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Responsibility for “Covering-up” an offence*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2016

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Extract

The following are some reflections on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abu Khadrah v. Attorney-General. The facts of the case, albeit very simple, enable a number of primary legal problems regarding the offence of “covering-up” a criminal act to be considered.

a. The facts. The appellant was aware from what someone had told him that his informant along with the appellant's brother and other persons had sailed in his brother's boat to Gaza—obviously before the Six Day War—had there met Egyptian intelligence personnel, had handed over a sack and received from them a not inconsiderable sum of Israel money. The appellant was charged under sec. 5 of the Penal Law Revision (State Security—Foreign Relations and Official Secrets) Law, 1957 (hereinafter called the State Security Law) with “covering-up” of an offence committed by his brother and the others contrary to sec. 22 (b) of that Law.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1968

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