uma, Design for Rural Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins for the World Bank, 1975)Google Scholar.

¹³ Lele, ibid., pp. 28–32, discusses situations in which greater emphasis on export production (without increases in the efficiency of food production) leads to decreased local food supplies. A sharper, more polemical, criticism is contained in Ledogar, Robert J., Hungry for Profits: US Food and Drug Multinationals in Latin America (New York: International Documentation, 1976)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ For a discussion of the possible consequences of pricing and marketing policies on production, see US Department of State, Agency for International Development, Providing Economic Incentives to Farmers: Increases in Food Production in Developing Countries, a Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 05 13, 1976)Google Scholar. For a general discussion of disincentive producing policies in LDCs, see Government Accounting Office (GAO), Disincentives to Agricultural Production (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1976)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Cf. the analysis of Chenery, Hollis et al. , Redistribution With Growth (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank and the Institute for Development Studies, 1974), esp. pp. 113–156Google Scholar.

₁₆ For a perspective that is pessimistic about the possibility of such a strategy, see Brown, Lester and Eckholm, Erik, By Bread Alone (New York: Praeger, 1975)Google Scholar and Eckholm, Erik, Losing Ground (New York: Norton, 1976)Google Scholar. The focus on production is pervasive in the policy orientation of food-oriented agencies. See, for example, Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985, FAER #98 (Washington, D.C., 12, 1974)Google Scholar and International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Meeting Food Needs in the Developing World: The Location and Magnitude of the Task in the Next Decade (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 02, 1976)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Cf. Lappe and Collins, Food First and Ledogar, Hungry for Profits.

¹⁸ This is essentially the position taken by Mellor, who differs from advocates of a capital-intensive, industrialization-oriented development strategy in his emphasis on labor-intensive production and agriculture as a “leading sector,” but nonetheless argues that deep problems in the rural areas cannot be solved in the agricultural production sector. Hence, he argues for a big push toward increasing production (to the benefit of large and medium size farmers) and a labor-intensive attempt to meet their new consumption needs, thus creating employment for the poor. This is, at root, a new “trickle down” theory which relies on changes in other sectors to alleviate undernutrition and poverty.

¹⁹ For discussion see Schumacher, E. F., Small is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered (New York: Harper and Row, 1973)Google Scholar. This is basically the position implied by the emphasis current in the World Bank on assisting the “bottom 40 percent,” as presented in Chenery et al. A review of this literature is presented by Oshima, Harry T., “New Directions in Development Strategies,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 25:3 (04, 1977) pp. 555–77Google Scholar.

²⁰ This is the claim of Lappe and Collins, and is discussed sympathetically in Griffin. Especially regarding land reform, authors unwilling to call for a thorough-going restructuring of society have argued for change in rural land-holding patterns. Cf., for example, Koo, Anthony Y., “An Economic Justification for Land Reformism,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 25:3 (04, 1977), 523–38Google Scholar.

²¹ See, for example, the discussion of India's adoption of high yielding varieties in Frankel, F. R., India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

²² Mellor, John, The Economics of Agricultural Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 57–66Google ScholarPubMed.

²³ Mellor, New Economics, reviews the literature on this topic.

²⁴ See Schertz, Lyle, “World Food Prices and the Poor,” Foreign Affairs 52:3 (04, 1974), 511–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

₂₅ For detailed descriptions of the consumption patterns for most LDCs, making this pattern clear, see the food balance sheets in FAO, Agricultural Commodity Projections, 1970–1980, volume II, pp. 85–407Google Scholar.

²⁶ In 1975, over 65 percent of consumer expenditures on food were accounted for by the processing and marketing of foods. USDA, Handbook of Agricultural Charts, Agricultural Handbook #504, 10, 1976, p. 30Google Scholar.

²⁷ Reutlingerand Selowsky, pp. 28–31.

²⁸ There are now numerous indications that certainly greater inequality, and perhaps absolute declines in living standards, are the consequences development has for the poorer people in LDCs. Cf. Adelman, Irma and Morris, Cynthia, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973)Google Scholar, Paukert, Felix, “Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development” in International Labour Review (08–09. 1973)Google Scholar, Keith Griffin and Azizur, “Rural Poverty: Trends and Explanation” (mimeo) and Griffin's, Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia (New York: Universe, 1976)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Reutlinger and Selowsky, pp. 26–9.

³⁰ USDA–ERS, World Food, p. 17.

³¹ See the definition of food production and the statistical evidence in FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture, 1975 (Rome, 1976), p.xGoogle Scholar.

³² For the quantities of grain required to produce a pound of different kinds of animal protein, see Lappe, Francis Moore, Diet for a Small Planet (New York: Ballantine for Friends of the Earth, 1973)Google Scholar.

³³ USDA, ERS, Growth in World Demand for Feed Grains Related to Meat and Livestock Products and Human Consumption of Grain (Washington, D.C.: 07, 1970)Google Scholar presents estimates of the grain/meat ratios at different levels of per capita income—essentially reflecting the extent to which livestock are grain fed. These ratios, rather than the current American ratio, were used in estimating the indirect consumption of LDC regions.

³⁴ Reutlinger and Selowsky, p. 25.

³⁵ Production figures are taken from FAO Production Yearbook, vol. 28–1 (1974), p. 42Google Scholar.

³⁶ Schertz, Lyle, “World Needs: Shall the Hungry Be With Us Always?” in Brown, Peter and Shuh, Henry, Food Policy: The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices (New York, Free Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

³⁷ ERS/USDA, World Food, p. 20Google Scholar.

₃₈ Computed from data printout provided by Economic Research Service/Foreign Agricultural Service, United States Department of Agriculture (Sept. 1976).

³⁹ Indeed, both countries now have “surpluses” in several major commodities—the EC in dairy products and soft wheat, Japan in rice. In part, this reflects Engles' law and decreasing direct cereal consumption. In part, it reflects policies to subsidize agriculture. See OECD, Agricultural Policy in the European Economic Community (Paris: OECD, 1974)Google Scholar and OECD,Agricultural Policy in Japan (Paris: OECD, 1976)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See the OECD studies on the EEC (p. 34) and on Japan (p. 46).

⁴¹ Computed from McNicol, David, Commodity Agreements and the New International Economic Order, Social Science Working Paper #144, California Institute of Technology, 11, 1976, pp. 52–5Google Scholar.

⁴² Examples of such a “vent for surplus” can be found, e.g., Nigeria and Ghana in early cocoa export development and the Ivory Coast during the 1950s. Cf. Berry, S., Cocoa, Custom, and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria (Oxford, 1975)Google Scholar and Amin, Samir, Neo-colonialism in West Africa (New York: Monthly Review, 1973)Google Scholar.

⁴³ Lele (cited, fn. 12), pp. 28–33.

⁴⁴ Bard (cited, fn. 4), pp. 35–44.

⁴⁵ For a discussion of the Colombian case, see Dudley, L. and Sandilands, R. J., “The Side Effects of Foreign Aid: The Case of PL 480 Wheat in Colombia” Economic Development and Cultural Change 23:1 (01, 1975); 325–36Google Scholar. A good discussion of the general literature on disincentive effects, and an excellent estimation of the disincentive effects in India taking into account the Fair Price shop market is Srivastava, Uma, Heady, Earl, Rogers, Keith and Mayer, Leo, Food Aid and InternatioNal Economic Growth (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1975)Google Scholar. An attempt to put together case studies and infer the conditions under which disincentive effects occur is Isenman, Paul and Singer, H. W., “Food Aid: Disincentive Effects and Their Policy Implications,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 25:2 (01, 1977): 205–37Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ The effect of a skewed income distribution is in part borne out by the fact that attempts to increase production which are successful often create “local surpluses” which in turn depress production—primarily because the region does not have enough purchasing power and the chance to ship to other areas is inhibited by pricing policies, acquisition policies or transportation facilities. Cf. Lele, pp. 101–15. Under conditions where the export of grain internationally was very unattractive to LDCs, it is likely that the same principle operated at a national level.

⁴⁷ Less than 20 percent of total PL 480 shipments 1954–74 were under Title I (nutritionally oriented). Annual Report.

⁴⁸ For a discussion of the PL 480 program, and detailed description of the options available under Title I sales, see Goolsby, O. H., Kruer, G. R. and Santmyer, C., PL 480 Concessional Sales: History, Procedures, Negotiating and Implementing FAER #65 (Washington, D.C.: USDA/ERS, 09, 1970)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Timmer, C. Peter, “The Political Economy of Rice in Asia: Indonesia.” Food Research Institute Studies XIV:3 (1975): 197–232Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Stolte, Darwin, “Team Effort Boosts US Farm Exports,” Foreign Agriculture XIII:21 (05 26, 1975)Google Scholar provides a list of cooperator organizations from which these examples are drawn.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵² Adelman, Irma, Morris, Cynthia, and Robinson, Sherman, “The One-Shot Attack!” Cerces 9:5 (09–10., 1976) pp. 17–20Google Scholar, summarizes findings of studies—including simulation efforts—indicating that attempts to change income distribution without changing asset distribution have relatively little enduring impact.

⁵³ Griffin, , Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 16–55Google Scholar, develops factor structure analysis much more completely than can be summarized in this paper. The interested reader is referred to this work.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 36–37.

⁵⁵ Cf. data in Chenery, et al. , op. cit., pp. 113–35Google Scholar.

₅₆ For summary treatment of these findings, see Reynolds, L., Agriculture in Development Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Griffin, , Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 36–37Google Scholar.

₅₈ lbid., pp. 17–18, 22.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 49–50. “Ultra-superior” is Griffin's term.

⁶⁰ See USDA/ERS, Market Structure of Food Industries, Marketing Research Report #971 (Washington, D.C., 09, 1972)Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Stolte (cited, fn. 50), p. 9.

⁶² The technology has been criticized for its operation within the United States, e.g., Hightower, Jim, Eat Your Heart Out (NY: Crown, 1975)Google Scholar. Specific examples (generally illustrating negative effects) are found in Ledogar (cited, fn. 13) and in Jacobson, M. and Lerza, C., Food for People Not Profit (NY: Ballentine, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁶³ Villegas, P. M., “Notes on the Philippine Beef Cattle Industry” in Drilon, J. D. (ed.) Agribusiness Management Resource Materials, vol. II (Tokyo: Asia Productivity Organization, 1968), pp. 3–25Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Cf. Barker, R. X. and Nyberg, N. M., “Coconut-Cattle Enterprises in the Philippines,” Philippine Agriculturist 52 (1), 49–60Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Sorenson, Ralph, “Los Arenas Marketing Corporation” in Drilon, (cited, fn. 63), p. 31Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Cattle ranching results are discussed in Villegas, P. M., “Delta Manufacturing Corporation” in Drilon, , pp. 51–68Google Scholar. Most generally the bias of those sectors toward concentration is documented in United States agricultural history. Cf. USDA–ERS, Market Structure, op. cit., and Federal Trade Commission, The Structure of Food Manufacturing, Technical Report #8 of the National Commission on Food Marketing (Washington, D.C.: 06, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Sorenson, p. 31.

⁶⁸ Villegas, P. M., “Wonder Feeds Incorporated” in Drilon, , op. cit., pp. 119–41Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Wright, Polly, “Multinational Power: Agribusiness in a Developing Country,” Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, (mimeo, 05, 1977), pp. 16–8Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ There is at present no evidence known to the author which establishes even a rough idea of what productivity increases might be expected. Mellor, New Economics, argues that such technologies will be inadequate, but without detailed discussion of productivity potential.

⁷¹ This depends on the assumption that small holdings (under 2.5 hectares) will experience diminishing returns to labor quickly.

⁷² Lele presents data on an extreme case (Ethiopia) where the combination of sharecropping requirements and tenant assumption of risk would require a 60 percent increase in productivity to make high yielding varieites economically profitable. See Lele (cited, fn. 12), pp. 87–8.

⁷³ In many cases, exploitation of marginal land occurs as a combination of population pressure and the poverty of rural people forces expansion into areas previously recognized by the local inhabitants as unsuited for cultivation. While the “long term” effects may sometimes be realized, short term imperatives pervail. Cf. Eckholm, cited (fn. 16).

⁷⁴ Reutlinger and Selowsky (cited, fn. 6) pp. 39–15.

⁷⁵ Griffin, , Political Economy(cited, fn. 2), pp. 52–3Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ This has been a major reason for reliance on imports to subsidize consumption—as in the case of Sri Lanka and India. Until 1972–3, these prices were low and stable.

⁷⁷ See pp. 46–52.

⁷⁸ For difficulties in delivering credit to the poor, see Lele, pp. 81–99; for more generalized difficulties associated with wider rural development efforts, see ibid., pp. 118–61.

⁷⁹ See Dalrymple, Dana, Development and Spread of High Yielding Varieties of Wheat and Rice in the Less Developed Countries (Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1974)Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Chenery et al. (cited, fn. 15), pp. 209–35.

⁸¹ Cline, William R., Potential Effects of Income Distribution on Economic Growth: Latin American Cases (New York: –Praeger, 1972)Google Scholar.

⁸² Herrera et al. (cited, fn. 2), pp. 87–95.