1. “Death to America” is the literal translation of “marg bar Amrīkā” and is the slogan Americans are most familiar with. However, “down with America” is a more correct translation because there is no word for “down with…” in Persian, and banners during the revolution reading “marg bar Amrīka” were usually translated (on the same banner) as “down with America” (also, “down with him” and “murdah bād ū”). While this is more or less a moot point because either slogan conveys the same message, it is important to note that the phrase is not reserved solely for the United States and Israel, but has a wider, more general use.

2. Cottam, Richard, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh:, 1988), 4.Google Scholar

3. It was jokingly remarked that if one were to remove Khomeini's turban, one would find the mark “Made in England” on his head.

4. Zonis, Marvin, Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah (Chicago, 1991), 190.Google Scholar

5. See for example, ibid., 189-91; Bill, James A., The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, 1988), 15–17Google Scholar; Rubin, Barry, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Persia (Oxford, 1980), 4–5.Google Scholar

6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, “Message of the President” (3 December 1907), LXI.

7. Wilson, Woodrow, The New Freedom (Englewood, NJ, 1913), 221.Google Scholar

8. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 4.

9. Perkins, Justin, A Residence of Eight Years in Persia Among the Nestorian Christians with Notices of the Muhammedans (Andover, NY, 1843), 85.Google Scholar

10. Dildam, Iskandar, Hājjī Vāshangtūn: tārīkh-i ravābiṭ-i Īrān va Amrīkā dar rūzigār-i Qājār va Pahlavī ([Hajji Washington: The History of Iran and America in the Days of the Qajars and Pahlavis] ([Tehran], 1368/1989), 23–24.Google Scholar When an American missionary attempted to explain to his Persian travel companion that the U.S. was situated across a huge ocean, the companion replied, “But there is no sea larger than…the Mediterranean”; Perkins, A Residence of Eight Years in Persia, 85. It is estimated that only 130 Iranians visited the United States from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth. See, Lorentz, John and Wertime, John, “Iranians,” in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, ed. Thernstrom, Stephen (Cambridge, MA,, 1980), 521–24.Google Scholar

11. Finnie, David H., Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA, 1967), 203–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12. The original five missionaries were Justin and Charlotte Perkins, Asahel and Judith Grant, and James Lyman Merrick. For more information, see, ibid., 209-24.

13. Perkins, Justin, A Residence of Eight Years in Persia, 149Google Scholar, 150, 500, respectively.

14. Ibid., 506.

15. For example, the missionaries taught Persians American-style table manners, hygiene, and how to dress properly. See Zirinsky, Michael P., “A Panacea for the Ills of the Country: American Presbyterian Education in Inter-War Iran,” Iranian Studies 26, (1993): 123–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Although the main focus of this work is on the inter-war years, it does discuss earlier periods as well. In it Zirinsky states, “the…schools….[a]lthough they articulated a desire to train youth for Christian life, in practice what they did seems very much like training Iranians to become like Americans.” Ibid., 125.

16. For further statistics see, The Story of the American Board: An Account of the First Hundred Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Boston, 1910)Google Scholar, passim. These specific statistics are taken from Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 15.

17. Education seems to have been the most important activity of the missionaries that earned the trust of the Persians. See, Zirinsky, “A Panacea,” 119-37.

18. Ibid., 129-32, passim.

19. “Boy Shah Likes Americans,” New York Times, 20 August 1911, pt. 3, 4: 7.

20. State Department Numerical File 5931, 22 December 1907.

21. Baskerville was often called “the American Martyr,” and described as “the foreigner who sacrificed himself for the freedom of our country.” See Kamalvand, Ali, Baskirvīl va inqilāb-i Īrān [Baskerville and Iran's Revolution] (Tehran, 1336/1957)Google Scholar, passim; see also Isma^ᶜil Amirkhizi, Qiyām-i Azarbayjān va Sattār Khān [The Uprising of Azerbaijan and Sattār Khān] (Tehran, 1338/1959), 324–41.Google Scholar

22. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 17. Dr. Jordan, even today, is highly regarded among many Iranians. A street in northern Tehran bore his name until the revolution in 1979. After the revolution the street was renamed Afrīqā (Africa) to show the revolution's sympathy with the oppressed (mustażafīn) of the world.

23. “Treaty of Friendship and Commerce,” in The United States and Iran: A Documentary History, ed. Alexander, Yonah and Nanes, Allan, (Frederick, MD, 1980), 2–5.Google Scholar

24. For more detail on the rule of Nasir al-Din Shah, see, Amanat, Abbas, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1851-1896 (Washington, DC, 1997).Google Scholar

25. The United States most likely did not want to establish diplomatic relations because Persia was a country in which it had no real interests. The U.S. did not have embassies in many countries outside of Europe, and there was no reason for it to establish one in Persia. Moreover, Persia was recognized as an area under British and Russian influence, and the U.S. had no intention of involving itself in areas outside its own sphere of influence.

26. “Dastūr al-^ᶜamal dar khuṣūṣ-i kharīd-i kashtī az Amrīkā,” in Guzīdah^˒ī asnād-i ravābiṭ-i Īrān va Amrīkā, 1851-1925 [Selected Documents of Iranian-American Relations, 1851-1925], ed. Mujani, Ali (Tehran, 1375/1996), 29–30.Google Scholar

27. “Iṭṭilā^ᶜ az ḥużūr-i nukhustīn vazīr-i muqīm-i Īrān dar Amrīkā” in Mujani, ed., Guzīdah^˒ī asnād, 59. For the American minister, see “The First United States Minister to Persia,” New York Times 8 August 1883, 4: 3. The minister was S. G. W. Benjamin and his Persian counterpart was Hajji Sadr al-Saltanah (Hajji Vashangtun).

28. The Tobacco Protest of 1891 took place when the shah, after making a string of concessions to several Western countries which literally gave away many of Persia's resources, granted an English company the exclusive right to produce, sell, and export Persia's entire tobacco crop. In response to this concession, there were a series of mass demonstrations, and a high-ranking cleric (mujtahid) issued a religious decree (fatva) forbidding the use of tobacco until the concession was cancelled. Despite the fact that tobacco was widely used in Persia, the decree was carried out by the masses. These events led to the cancellation of the concession and, more importantly, gave rise to a grassroots political movement.

29. The classic work in the English language on the constitutional revolution is Browne, Edward G., The Persian Revolution, 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1910).Google Scholar For the best contemporary work on the revolution, see, Afary, Janet, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism (New York, 1996).Google Scholar

30. Foreign Relations, 1906 (22 August 1906), 1216-1217.

31. For more detail on the rise of the merchant class in Persia, see Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 29-33

32. Yeselson, Abraham, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883-1921 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1956), 88.Google Scholar

33. “President Roosevelt to the Shah of Persia,” in Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 3.

34. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, passim.

35. Samii, Kuross A., Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran (University Park, PA, cl987), 37.Google Scholar

36. McDaniel, Robert A., The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution (Minneapolis, 1974), 114.Google Scholar The emphasis is mine.

37. Taheri, Amir, Nest of Spies: America's Journey to Disaster in Iran (New York, 1988), 10.Google Scholar

38. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 10.

39. McDaniel, The Shuster Mission, 114.

40. Shuster, William Morgan, The Strangling of Persia: A Personal Narrative (New York, 1912), 4.Google Scholar The fact that the United States was chosen suggests that the U.S. was not sympathetic to Persia. For if it was, it is very unlikely that either Russia or England, in their distaste for the constitutional government, would have approved such a move.

41. Foreign Relations, 1910 (25 December 1910), 679.

42. For a full narrative of the events leading to Shuster's appointment see, Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 107-111; McDaniel, The Shuster Mission, passim.

43. Shuster, Strangling of Persia, 4.Google Scholar

44. Ibid.

45. See Cottam, Iran and the United States, 34.

46. Muhammad ^ᶜAli Shah (r. 1907-1909) took power after Muzaffar al-Din Shah's death (r. 1896-1907). Unlike the previous Shah, Muhammad ^ᶜAli was not open to reform and worked to destroy the revolution. After an attempted coup, he was deposed by the constitutionalists and sent to live in Russia. Later, with Russian support, Muhammad ^ᶜAli and his army secretly entered Persia from the Caspian and made an attempt to overthrow the new government. It was at this point that Shuster placed a 100,000 tūmān bounty on his head. Largely because of this bounty, the ex-shah failed to achieve his goal. See, Davud Mu^˒ayyad Amini, Farār-i Muḥammad ^ᶜAlī Shāh, (N. p., 1324/1945).

47. The full text of the letter is in Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, Appendix C, 371.

48. New York Times (23 December 1911), 3: 5.

49. For the full text of the ultimatum see, Foreign Relations, 1911 (25 November 1911), 683.

50. Ibid.

51. In its second attempt, Persia again sent a letter stating that, if the Russian ultimatum was accepted, “it will destroy our independence and if rejected, will cause great misery and bloodshed. Will the United States Government, in the name of Peace and Humanity, use its great influence to assist an ancient nation in this serious crisis?” The Secretary of State replied blandly that he had nothing to add to the previous statement made. See, Decimal File 761.9, 1 December 1911, in Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 119.

52. Congressional Record, 62nd Congress: 2nd Session (7 December 1911), 48: 88-89 in Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 119-20. A Persian students’ group in Switzerland also appealed to the United States, asking that President Taft “in the name of humanity and liberty…protect Persia from foreign aggression.” See, New York Times (7 December 1911), 5: 4.

53. Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 119.

54. Foreign Relations, 1911 (1 December 1911), 685.

55. “Same to Same,” Telegram No. 1805 (November 4/17, 1911), in Kazemzadeh, Firuz, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven, 1968), 629.Google Scholar

56. “President Roosevelt to the Shah of Persia,” in Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 6.

57. Cottam, Iran and the United States, 26.

58. Scott, James Brown, ed., President Wilson's Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers (New York, 1918), 11Google Scholar May 1914, 45.

59. Foreign Relations, 1914 (6 November 1914), supplement. See also Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 132.

60. There are no communications of relevance between the two nations between 1914 and 1917 in either Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History; Foreign Relations, 1914-1918; or Mujani, ed., Guzīdah^˒ī Asnād.

61. F. L. Bird, “Solving the Persian Problem,” Asia 19 (October 1919): 984.

62. Nicolson, Harold, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925 (New York, 1939), 129.Google Scholar

63. Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 137; “Judson Sails for Persia,” New York Times (14 July 1918), 9: 4.

64. “The Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Moshaver-ol-Mamalek) to the Secretary of State,” in Alexander and Nanes eds., A Documentary History, 22.

65. Decimal File 891.51, 7 April 1918 in Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 140. The only assistance furnished on behalf of the United States government was $15,000 given to the American Minister in Persia to be distributed among the suffering Jewish population in Persia. See Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 22.

66. Scott, ed., President Wilson's Foreign Policy, 160.

67. For the most complete history of Persia at the Peace Conference, see, Fard, Faridun Zand, Iran va Jami'ah-'i Millal [Iran and the League of Nations] (Tehran: Nashr-i Shirazah, 1377 [1998]), 46–60.Google Scholar

68. “Persian Minister to the Secretary of State,” Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 16.

69. Decimal File 763.72111, 30 January 1919 in Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 148.

70. Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 148.

71. Decimal File 763.72111, 15 November 1918 in ibid.

72. Ibid., 151.

73. “Persia Wants Our Help,” New York Times (8 March 1919), 12: 7.

74. Salih, Ghulam Husayn Mirza, ed., Asnād-i rasmī dar ravībiṭ-i siyāsat-i Īrān bā Inglīs va Rūs va ^ᶜUsmān [Official Documents of Iran's Political Relations with Great Britain, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire], (Tehran, 1365/1986): 1: 57–58.Google Scholar

75. Nicolson, Curzon, 38, 122.

76. Quote from ibid. The Anglo-Persian agreement is usually identified with the imperial ambitions of Lord Curzon who negotiated it. Shaul Bakhash, however, has argued that the agreement began as a Persian, not British, initiative in 1914. He states that many in British government circles as well as the viceroy of India opposed involvement in Iran. It was Persian Prime Minister Vusuq al-Dawla and his supporters who looked to the British to keep them in power against the rising tide of the nationalists. See, Bakhash, Shaul, “The Origins of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.” Asian and African Studies 25 (March 1991): 1–29.Google Scholar

77. Both France and the Soviet Union opposed the Anglo-Persian agreement. However, the Soviet Union was in the midst of a civil war, and France had emerged from World War I a weaker nation. Neither nation was in any condition to oppose the treaty in any substantial manner, and U.S. opposition led the way.

78. See, for example, Cottam, Iran and the United States, 37-39; Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 160-66.

79. “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis),” 20 August 1919, in Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 23. The greater portion of the statement is repeated here and only a small section, which does not deal with the topic at hand, has been omitted by the author of this paper.

80. Foreign Relations, 1918 (19 October 1919), 714-17. See also Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 161.

81. “The Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell),” 4 September 1919, Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 23-24.

82. Cottam, Iran and the United States, 37-38.

83. “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis),” 20 August 1919, Alexander, and Nanes, , eds., A Documentary History, 23.Google Scholar

84. “The Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell),” 4 September 1919, in ibid., 23-24.

85. For the text of Lord Curzon's attempt see, Foreign Relations, 1919 (13 September 1919), 2:708-11; for the U.S. rebuttal see, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis),” 4 October 1919, Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 25-27.

86. Foreign Relations, 1919 (22 December 1919), 718-19.

87. See for example, Bill, The Eagle and the Lion; Cottam, The United States and Iran; Mansuri, Javad, 25 sāl ḥakamīyat-i Amrīkā bar Īrān [25 Years of America's Rule over Iran], ([Tehran], 1364/1985)Google Scholar; Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions; Sale, Richard T., “America in Iran” School of Advanced International Studies Review 3, (1981-1982): 27–39Google Scholar; and Sick, Gary, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York, 1985).Google Scholar

88. Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 196.

89. In 1901, a British subject, William D'Arcy, was awarded a private concession which gave him rights to all of the oil in Persia, except for five northern provinces. In return, the Persian government was to receive sixteen percent of the company's annual profits. See ibid., 197.

90. Keddie, Nikkie, “Iran Under the Later Qajars,” in Avery, Peter, et. al., eds., The Cambridge History of Iran, (Cambridge,), 7: 207.Google Scholar

91. Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 196.

92. Ibid., 197.

93. “The Chargé in Persia (Engert) to the Secretary of State,” 21 June 1921, Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 29.

94. Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 196

95. Foreign Relations, 1920: 350-51.

96. “The Chargé in Persia (Engert) to the Secretary of State,” 21 June 1921, in Alexander and Nanes, eds., A Documentary History, 29-30. See also, Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 204.

97. Rubin, “Stumbling through the ‘Open Door,’” 205-206.

98. Dec. File 891.6363, Standard Oil, 20 December 1921, 31 December 1921.

99. Foreign Relations, 1921::654-55; New York Times, 28 February 1922. See also, Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 200-20.

100. It is true that Reza Khan toyed with the idea of reinstituting the Constitution of 1906 but was dissuaded by powerful members of the ^ᶜulamā^˒. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that, given the force and rapidity with which Reza Khan took near-dictatorial power, he would have been willing to institute a democratic government, especially since it is now known that his coup d'état had the consent of the British, who believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that he would work for their interests. See, Ghani, Cyrus, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule (London: I. B. Taurus, 1998).CrossRefGoogle Scholar passim.

101. Gary Sick, “The Iranian Stalemate: They're Changing, Why Can't We?” www.iic.org/salaam.htm (visited on 29 March 1999).

102. Iran, 25 November 1921, in Decimal File 891.6363/45, enclosure 5.