Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-fvjsw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T00:29:54.265Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Retrospect and Prospect, Retribution and Deterrence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2016

Get access

Extract

(1) During my lifetime most of the discussion of punishment in British philosophical journals has started from an article first published in 1939. Thirty years later this was reprinted, along with a selection of eleven of the most substantial subsequent contributions, to form a volume which has since served to introduce further student generations to The Philosophy of Punishment. In that seminal paper the late John Mabbott — whom it was later my good fortune to have as one of my tutors — proposed “to defend a retributive theory of punishment, and to reject absolutely all utilitarian considerations from its justification”.

His initial claim perhaps sounded bolder, or rasher, than it was. For Mabbott in his second paragraph explained: “The question I am asking is this. Under what circumstances is the punishment of some particular person justified, and why?” After giving and defending his retributive answer to this question Mabbott turned to the “distinction between abolishing injustice in punishment and abolishing punishment altogether”. While still insisting that “punishment is a corollary of law breaking …” he went on to allow that “considerations of utility come in on two quite different issues. Should there be laws, and what laws should there be? … The choice which is the essential prius of punishment is the choice that there should be laws”.

Information

Type
Theories of Punishment
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1991

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable