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Sentencing as Art

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2016

Yoram Shachar
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Extract

Thomas Aquinas, in his famous argument on human law, classified the process of sentencing as an art, as opposed to a science. Human law, he argued, or at least good human law, “has the force of law in that it flows from natural law”. And yet, Aquinas further maintained that “commands can be traced to natural law in two ways; one, drawn deductively like conclusions from premises; two, grounded on it like constructional implementations of general directives. The first process is like that of the sciences. … The second process is like that of the arts where a special shape is given to a general idea, as when an architect determines that a house should be in this or that style”. Hence while a proposition such as “you must not commit murder” can be deduced from “you must not commit harm”, no similar deduction can determine the appropriate punishment for the crime: “Natural law pronounces that crime has to be punished without deciding whether this or that should be the penalty; the punishment selected is like a determinate form given to natural law”, concludes Aquinas.

Information

Type
Determining Penalties (2): Norm Versus Discretion
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 25 , Issue 3-4 , Summer–Autumn 1991, pp. 638 - 661
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1991

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References

1 Summa Theologia, 1a2ae 95 art. 2 (Blackfriars ed.).

2 Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980) 286Google Scholar.

3 Id., at 288.

4 Id., at 289-90.

5 See text at n. 2.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 For Finnis's own version of the argument from authority see id., at 231 ff.

9 von Hirsch, Andrew, “Guiding Principles for Sentencing: The Proposed Swedish Law” [1987] Crim. L. R. 746Google Scholar.

10 For text see Knapp, K. A., Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary Annotated (Minn. Continuing Legal Education, 1985)Google Scholar.

11 von Hirsch, supra n. 9, at 749.

12 Id., at 749-50.

13 Id., at 750.

14 For English text see (1987) 13 New England J. on Crim. and Civil Confinements.

15 von Hirsch, supra n. 9, at 750.

16 Id.

17 See Schulhofer, Stephen J., “Due Process of Sentencing” (1980) 128 U. Pa. L. R. 733, at 800Google Scholar.

18 von Hirsch, supra n. 9, at 750.

19 Id.

20 Davis, Michael, “How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime” (1985) 27 Criminal Justice 119, at 134–6Google Scholar.

21 Id., at 134.

22 Id., at 135. For a view that some shared morality is essential to the existence of any society, but that the portion of human morality that is truly essential in this sense is small, see Hart, H. L. A., Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1963) 51Google Scholar; Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961) 189Google Scholar.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id., at 152, n. 15. Incidentally, if crimes are grouped by intent (i.e., in Davis's analysis, the actor's aim), it is difficult to see why unintentional killing, or any unintentional harm, should be classified as crime at all. Unintentional killers usually aim to achieve perfectly legitimate goals.

26 Supra n. 9.

27 Id., at 751.

28 Id.

29 See supra text at nn. 20-21.

30 von Hirsch, supra n. 9, at 751.

31 Id.

32 Id. (e.g., “the harm characteristic of … murder”).

33 Id., at 752.

34 Feinberg, Joel, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford U. P., 1984) vols. 1–4Google Scholar.

35 Supra n. 9.

36 See the two leading treatises on criminal law; Levy, Y. and Lederman, E., Principles of Criminal Responsibility (Ramot, 1981, in Hebrew) 456Google Scholar; Feller, S. Z., Elements of Criminal Law (Hebrew University, Harry Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, 1984, in Hebrew) 617Google Scholar.

37 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Attorney General (1954) 8 P.D. 456; 2 S. J. 92, at 113.

38 Feller, supra n. 36.

39 For example, id., at 648-50.

40 Feller, id., at 620.

41 Austin, John, Lectures in Jurisprudence (1861) vol. 2, p. 108Google Scholar.

42 Bedau, Hugo Adam, “Classification-Based Sentencing: Some Conceptual and Ethical Problems” (1985) 27 Criminal Justice 89Google Scholar. See also Mackie, John L., “Morality and the Retributive Emotions” (1982) 1 Criminal Justice Ethics 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 Bedau, id., at 92 ff.

44 Id., at 98.

45 But note that degrees of culpability do have an effect in the Pennsylvania scheme on the definition of specific offences; id., at 112.

46 Id., at 94.

47 “Proposed Preliminary Part and General Part for a New Criminal Law and Short Explanatory Comments” (1984) 10 Mishpatim 127Google Scholar.

48 Secs. 72-163.

49 Secs. 101-112.

50 Sec. 78(a).

51 Secs. 164-183.

52 Sec. 164.

53 Sec. 165.

54 Sec. 165(a)(2).

55 Sec. 169.

56 Sec. 182(b).

57 Secs. 177-180.

58 Sec. 182(a).

59 Sec. 171.

60 Sec. 221(3).

61 Sec. 221(5).

62 Sec. 221(4).

63 Secs. 172-176, 183.

64 Secs. 25-37.

65 Sec. 27, versions 1 and 2.

66 See Shachar, Y., “The Fortuitous Gap in Law and Morality” (1987) 6 Criminal Justice Ethics 12, at 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 See, generally, references in Shachar, id.

68 U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines, Revised Draft, Feb. 1987, in 40 Criminal Law Reporter no. 20, p. 3201Google Scholar.

69 Id., at 3203.

70 Id.

71 Sec. X211, id., at 3251.

72 Id.

73 Sec. Y221.

74 Sec. Y225.

75 For example, permanent bodily injury can increase the offence level by six points sec. Y225). The base offence level for, e.g., both rape and attempted rape is 28 points sec. A261), but the accomplished act is likelier to cause injury (or aggravate it) and so turn a 78-months minimum term of imprisonment for a first offender (assuming there are no other specific offence characteristics according to sec. A261) into, e.g., a 151-months minimum term (see Sentencing Table, id., at 3206).

76 See comment to sec. A214, id., at 3208.

77 The penalty can move up and down the scales due, e.g., to a lesser degree of planning (see comment to sec. A214, id., at 3208) or the use of weapons (sec. Y226).

78 For a full analysis of deterrence and attempt see Schulhofer, Stephen J., “Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct” (1974) 122 U. Pa. L. R. 1497, at 1519–1522, 1533 ffGoogle Scholar.

79 U.S. Guidelines, supra n. 68, at 3204.

80 Aquinas, supra n. 1.

81 See text at supra nn. 6 and 7.

82 U.S. Guidelines, supra n. 68, at 3204.

83 Id.

84 See, e.g., Partridge, A. and Eldridge, W., The Second Circuit Sentencing Study: A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit (Federal Judicial Center, 1974)Google Scholar.

85 See Weston, Peter, “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95 Harv. L. R. 537, at 557Google Scholar.

86 For a brief history of race-in-sentencing studies in America see McConville, M. and Baldwin, J., “The Influence of Race on Sentencing in England” [1982] Crim. L. R. 652, at 652–3Google Scholar; note the authors' view that these studies were in fact inaccurate and that race has not influenced sentencing much; but see more recent American studies reporting race biases: Austin, T. L., “Does Where You Live Determine What You Get? A Case Study of Misdemeanant Sentencing” (1985) 76 J. of Crim. L. and Criminology 490CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, two impact reports cited in Frankel, M. E. and Orlando, L., “Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines” (1984) 73 Georgetown L. J. 225, at 237, 239Google Scholar. For early evidence of some Arab-Jewish bias in the criminal process in Israel see Hag-Yih'ieh, M., Rahav, G. and Teichman, M., Differentiation Between Jews and Arabs in Juvenile Criminal Process (Publications of Tel-Aviv University Institute of Criminology and Criminal Law, No. 11, 1978)Google Scholar.

87 See supra n. 17, at 801.

88 Ten, C. L., Crime, Guilt and Punishment (Clarendon Press, 1987) 164Google Scholar.