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A revenue-equivalence theorem for electricity auctions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

Juri Hinz*
Affiliation:
Universität Tübingen

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the real-time trading of electricity. We address a model for an auction-like trading which captures key features of real-world electricity markets. Our main result establishes that, under certain conditions, the expected total payment for electricity is independent of the particular auction type. This result is analogous to the revenue-equivalence theorem known for classical auctions and could contribute to an improved understanding of different electricity market designs and their comparison.

Information

Type
Research Papers
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 2004 

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