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Rejoinder

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 March 2012

Extract

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In this brief response I address two issues raised by these generous comments. Rivka Weill and Margit Cohn prod me to provide a more theoretical underpinning for the historical account I offered, and all three commenters suggest that the U.S. experience does not shed much light on the normative case for constitutional review presented by Alon Harel in other work. I sketch a theoretical account of the historical narrative, grounded in the structure of U.S. government and politics. That sketch may have some implications for conceptualizing the course of constitutional development in other polities. Then I raise some questions about Harel's theory of constitutional review as a mechanism for providing individuals with a forum in which they can receive an explanation of why they are properly being subjected to treatment that harms them individually, if one is available. I end with a suggestion connecting the two components of this Rejoinder.

Information

Type
Symposium on Mark Tushnet's The Rights Revolution in the Twentieth Century
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2009