Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T03:25:00.389Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Right-Based Justification of Punishment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2016

Get access

Extract

The deontological justification of punishment is generally associated with the notion of “retributive justice”. This notion, however, underlies only one of two distinct approaches by which one may attempt to justify punishment within deontological morality. According to this, the classical approach, punishment is to be regarded as an end in itself, intrinsically valuable, from the moral point of view. According to other deontological views, however, punishment has only instrumental value – not, as in consequentialism, in the maximization of some general social good, but in the maintenance and equal distribution of basic individual rights. Borrowing Dworkin's terminology, this view can be called a “right-based” conception of punishment.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable