Introduction
Migrants’ destination choices depend largely on expectations driven by access to information, financial resources, and legislation. Migrating to Japan, or to Southeast and East Asia more broadly, is a relatively new phenomenon for the Iranian diaspora. Mainstream Iranian migration after the 1979 revolution primarily focused on Europe and the United States, often via “transit” countries such as Pakistan and Turkey (Türkiye).Footnote 1 In light of increasing global restrictions on Iranian mobility, countries that did not require visas created an “eastward” flow of Iranians, and Japan’s booming economy created the coming-to-Japan boom.
As a non-Western developed country, Japan has been an exceptional counterpart for Iran, both before and after the 1979 revolution. The countries gradually established diplomatic relations as modern states in the late nineteenth century, with their economic relationship developing in the 1930s and accelerating as Iran’s oil revenues increased in the early 1970s.
In 1974, Iran and Japan instituted a mutual visa exemption for economic cooperation. As economic relations between the countries strengthened in the latter half of the twentieth century, Japanese businesspeople and engineers were dispatched to Iran. At the same time, Iranian traders travelled to Japan to buy goods, including ceramics and sundries.Footnote 2 To launch the plant of the Iran–Japan Petrochemical Company (IJPC), started in 1976, Japanese workers were sent to Iran. Therefore, before the 1979 revolution, the Japanese made greater use of the visa exemption than Iranians. Even after the revolution, trade traffic between Iran and Japan was relatively frequent. While Western companies gradually withdrew from the Iranian market amid the unrest following the 1979 revolution, Japanese companies attempted to maintain their activities, including local subsidiaries, joint ventures, and government-led development projects.Footnote 3
These comings and goings paved the way for the “coming-to-Japan boom” of Iranian migration to Japan from the late 1980s to early 1990s. The start and end of the “boom” are statistically clear, and the influx of Iranians was both rapid and short-lived. According to government statistics compiled by Inaba and Higuchi, arrivals rose sharply from 17,050 in 1989 to 32,125 in 1990. Until 1988, the arrival and departure of Iranian nationals had been nearly equal; in 1989, however, arrivals (15, 969) exceeded departures by nearly 1,000 and, in 1990, by over 11,000. This gap widened further in 1991, when there were 47,976 arrivals but only 15,381 departures—less than one-third of those entering. This discrepancy reflected a growing number of overstayers. When visa exemptions for Iranians were suspended in 1992, the numbers dropped to 15,415 arrivals and 6,798 departures, alongside 14,533 deportations. From 1993 onwards, arrivals and departures again converged but the number of deportees remained high—8,993 in 1993 and 5,671 in 1994—before gradually decreasing after 1995. This indicates that those who arrived before 1993 eventually left the country, either voluntary or through forced removal.Footnote 4
This sudden population flow is related to the political and economic situations in both Iran and Japan. Specifically, the economic boom in Japan and the post-war recession in Iran in the late 1980s prompted many Iranians to seek opportunities that were unavailable at home. However, understanding this phenomenon requires more than the push-and-pull migration model, especially when considering migrants’ motivations, shifting legal status, and their global trajectories before and after arriving in Japan. Accordingly, this paper identifies the 1989–1991 period as a boom in immigration from Iran to Japan and, more broadly, the late 1980s to early 1990s as the “coming-to-Japan boom.” I re-examine this “boom in coming to Japan” within the broader context of the Iranian diaspora, seeking to better understand both the transnational flows of Iranians in this period as well as the role of public gathering spaces for Iranians in 1980s Japan.
This study clarifies three as-yet understudied questions about the “coming-to-Japan boom” of Iranians. First, for Iranians, how was migrating to Japan different from migrating to other countries? This question assumes that migration intention not only varies over time and place but also according to migrant attributes. Second, Iranians became notable for park gatherings and attracted much public attention, yet the perceptions of those who gathered remains unexamined: why and how were Iranians gathering in public places, such as parks, when other immigrant groups did not gather in this way? What social impact did these gatherings have? Third, how do we locate the “coming-to-Japan boom” in the broader context of Iranian diaspora studies? As a relatively new phenomenon to migrate East, how was this movement linked to the flow of Iranians to the West? I begin by outlining Japan’s immigration policy and then identify how previous research in sociology and Iranian studies in Japan has addressed the “coming-to-Japan boom.” Gatherings in public spaces were significant during this period. I examine this phenomenon and argue that encounters after the arrival of Iranians were more important than their pre-departure social relationships.
Methodology
Whereas previous studies have explored the relationship between personal motive and migration, this study considers the coming-to-Japan phenomenon as a cohort action that appeared in newspaper articles and academic literature, as well as the social conditions in Japan and Iran that encouraged people to move. The anthropology of migration that I draw on theoretically regards migration as part of, rather than an exception to, everyday practices. This theory begins by questioning a “field” with clear boundaries in the era of globalization and criticizes the consideration of mobility as external to everyday life.Footnote 5 Anthropological theory focuses on the sense of (non-)place in transition and the relationship between identity and displacement/emplacement.Footnote 6 Using these theories alongside studies of the ethos and pathos associated with migration, I situate the “coming-to-Japan boom” within the broader context of the Iranian diaspora.Footnote 7 I also analyze how this boom has transformed the meaning of migration for Iranian society and the meaning of “foreigners” for Japanese society.
This study analyzes magazine articles, interviews conducted for previous studies, and newspaper articles collected from databases. Asahi-Shinbun is considered a liberal newspaper with a wide circulation. The database includes national and local editions, and the weekly magazines of Asahi-Shinbun publishing, AERA, and Weekly Asahi. A search of the Asahi-Shinbun database for “Iranian” (Iranjin) produced 3,316 matches between 1984–2024, and 83 matches from the first issue in 1879 to 1983. From these, news unrelated to Iranians in Japan was excluded for the purposes of this study. Similarly, the search for “Persians” (Perushajin) produced 125 results, but none related to Iranians in Japan. While fewer than five articles appeared per year until 1989, this number rose to 24 in 1990, 98 in 1991, and remained at approximately 200 between 1992–1994. This coincided with the period of peak social attention on Iranians, and from 1995 onwards, the number of articles about Iranians gradually declined Chart 1. After excluding articles that appeared to have overlapping content, I chose 972 of the 3,399 headlines for analysis. Hereafter, articles from Asahi-Shinbun database are denoted as (Asahi day-month-year).
Articles related to Iranians in Japan in Asahi-Shinbun Database 1984-2024
Immigration policy and the Iranian population in Japan
Immigration policy in Japan
Despite Japan’s long history as a country of emigration, domestic labor shortages were addressed through immigration beginning in the early twentieth century, mostly from colonies on the Korean Peninsula. This flow of Korean migration later evolved into forced migration under the National Requisition Ordinance from 1939 to the end of the World War II, some of the policies of which carried over to the new government after the war. Immigration control policy under the Allied occupation managed both the return of Japanese from the colonies and the return of those of “colonial heritage” to their colonies, even if the latter were born and raised in Japan. Emigration from Japan declined significantly in the mid-1960s, while the government’s migrant sending program persisted until 1993. This led to the later immigration policy of granting right of residence “based on lineage”: descendants of former colonial subjects born in Japan were administered as foreigners who required re-entry permission, whereas descendants of Japanese nationals born outside Japan (Nikkei) were considered foreigners but granted the right to reside in Japan.Footnote 8
In addition, Japan’s immigration policy has long disallowed “unskilled” labor immigration. Work visas have mainly been limited to those who are certified, such as professors or doctors, or recognized artists or journalists. Despite labor shortages in various fields, work visas issued for both skilled and unskilled labor sectors, such as for construction or elder care, is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was only in 2019 that the Specified Skilled Worker Program was finally established, which allowed for a wider range of labor migration.
The labor shortage in Japan was addressed in four distinct phases. First, in the late 1980s, in what I call the “backdoor-entrance” period (1986–1989), which coincided with the economic boom, most migrant workers came to Japan as tourists, students, interns, or entertainment visa holders. Country of origin tended to determine legal status and field of employment. For example, women from the Philippines came as entertainers and worked at nightclubs, contributing to social problems with brokers, human trafficking, and sexual exploitation. The manufacturing sector—including the metalworking and auto parts industry—employed workers from Latin America, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Construction workers mostly came from Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. East Asian students from China, Korea, and Taiwan worked in the service sectors.Footnote 9 In this period, the number of Iranians arriving to Japan gradually increased, mainly working in the manufacturing and construction sectors. Japan had a mutual visa exemption with several countries during this period, including Iran (which was valid for ninety days). Many Iranians who arrived with visa waivers overstayed. Japan suspended visa exemptions for Bangladesh and Pakistan in 1989 and Iran in 1992.Footnote 10 The number of both Bangladeshi and Pakistani undocumented workers increased around 1985 but gradually decreased after visa waivers were suspended, whereas the number of Iranian undocumented workers increased sharply around 1989.Footnote 11 This indicates that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis came before Iranians, who arrived last in the first “backdoor” period.
The second period (1990–1993) signaled the coming of the Nikkei. Facing labor shortages in a booming economy, Japanese society had accepted backdoor migrant workers and the government and companies sought to legitimize and stabilize the inflow. The solution was not to give migrants visas, but to have legal residents who could be potential workers. In 1990, the Immigration Control Act was revised to supply workforce by issuing long-term residency visas for the Nikkei and their spouses, mostly from Brazil and Peru. In the early 1990s, even though Japan was already in recession, the labor shortage persisted. Although the 1986 Worker Dispatching Act had allowed temporary agency work to create a more flexible labor market, sectors experiencing labor shortages, such as manufacturing, were not eligible under the act. Introducing a workforce with long-term residency became de facto temporary agency work for those sectors. According to sociologist Tanno Kiyoto, the transnational labor market for the Nikkei was shaped by travel agencies, local recruiters, and Japanese outsourcing contractors. In the early stages, Japanese manufacturing companies directly visited the Nikkei community in Latin America for recruitment; later, travel agencies acted as recruiters, with mediators entering the recruiting system.Footnote 12 Outsourcing contractors hired workers to manufacture and deliver products to clients, making it possible to send workers to sectors not designated by the Worker Dispatching Act.Footnote 13 In summary, the long-term residency visa was a grey solution to accepting labor migration.
In the third period (1993–2009), the Technical Intern Training Program (Ginou-jisshū) was launched in 1993 to transfer skills and technologies abroad. Internships (kenshusei) started with a one-year training period. Nevertheless, this period was not completely open to immigration. In the fourth period (2010–2019) and thereafter, the Japanese government showed greater acceptance of migrant workers despite providing limited settlement options. In 2019, the Specified Skilled Worker Program (Tokutei-ginou) was introduced to address workforce shortages in sectors such as nursing, farming, fishing, construction, and manufacturing.
It is the second period that coincides with the influx of Iranians to Japan, which was socially considered a transient boom of “dekasegi”—a Japanese term for temporary migrant workers seeking livelihoods. As latecomers of the first period, the competition between migrant workers and the sharp decline in the Japanese economy made it hard for Iranians to survive in the Japanese labor market.
The Iranian population in Japan
Few Iranians resided in Japan immediately before and after the revolution: 187 in 1974 and 543 in 1985.Footnote 14 They came as traders, students, governmental officials, and employees of Iranian companies. Although most came from elite families and knew each other, no association of Iranians was established in Japan in this early period.Footnote 15 Instead, they formed loose networks, comprising scholars of Iranian studies, Iranian and Japanese students, and Japanese political and economic personnel. The Japan–Iran Society was established in 1954, and its newsletter, Japan–Iran Society News, was published between 1972–1998 (renamed to Chashm in 1990). Articles on the coming-to-Japan boom appeared in this magazine in the early 1990s. A contributor to the magazine, Moazeni Junko, who was married to an Iranian and had lived in Japan since the revolution, noted the large numbers applying for visas at the US embassy in Japan in the late 1980s. Moreover, Iranians residing in Japan often accompanied and interpreted for Iranian visitors applying for US visas.Footnote 16 A prior personal relationship between Iranians visiting and those assisting them in Japan was not a prerequisite. On April 7, 1980, amid the US embassy hostage crisis in Tehran, the US severed diplomatic ties with Iran and the Immigration and Naturalization Service banned all Iranians from entering the United States. Although Japan followed US policy, the mutual visa exemption was practically maintained for commercial purposes so as to not interfere with economic relations.Footnote 17
In 1989, the number of Iranians entering Japan slightly exceeded those leaving. In 1990, however, 32,125 Iranians entered the country, an 88 percent increase on the previous year, and between 1989–1992, the number of Iranians entering the country significantly exceeded the number leaving. Since Iranians who arrived in Japan during this period entered under the visa waiver program, their profiles are unclear. According to Komai’s 1993–1994 group research, 166 (67.7 percent) of the 245 respondents were under 30 years old, 96 (57 percent) of the 166 valid responses were high school graduates, and 65 (28 percent) of the 231 valid responses were married.Footnote 18 As this research asked whether a respondent had a wife, all respondents were assumed to be male. This result is consistent with findings from other research indicating that many young, single male Iranians temporarily migrated for employment opportunities. It should be noted, however, that a significant number of cases involved families staying together, as discussed in a later section.
According to Inaba and Higuchi, the number of Iranians registered as spouses of Japanese nationals and permanent residents steadily increased over time.Footnote 19 The number of Iranians holding “spouse of Japanese nationals” visas peaked at 1,549 in 2001 and has since declined due to changes in permanent residency status. In 2015, statistics showed that Iranian males had the highest ratio of marriage to Japanese women among Japan’s Asian and South American populations.Footnote 20 In 2023, 2,617 Iranians held permanent residency.
Literature review of Iranian migrants in Japan
The earliest research on Iranian migration to Japan dates back to the mid-1990s. In 1993–1994, sociologist Komai Hiroshi and his students at Tsukuba University conducted one of the only large-scale surveys on the living conditions of Iranians. His team conducted 245 surveys in well-known gathering places for Iranians in Japan, such as the Ueno and Harajuku train stations in Tokyo. Despite the vulnerability of unregistered workers and legal risks associated with interviewing mostly overstayers after the suspension of visa exemptions in 1992, Komai justified focusing on Iranians, stating: “Iranians are likely to be the most affected by the recession as they are the lowest-ranking of foreign workers.”Footnote 21 This assessment likely matched Iranians’ self-perception at the time. A member of the research group, Kura Shinichi, later observed that, although respondents were initially wary, the survey generated substantial participation, including many responses to open-ended questions. The resulting Tsukuba Report covered wide-ranging topics—education, employment, income, remittances, residential status, discrimination, and religion—and introduced “self-exile” as a distinct category of migration motivation (23 percent), alongside dekasegi (livelihood-seeking; 58.8 percent) and “self-improvement” (38.3 percent).Footnote 22 Komai’s “self-exile” categorization parallels findings by Bozorgmehr and Sabagh on Iranians in Los Angeles, underscoring the blurred lines between legal status and individual motivations for migration across diasporic contexts.Footnote 23 Komai’s study remains one of the most extensive surveys on the living conditions of Iranians in Japan, even if, as Kura indicated, there was a possibility of bias since the exact size of this vulnerable population was unknown.Footnote 24
Because many Iranians in Japan in the early 1990s had overstayed their visas, qualitative interviews and fieldwork were difficult to carry out; journalists were, therefore, often better positioned to publish articles on this subject than academics. Photojournalist Nishiyama Takeshi, for example, spent three months with Iranians in 1994.Footnote 25 Despite a reliance on Japanese-language communication, the resulting interview-based articles provide complementary information in the absence of qualitative research in that period.
In the late 1990s, sociologists began conducting interview-based research among Iranians, often in comparison with migrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan who arrived in the same period. Studies of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Turkish workers traced the emergence of ethnic niches, such as the second-hand car trade for Pakistanis; Iranians, in contrast, did not form such ethnic niches.Footnote 26 Similarly, unlike Bangladeshis, who continued to arrive despite the suspension of visa exemptions, Iranian migration declined sharply.Footnote 27 Inaba and Higuchi conducted extensive research on returned migrants in Bangladesh and Iran, finding through 120 interviews that for both groups, life-cycle factors influenced the decision to return home, such as reunion with family or deportation by immigration law enforcement, rather than economic factors.Footnote 28 Significant differences emerged between married and unmarried respondents in their lengths of stay in Japan, with half of married respondents returning home within eighteen months, half of unmarried respondents returning home after four years, and just under half staying for more than five years.Footnote 29 Inaba and Higuchi’s findings stressed that life for married versus unmarried migrants in Japan differed from that of other countries, contributing to such high returns among Iranians in this period. Overall, the differences in arrival periods between Iranians and other groups resulted in different social circumstances in Japan, with two factors leading to distinctive behaviors among Iranians: their self-perception as “self-exiles” and their tendency to gather in public spaces.
Another key characteristic of Iranian migrants compared to others in Japan was their visibility in public spaces, such as parks and stations. However, research has scarcely examined how and why, among migrants in Japan, only Iranians held prominent meetings in public spaces. An exception is the study of urban sociologist Machimura Takashi, who investigated why Yoyogi Park became a gathering place for Iranians, locating the phenomenon within a long history of the park’s development.Footnote 30 While providing a detailed account, he argued that this distinctive gathering related to the period of Iranians’ arrival in Japan. Compared to other migrants at the time, Iranians were disadvantaged in terms of networks because they arrived after the Japanese economic boom, had a high proportion of overstays, and were largely single men.
Iranians had overcome recruitment disadvantages through both ethnic ties and local networks. For example, Tanno specifically examined recruitment practices among undocumented Pakistani and Iranian workers, highlighting the centrality of “foremen (shokucho) networks” in construction and manufacturing industries in Japan. These local employer networks allowed undocumented foreign employees to move between workplaces with a foreman’s referral, enabling job information to spread beyond close contacts. Foremen networks enabled Iranians to access various jobs and workplaces. Overall, no primary social relations played a consistent role in chain migration among Iranians in Japan. Instead, every communication became an opportunity to improve lives.
Iranian studies scholars in Japan approached the “coming-to-Japan boom” from a different vantage point than the above sociologists, through social outreach rather than surveys, serving as interpreters or advisors and bound by confidentiality. Such scholars, particularly in the 1990s, emphasized placing migration in the broader context of Iranian society. Okada Emiko, a scholar of Persian literature, published life histories of Iranians she encountered in Japan, analyzing cultural concepts such as patience, jealousy, and the evil eye as keys to understanding their worldviews.Footnote 31 Economist Mohammad Naghizadeh noted that, by 1991, more than 50,000 Iranians had gone to Japan, sending home nearly USD 1 billion in remittances, though these flows fueled greater consumption than economic development.Footnote 32 Naghizadeh argued that Iranian youth migrated to Japan in this period not due to labor market disequilibrium but because of social conditions; rural-to-urban labor migration for economic development; and internal and external migration owing to the revolution and the Iran–Iraq war. Rural sociologist Mahdi Taleb also showed that, while education was a key factor in pre-revolution migration to the West, after the revolution, middle-class youth also began to study in Asian countries such as the Philippines. As temporary labor migrants headed to Arab Gulf countries, a shuttle trade emerged via purchasing trips to Southeast and East Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Korea.Footnote 33 These shuttle trading groups, which played a significant role in supplying foreign products to the Iranian market during the war, shifted focus to Japan after the war.
Yamagishi Tomoko has attempted to explain the reasoning for working in Japan from an Iranian perspective, showing how returnees’ word-of-mouth success stories encouraged more Iranian youth to go to Japan, undeterred by the Iranian media’s negative portrayal of life there.Footnote 34 Before the cost of airfare increased, it had been possible to earn more than the cost of travel expenses within the permitted length of stay, making overstaying unnecessary; longer stays were required later to recoup costs. As Yamagishi showed, those working without permission found it difficult to understand why they could not “work” when business meetings and negotiations were permitted under the visa waiver. Iranians did not perceive unauthorized work and as a major issue, and Yamagishi stressed that although Iranians had already contributed to and become part of Japanese society, neither were properly recognized by the Japanese or Iranians.Footnote 35 Later, Yamagishi and Morita published research in 2002 based on interviews with returnees in Iran, identifying group formations during their stay in Japan.Footnote 36 This was the first qualitative study of Iranians in Japan before Inaba and Higuchi’s study in 2006. Yamagishi and Morita interviewed thirty-six individuals, learning that several groups had been formed during their stay in Japan, depending on where they worked and lived. Notably, these groups maintained longstanding friendships, but did not develop continuous mutual help in all areas of life. Additionally, although some received financial support from siblings or work placements from friends, pre-existing relationships did not form the basis of life in Japan. This point is thought to have much to do with the park and station gatherings.
Taken together, the sociological and Iranian studies perspectives reveal both structural and subjective dimensions of Iranian migration to Japan. Both strands of research underscore two distinctive features of Iranians in Japan, distinguishing them from other migrant groups of the same era: their strong self-perception as “self-exiles” and their highly visible gatherings in public spaces. Meanwhile, what previous studies of Iranian migration to Japan have overlooked is the multifaceted nature of relationships among and the transnational mobility of Iranians who have been to Japan. I examine these points in the following sections.
Chronology of the “coming-to-Japan” boom: 1984–1994
From the shuttle trade to migrant work
In Iran, the issuing of new passports stopped between 1980–1983 to prevent population outflow during the Iran–Iraq War; few Iranians could legally travel abroad during this period. After these strict border controls were lifted in 1984, Hajj—the pilgrimage to Mecca—remained one of the few opportunities to travel abroad. According to Iranian newspaper Keyhan (as cited in Asahi, September 18, 1984), 150,000 people went for Hajj in 1984, returning with electrical appliances and clothing lacking in the domestic market. At that time, overseas travel was limited to once a year, and withdrawing money was restricted. From 1985, travelers could only carry around USD 300–500 per person.Footnote 37 Around the same time, Iranian entrepreneurs began trading in the shuttle trade, buying goods by traveling abroad to countries such as Turkey, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan, as Iranians had visa exemptions in these countries. Shuttle traders eventually formed organizations, providing accommodation, airfare, and purchasing funds for groups of approximately ten people, with transported goods resold to bazaar merchants. Brokers mediating travel to Japan later emerged from among these private importing organizations.Footnote 38
After 1985, employment gradually replaced shuttle trade as the main purpose of travel from Iran to Japan. Following the September 1985 Plaza Accord, a joint agreement by G5 countries to intervene in currency markets, the yen appreciated rapidly, leading to an increase in the number of Iranians going to South Korea rather than Japan for shuttle trade, although still traveling via Japan. In 1985, 23,949 Iranians entered Japan. Iran Air operated two flights per week from Tehran to Narita via Beijing. The Narita branch of Iran Air told Asahi Shimbun that, in 1987, approximately 20,000 people had taken one-way flights from Iran to Japan, with more than half traveling on to Seoul from Narita. At the time, South Korea had a visa waiver for Iranian nationals for stays of up to fifteen days.Footnote 39
Although the number of Iranian arrivals increased rapidly from 1989, very few newspaper articles addressed this, with only three published in that year in Asahi Shimbun. In 1990, twenty-four reports were published on Iranians in Japan, as Japanese newspapers tended to only report about foreigners when they were arrested or during humanitarian crises. However, around this time, the collective behavior of Iranian overstayers began to gain public attention. One article reported that many overstayers visited the Immigration Bureau and offered to voluntarily deport due to rumors that illegal workers would be arrested when the Immigration Control Act was revised in June 1990. In reality, the new act only applied to those who entered Japan after June 1, and it was the employers who would be punished.Footnote 40 As these rumors originated in workplaces, workers of various nationalities—including Iranians—turned themselves into the Immigration Bureau. Iranian deportees increased from 27 in 1989 to 677 in 1990.Footnote 41
However, the number of people coming from Iran to Japan simultaneously increased drastically, despite Iranian newspapers and television reporting on the problems of Iranians in Japan—including denial of landing, accidents, and troubles at work—in an attempt to deter people from going to Japan. Contrary to intent, these detailed reports were more often perceived as guidelines on how to migrate to and work in Japan, rather than a deterrent.Footnote 42 Meanwhile, Iranian worker accidents had been reported in Japan since 1990, but most of these cases were not covered in Iran. For example, Asahi newspaper reported that compensation had been granted for the death of a twelve-year-old boy, which was exceptional for unauthorized employment. The boy had entered the country with his parents and younger brother and worked at a wastepaper collection factory in suburban Tokyo, Tochigi Prefecture.Footnote 43 This incident shows that not only single men came to Japan. As rumors spread in Iran and trips to Japan became more popular, more single men began traveling to Japan.
A November 1990 article reported a rush of people boarding flights to Japan in Tehran. Iran Air’s two weekly flights from Tehran to Narita, with 310 seats each, were fully booked. When the airline office in Tehran reduced the number of booking offices to one in October, 15,000 people queued for reservations.Footnote 44 Around 1991, brokers began to book hotels, purchase airline tickets, teach people how to travel to Japan, teach basic Japanese, and even provide travel loans.Footnote 45 Unlike forged passports and illegal arrangements, brokers were open to the public and advertised in Iranian newspapers.
In Japan, not only was the impact of Iranian arrivals significant, but their departures also increased. In December 1991, the number of overstaying Iranians seeking deportation rose to 1,000—almost six times that in January 1991. According to the Immigration Bureau, “many [of the Iranians who turned themselves in] complain of homesickness, but this may also be because the open tickets they had expired all at once, or the airfares of Iran Air increased making them difficult to replace”.Footnote 46
As with the 1991 revised Immigration Act, there were rumors that punishment would be more severe after the suspension of visa exemptions in April 1992. From mid-March, 400–500 people presented themselves at the immigration office daily, of whom about half were Iranian.Footnote 47 The Ministry of Justice stated that detection of overstayers would not increase after the visa waiver suspension, as it was meant to limit new entries. Nevertheless, investigations into migrant workers were conducted in February and March 1992.Footnote 48 In 1992, there were 14,533 Iranian deportations.
Social visibility and social perception
Gradually, Iranian gatherings in Japan began attracting public attention. In late 1990, several hundred people spent each night in the lobby at Narita airport. On May 28, 1991, as a result, a notice was posted in Persian requesting that people not stay in the airport any longer than necessary.Footnote 49 Meanwhile, the number of Iranians gathering in Tokyo’s Ueno Park increased rapidly from May 1991. More than a dozen people slept there and 70–150 people gathered in the mornings.Footnote 50 As there was a large, 200-person capacity warehouse accommodation run by Iranian traders in Nippori, Iranians were also seen in front of the JR Nippori station.Footnote 51
Iranians called Tokyo’s Yoyogi Park “Harajuku” due to its nearness to JR Harajuku station (Figure 1). Gatherings of Iranians on their day off began in autumn 1990. By summer 1991, more than 200 people were gathering daily, and by winter, that number had reached approximately 1,000. Most of those gathering lived in the suburbs of Tokyo, where factories are located, traveling into the city to visit the park, meet friends and acquaintances, or meet other Iranians. Pakistanis and other migrant workers joined Iranians in the park.Footnote 52 On December 22, 1991, the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, Shiokasa, inspected the park and commented: “They [Iranians] seem to blend with the public, so there is no need to be particularly careful. Just ensure to prevent accidents”.Footnote 53 Thus, the public gatherings were being noticed but not yet questioned.
Tokyo Railway Map and the Location of Ueno and Yoyogi Parks.
One year after the visa waiver suspension, Iranians were still gathering in Tokyo’s major parks and stations on a large scale. Parks were a place for people to not only exchange information and socialize but also participate in the informal economy. Meanwhile, the perception of Iranian illegality in Japan was coming to the fore. In 1991, 98 articles were published about Iranians in Japan, increasing to 216 in 1992 and 181 in 1993. Alongside news of the visa waiver suspension and park gatherings, media coverage featured labor problems, such as work-related accidents and non-payment of wages, and reports of Iranians as perpetrators or victims of assault and murder. According to such reports, Iranian involvement in crimes such as drug smuggling, trafficking, and the sale of forged prepaid phonecards was increasing.
Meanwhile, a Japanese exclusionist group began posting leaflets in Tokyo’s parks, stations, and suburbs that read: “Remove illegal foreigners with expired visas from Japan”.Footnote 54 A sign posted in JR Nippori station by police stated, in Persian and Japanese, “Please leave promptly as loitering is a nuisance to the citizens,” but was removed after a Japanese graduate student protested at the station office.Footnote 55 Thus, both exclusionists and public authorities were attempting to remove Iranians from public places.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government closed part of Yoyogi Park for three months at the end of April 1993. While the closure was supposedly due to “maintenance work,” it was seen as an attempt to limit gatherings. On the first Sunday after the blockade, “uniformed and plainclothes police officers stood around under the rain, and repeatedly shouted crudely in Persian, ‘Illegal aliens must go to the immigration office’”.Footnote 56 Stalls that had long been in business for park visitors were closed, and exclusive gentrification occurred. The park reopened on July 31 despite opposition from the National Police Agency, and about 150 Iranians and their supporters gathered on the first Sunday after the opening. The park then closed again on August 10.Footnote 57
Ueno and Yoyogi parks were gathering places for Iranians living in the suburbs of the capital. As the number of Iranians working in regional cities increased, however, such gathering began to be observed in the parks and trains stations of Nagoya in 1991 and Osaka in 1992. Public gatherings were repeatedly subjected to intense investigation and gradually disappeared.
Kura analyzed trends in media portrayals from 1990–1999, showing how the 1990 Immigration Control Act and subsequent closure of Yoyogi Park in 1993 specifically intended to eliminate the large gatherings and shift popular perception of Iranians from overstayers to “illegal” residents.Footnote 58
In 1994, there were 201 articles on Iranians living in Japan published. Of the 177 news items I explored from 1994, 172 related to crime. News coverage linking crime to Iranians constituted a high proportion of reports until 1995. Among the articles on crimes committed by foreigners, Iranians received particular attention in relation to the fabrication and sale of phone cards. There were also cases of group smuggling by sea in 1997. Meanwhile, an increasing number of Iranians settled in Japan by marrying people with resident status in the late 1990s; however, this phenomenon received very little media coverage. In 1999, a movement of Iranians and other foreigners living and working in Japan for long periods emerged, applying for Special Permission to Stay in Japan and amnesty, with those meeting certain conditions being accepted, as I explain later in detail.
Information gathering: parks, phones, and communication
Many studies posit that the pursuit of information was the reason Iranians gathered in Japan’s public spaces. Although not as prominently as in Japan, Iranians also gathered in other places around the world.Footnote 59 Shahram Khosravi explained that it is common for all immigrants to have hubs. For example, Cantt station in Karachi, Pakistan, and Aksaray or Laleli area in Istanbul, Turkey, served as hubs for Iranians in those cities.Footnote 60 Indeed, many Iranian migrants and asylum seekers only knew the names of the gathering places in the cities to which they went when they left Iran.
Since many Iranians who went to Japan relied on uncertain information from the outset, airplanes and Narita airport became fora of information exchange.Footnote 61 Although loitering at Narita airport was banned in May 1991, small-scale gatherings were already occurring at Yoyogi Park in late 1990. Thus, it was common for Iranians to socialize with other Iranians in public spaces; however, gatherings did not always occur for the same purpose.
As Machimura explained, the time at which Iranians began to gather at Yoyogi Park coincided with when street music became popular.Footnote 62 Early Iranian visitors to the park claimed that they wanted to see the music and dance performances in the pedestrian area. In a news article, a man called Mr. Ali stated: “The young people enjoy dancing. I wanted to join.” He soon began selling kebab on the street. Yoyogi Park began holding stalls on weekends and became a meeting place for up to 8,000 people, mostly Iranians. A spokesperson for the Iranian embassy told the newspaper that, in Iran, people sometimes gather on street corners to talk, but “even within Iran, it is rare for groups of thousands of people to form. I have never heard of it in foreign countries as well” (Asahi, May 15, 1993). It was also unusual for more than 47,000 people to leave Iran for a particular country in one year (1991), for reasons other than pilgrimage.
Similar to Yoyogi Park, Ueno Park also became a meeting place. The area around the JR Ueno station had been a shopping destination for Iranian buyers since the mid-1980s. In May 1991, the park began attracting significant Iranian crowds. Ueno Park is a popular destination for cherry blossom viewing, attracting visitors from late March to early April, when the trees are in full bloom. During the cherry blossom viewing season in 1992, Persian-language leaflets were distributed by the Ueno Police Department to avoid problems with cherry blossom viewers, and a temporary guardroom was set up in the park. However, rather than causing problems, Iranians sought police advice on how to view the cherry blossoms.Footnote 63
Of all the places where Iranians gathered, they set up unofficial stalls only in Yoyogi Park. Iranians gathered outside the gate of Yoyogi Park, on a street that branched off from where street musicians played, and set up stalls in the space behind the garden. In that space, which Machimura called the “bazaar space,” shops selling Persian magazines, videos, sundries, and foodstuffs were set up, with the sales areas divided by items (Figure 2). The number of sellers exceeded 100 at its peak, with Pakistanis and Afghans also visiting the market.Footnote 64 The area in which the stalls were located was temporary closed in April 1993.
Iranian Stalls at Yoyogi Park, Photo by Takeshi Nishiyama.Footnote 65
Photojournalist Takeshi Nishiyama described the rows of stalls in Yoyogi Park in 1992 as follows:
…skewered kebabs, boxed lunches, and sandwiches. Cassette tapes and videos of American singers, Persian-language popular magazines for Iranians published in the US. All of which, of course, are now banned in Iran. …There are about twenty barbers who charge 1,000 yen [USD 10 at the time]. … Discount airline tickets, forged phone cards are sold as well.Footnote 66
In 1991, the economic recession led to layoffs and unpaid wages. At that time, newly arrived Iranians had difficulty finding work, not only because they were unable to take jobs they had been introduced to beforehand, but also because many came without any information about employment or living in Japan. They relied only on names such as Ueno and Harajuku (Yoyogi Park) to obtain information. Brokers emerged in the parks to provide (and take commission from) jobs, some of whom had been active at Narita airport earlier.Footnote 67 A series of accommodation investigations were conducted in the same period, including at three hostels near JR Nippori station. The hostels’ owner was an Iranian businessman, who had opened the first hostel in 1987 and expanded in 1988 and 1991, allowing up to 200 people to be accommodated simultaneously. According to the Arakawa police, some guests revealed that they had come to Japan after seeing an advertisement for this hostel in an Iranian newspaper. It was also confirmed that business cards with phone numbers and directions to the hostel were stacked at Narita airport.Footnote 68 Both these hostels and JR Nippori station became an information-exchange spot.
Although there were Iranians in their lodgings and workplaces, Iranians still sought other places to gather information. Yamagishi and Morita describe this phenomenon as follows:
The Iranians merely sought information from anyone they could contact, and some just told what they knew. It was an extension of daily conversation. The more astute found a good business opportunity by charging for job information. Even so, the brokers were not always reliable.Footnote 69
At the same time that Iranian gatherings were gaining attention, Iranians’ sale of forged phone cards became even more prominent. The first news article on this appeared in January 1992. Cases of the illegal modification of public telephones occurred around 1991, with the national telecommunication company taking countermeasures, leading to the subsequent appearance of forged phonecards. A three-minute call from Tokyo to Tehran in 1991 cost at least 740 yen (USD 7.50 at the time), which was far more than the minimum hourly wage of 541 yen. As such, forged phonecards found significant demand among Iranians. Newspaper articles reported that on Nowruz (the spring equinox) in 1992, Iranians were increasing being arrested for using forged phone cards to call their families.Footnote 70
Forged phonecards were illegal and risky, but attracted unemployed Iranians and others who made international and domestic calls. Although Japan’s national telecommunication company was privatized in 1985, both international and long-distance domestic calls incurred high costs in the early 1990s. In 1994, several international telecommunication companies tried to cater to migrant communities.Footnote 71
From the beginning of 1992, parks and workplaces became subject to overstay and illegal employment checks, with the use of forged phonecards becoming an opportunity to arrest individuals for minor offences. Iranian public gatherings lost their joy, gradually becoming smaller and less conspicuous due to increasing arrests. Meanwhile, between late 1992–1993, increasing media coverage of Iranian trafficking of forged phonecards and drugs cemented their “criminal” image in Japanese society.Footnote 72 Consequently, the “bad Iranians/good Iranians” explanation took hold among Iranians themselves, as evidenced by their responses in the Tsukuba research.Footnote 73 As an Iranian office worker interviewed in Yoyogi Park in May 1993 said: “There are bad people in Iran [same as in the world]. They can do it because they are cut off from their families”.Footnote 74
Being cut off from family and migrating to Japan alone is key to understanding Iranian gatherings in Japan—“communitas,” to use Victor Turner’s term, rather than society or community.Footnote 75 Turner used the Latin “communitas” to distinguish this idea from the structured social relationship called “community,” “giving recognition to an essential and generic human bond.” Irrespective of age, career, and educational background, Iranians generally had limited information and resources in Japan. Having less social capital created an egalitarian sphere among Iranians, as reflected in Turner’s concept of “liminality,” which appears in the transition of a social group, as extracting benefits from one another was not a likely outcome.
In the liminal sphere of those cut off from family ties and lacking sufficient resources, no hierarchy emerges between those who provide benefits and those who seek them, and thus the group remains unstructured. According to linguistic anthropologist William Beeman, the Persian term partībāzī refers to a bargain made by an individual to fulfil a request through access to the family and friends of a person who can provide a convenience. Partībāzī needs stable relationships, such as family and friends, and a fluctuating status within the community. Conversely, the limited number of people with status and authority among migrants during the coming-to-Japan boom did not result in indirect access to certain individuals, and thus did not create what Beeman has called “the chain of obligation.”Footnote 76
Instead, there was often non-reciprocal giving to those in need. On June 20, 1994, an investigation was conducted at Ueno Park following the arrest of a thirty-four-year-old man for not carrying his passport, who complained of a headache while in detention and died at the hospital. While the time of the injury’s occurrence was not disclosed, his head and body were reported to have shown signs of beating and bleeding.Footnote 77 His Japanese wife, and his mother who lived in Iran, claimed, along with supporters, that he had been assaulted during the arrest, demanding the disclosure of police documents and filing a lawsuit against the hospital that diagnosed him. A rally was held to mourn his death on June 23. Nishiyama described the situation:
On the night of the 23rd, Arijan’s [Arjang’s] close friend, Abbas, ran around gathering Iranians and held a memorial service under the Saigo statue in Ueno. The fifty Iranians gathered were emotionally overwhelmed and silent throughout. Abbas raised 800,000 yen [USD 8000 at the time] for the transportation of his body. The bundle of notes was about five centimeters thick and enough for Arijan to return to Iran.Footnote 78
Mutual help arising from sympathy based on a shared position can be found in many situations; however, they were rarely socially visible. This was because most Iranians in Japan overstayed and their lives were more fluid than those living in other countries with similar-sized Iranian populations.
Fariba Adelkhah notes that religious gatherings were held and patron-client relationships formed by those in power among Iranians in Japan.Footnote 79 Both grass-rooted and elite-led social circles of Iranians existed in Japan, but were unlikely to have integrated the Japanese Iranian population. Nadi, who came to Japan with her parents and two younger brothers in 1991 when she was six, recalled the family’s life in Japan in her memoir. She described her father’s religious circle as follows:
Prayer gatherings were held weekly at someone’s home, where one person would read the Qur’an and lead the congregation in prayer. This practice was common in Iranian mosques, but since there were no nearby mosques in Japan and many people had overstayed their visas, they gathered in this way so that they would not have to travel far. My father often read the Qur’an at these gatherings.Footnote 80
Iranians abroad have organized ritual and prayer gatherings at home, and these have sometimes developed into wider communities, such as Islamic centers.Footnote 81 In Japan, however, religious gatherings were only visible at temporary sites or Iranian government-provided sites. Nishiyama reported an Ashura ritual held in Ueno Park on the evening of July 10, 1992, “Shab-e Ashura,” with the “Zohr-e Ashura” held the following day at the Iranian embassy, both commemorating the death of the Third Imam, Hussain.Footnote 82 According to Nishiyama, while roughly 200 Iranians gathered at Ueno Park for this religious gathering, they were subsequently excluded from this public space, so future gatherings could no longer be held there.
As in other Iranian diaspora communities, market-driven community building was also seen in Japan, such as publishing Persian-language magazines—such as Pol-e Abrīsham and Āftāb-e Rōshanāī, published in the late 1990s—and organizing concerts.Footnote 83 Such magazines featured advertisements for international calls, recruitment, and consultancy services on stays in Japan, while concerts included that of Moein in August 1992, with Jamileh and Fataneh, and Mahasti in August 1993, with Susan Roshan and Faramarz Assef, both around Tokyo. An audience of more than 3,000 attended the Moein concert, and many without tickets broke into the hall. The concert was interrupted when around 100 people climbed onto the stage.Footnote 84 The Mahasti concert was smaller, with 800 people in attendance, even after Yoyogi Park was closed and overstaying was more strictly detected.Footnote 85 These cultural industries did not flourish in Japan for long, however, as the Iranian population declined just as quickly as it had grown.
Among Iranian communities in other countries, these gatherings typically evolved from small, informal meetups into more institutionalized and commercial events. In contrast, gatherings of Iranians in Japan in the early 1990s began as informal meetings in public spaces with entertainment. While these events rapidly expanded in scale and attendance, they never transitioned to formal, organized structures. This difference can be attributed to the community’s arrival with visa exemption and without prior direct connection to Japan. Placed in this liminal context, factors such as background, age, reasons for migration, and sociopolitical stance became neutralized. As a result, communitas emerged among individuals with limited resources, fostering equal relationships. However, stricter immigration enforcement and economic difficulties led to a rapid decline in Japan’s Iranian population, ultimately resulting in the dissolution of these public gatherings and cultural activities.
Sojourners and settlers
In general, the motives, intentions, and goals of migration change constantly over time. Hence, repeated entry into and exit from a particular country, alongside repatriation and secondary migration, are often observed. In the case of Iranians, patterns can be seen in their attempts to re-enter Japan: those who wanted to stay outside Iran as exiles in a broad sense and those who could not recoup the costs of travel, both in terms of financial compensation and social recognition as successful returnees in Iran.
Although shuttle trade and migrant work may have been linked, news articles on Iranian asylum seekers indicate that the purpose of coming to Japan was not just for economic activities. In a 1985 article, it was reported that “new refugees” from Iran and Afghanistan were becoming an issue in Japan, as there were nearly eighty asylum cases, including Iranians, due to the reduced intake in North America.Footnote 86 Another article described a statement from Iranian asylum seekers calling for refugee status.Footnote 87
Before the visa waiver suspension, some Iranians left the country every ninety days to maintain their legal stay in Japan. For example, a twenty-seven-year-old Iranian man and his family arrived in Japan between May–June 1983 and applied for asylum in October. When their asylum was refused, the family filed a complaint against the decision and traveled regularly to the Philippines in accordance with their ninety-day residence permit.Footnote 88 Similarly, a twenty-six-year-old Iranian man who came to Japan in 1981 also had to leave the country every ninety days to maintain his legal presence, later marrying a Japanese woman. As he was politically active in an anti-government organization in Iran, he applied for asylum in 1986, but was rejected. He filed a lawsuit against this decision while in immigration detention under a deportation order. Eventually, he was granted a residence permit due to having a family in Japan, not based on his refugee claim.Footnote 89
Refugee status was not granted in Japan until 1982, except for refugees from Indochina. Japan joined the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1981, recognizing refugee status since 1982. Nevertheless, Japan did not have a comprehensive procedure to screen applications for those from places other than Indochina. If a refugee application was rejected and the applicant’s period of stay expired, they were either detained by the Immigration Bureau or given provisional release status. An Iranian religious minority family entered Japan in 1985 on tourist visas and claimed asylum soon after arrival. It took approximately two years for their claim to be rejected in 1987. The father was sent to the immigration detention center the following year, while his family remained on provisional release (kari-houmen), which allows the holder—often wives and children of detained men—to temporarily remain outside the detention center, but with restrictions on travel and work until they show intention to return home.Footnote 90
A man who came to Japan in 1991 and was detained for overstaying in 2000 applied for refugee status on the grounds of homosexuality. His application was rejected, but after about six years of detention and provisional release, he was granted refugee status by the UNHCR and moved to Sweden through third-country resettlement.Footnote 91
The choice between applying for asylum and obtaining residency another way is made based on the possibilities and difficulties of both processes. Those who left Iran in response to social repression rather than fear of persecution had no possibility of asylum, so if they were incapable of obtaining residential status abroad, “illegal” migration was the last option. In his autoethnography, Shahram Khosravi described Iranian youths, including himself, who escaped conscription during the Iran–Iraq War. Since avoiding conscription was not a valid reason for claiming asylum, they explored various routes across the border and repeatedly attempted to apply for refugee status on other grounds.Footnote 92 Without refugee status, they were deemed “illegal” and deprived of protection. This “illegality” also gave rise to emotions such as shame, which Khosravi described as “part of the punishment for transgressing nation-state sovereignty.”Footnote 93
Those who overstayed in Japan also experienced the emotions associated with being in the country “illegally.” Okada described an Iranian youth, using the pseudonym Majid, whose life history exemplifies the complexities of staying in Japan in the 1990s. Born in Tehran to an Ardabili-Azeri family, Majid enrolled in compulsory military service before entering university, but left halfway through his mandatory two-year term. A rumor was circulating that military service evaders might be executed if caught by the police.Footnote 94 This fear drove Majid to travel abroad, bringing both fake and real passports. On his arrival in Canada via the UAE, he was refused entry without a valid visa. He searched for a country where Iranians could enter without a visa and arrived in Japan in 1991. When his life there was unsuccessful, he tried to leave for the United States using forged passports. He traveled to Turkey via Canada, was detained at the airport, and escaped. He then worked in Bulgaria before returning to Japan just before the visa waiver suspension in 1992.
Okada supplements Majid’s trajectory, saying:
The biggest worry of [Iranian] workers abroad seems to be the fear that they will not be accepted in their home country. This is because they left the country illegally, and I was told that a significant number of those working abroad have left the country illegally… Their greatest fear is being arrested as a criminal at the airport in their home country.Footnote 95
Therefore, if there was even the slightest threat to their security back home, Iranians chose to remain outside the country rather than return. Later, Majid realized that military service evaders could make payments for exemptions. He dreamed of temporarily returning to Iran from Japan with a forged passport before returning legally by paying the fine.Footnote 96 It was important to Majid to “return properly” to Iran, and any residence status was acceptable to stay away temporarily. Okada used the phrase “return properly” because Majid wished to return without fear of arrest. Being “illegal” in Iran is the thing he wanted to avoid most. Instead, Majid chose to be “illegal” abroad or use a forged passport to enter Iran before returning properly.
Iranians who resided and worked without legal status in Japan had both local and global cosmopolitan ties with other countries. In 1997, a series of stowaways came to Japan from South Korea, including a significant number of Iranians. For example, of the twenty-five people who landed in Matsuura, Nagasaki Prefecture, from Busan, South Korea, in January 1997, eighteen were Iranian, four were Indian, and three were Pakistani.Footnote 97 While there had been previous cases of smuggling from South Korea, the 1997 Asian currency crisis led to increased unemployment in the country and many unauthorized Iranian workers left, sometimes without passports.
In the process of smuggling, liminal solidarities emerged between Russian seafarers and Korean and Bangladeshi brokers. Nevertheless, passengers sometimes faced sudden betrayals and were left behind. For example, a tugboat of forty-five stowaways arrived in Okayama from Busan, placed in a refrigerator car, and left behind in Osaka. Those with enough money were taken to Tokyo by bullet train and those without disembarked at Nagoya.Footnote 98 With limited capital and information, it is difficult to reach where one wants to go. As John Urry argues, although mobility has the potential to enhance social status, it can also lead to social deprivation and exclusion. Several factors that influence changes in social status associated with mobility include financial resources and access to information.Footnote 99 The above example demonstrates that even those on the same path can end up in different places, depending on their resources, and the same can be said for visions of greater mobility.
The high costs and risks of smuggling may seem irrational, particularly in the absence of secure employment in Japan, but it has been a desperate attempt to “return properly” to Iran, as seen in Majid’s case. A 1994 article reported on an Iranian man arrested in Japan who, in 1990, had worked and successfully earned enough money to buy an apartment in Tehran. He then lost his job as a driver, due to a hernia, and left for Korea in 1993. He sold the apartment he had bought with his first earnings for his next trip, leaving his family with little money. Although he worked in Korea, he wanted to return to Japan. It took more than five months for him to get smuggled into Japan, and he was arrested immediately upon landing. News of his arrest reached his family, and his father in Tehran told a Japanese correspondent, “I feel we have lost not only our money, but also our pride” (Asahi, May 2, 1994). Being “illegal” due to overstaying visas, unauthorized work, deportation, or smuggling is considered worthwhile if one can “return properly.” However, if the family discovers that the individual has been arrested and requires bail, the chance to “return properly” has been lost.
The meaning of “illegality” changes when a person settles in a place to which they previously sojourned. Marriage is one such trigger. Marriages in Japan increased from around 1993, although the registration of such marriages does not automatically confer resident status. The Special Permission to Stay for overstayers due to marriage takes over a year to examine, requires payment of at least 300,000 yen (USD 3,000 at the time) for provisional release, and does not allow work outside the permit during screening. Considering the time and cost, marriage is not an expedient solution to legal residence. At its peak in 2001, 1,549 Iranians held spousal visas, a figure that declined as more people switched from spousal to permanent resident visas.Footnote 100
The path to settlement for those who came with their families was even more challenging. In 1999, twenty-one overstayers, including sixteen Iranians from four families, voluntarily presented themselves at the immigration office for the Special Permission to Stay, insisting they had been in Japan for nearly a decade and established livelihoods. One Iranian family described the circumstances of their stay in Japan in an interview: the father had come on a tourist visa in 1991, and after working as a plumber, invited his wife and four-year-old daughter. The daughter attended primary school and a son was born in 1994, when they had no medical insurance in Japan. Both this lack of Japanese national health insurance and the children’s inability to adapt to Iran upon return were major concerns for the family.Footnote 101 At that time, overstaying children could attend public schools if they held the Alien Registration Card issued at municipal offices, although this was largely at the discretion of the schools.
In particular instances, Special Permission to Stay was granted to people who did not qualify as refugees or residents. The guidelines for this permit were not established until 2006, however; in the 1990s, this system mainly applied only to those married or raising children born to Japanese nationals. According to the Ministry of Justice, there were approximately 270,000 overstayers and unauthorized migrant workers in Japan at the end of 1999, including Iranians, and a growing movement to award them permanent residence status.
However, a series of appeals produced different results depending on family structure. In 2000, Minister of Justice Usui Hideo eased the criteria for Special Permission to Stay. In examining the applications of twenty-one people who presented themselves in September 1999 for this permit, the minister decided to allow them to stay “if their children have grown up in Japan and it has become difficult for them to live in their home country”.Footnote 102 Among these twenty-one applications, there were also single people who did not wish to return home for various reasons, such as those receiving medical treatment for work accidents or those who feared persecution because they had participated in anti-government activities. As the new criteria was based on child welfare, not all presenters met the permit’s conditions, as it was limited to families with children “in school.” Thus, while an Iranian family with a fifteen-year-old son received Special Permission to Stay, a family from Myanmar with a two-year-old daughter received a deportation order.Footnote 103 Even families with school-aged children were not guaranteed approval, the reasons for which were never disclosed.Footnote 104 In 2007, all four members of an Iranian family accepted a deportation order on the condition that the elder daughter was assured of an immediate re-entry permit to enroll in college.Footnote 105
In many cases of family deportation orders, only the head of the family was detained while the rest of the family remained at home on provisional release. Family fragmentation is often used by governments as a strategy to make unauthorized migrants give up and return home, as Kurdish Iranian Journalist Behrouz Boochani reported in the case of Australian detention centers, where women and children were housed separately from men in the surrounding islands.Footnote 106 The Special Permission to Stay and deportation orders dictated how individuals and families lived.
Conclusion: what was the “coming-to-Japan boom”?
Much of the transnational migratory flow of Iranians after the 1979 revolution can be seen through the case of Japan: shuttle traders, migrant laborers, conscription evasion, temporary stops in attempts to claim asylum in Europe or the United States, entry through transit countries, and smuggling. The coming-to-Japan boom was characterized by three features: the time of entry, status of residence, and gender and family structure. The demand for long-distance international calls and rampant unemployment due to Japan’s economic slowdown both contributed to the distribution of counterfeit phonecards by Iranians. Large numbers of men, both married and unmarried, migrating at approximately the same time and working as unauthorized workers created fragmented but egalitarian relationships, rather than hierarchical societies. Massive gatherings at parks and stations emerged in this situation, where seeking information, networks, and a good time converged. These modes of communication were common to the global Iranian diaspora, but the scale was unique to Japan.
What did the coming-to-Japan boom contribute to the world map of the Iranian diaspora? The massive flow of people to the East and increased economic exchange between Iran and Japan in the late twentieth century facilitated Iranians’ entry into Japan. These circuits changed constantly according to information expectations and institutional possibilities. Iranians living in Japan created a new hub for Southeast and East Asian countries, which included Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and China. However, Japan’s strict immigration policy prevented the continued entry of Iranians. Those who came during a particular period settled down through marriage or other means; as a result, almost all members of the Iranian community in Japan are of the same generational cohort. In the documentary film Mehrabad-Narita, directed by Amir Bashti (1397/2018), about Iranians in Japan, a man narrates:
They [Iranians] have been in Japan for approximately twenty-five years and are still the same as they were twenty-five years ago. I myself have not changed from twenty-five years ago. The behavior, personality, and principals of twenty-five years ago, and I am still keeping the same young innocence and manner. The only thing that changed was the living situation, having lived in a different country.
According to this narrative, Iranians currently living in Japan continue to maintain egalitarian, anti-structural communities forged during the 1980s and 1990s, even as some of their friends and acquaintances returned to Iran or migrated onward to other countries.
