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Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

Hsiao-Chi Chen*
Affiliation:
National Taipei University
Yunshyong Chow*
Affiliation:
Academia Sinica, Taipei
June Hsieh*
Affiliation:
Academia Sinica, Taipei
*
∗ Postal address: Department of Economics, National Taipei University, 67, Section 3, Min-Sheng E. Road, Taipei, Taiwan 104, Republic of China. Email address: hchen@mail.ntpu.edu.tw
∗∗∗ Postal address: Institute of Mathematics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan 115, Republic of China.
∗∗∗ Postal address: Institute of Mathematics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan 115, Republic of China.
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Abstract

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In this paper we study players' long-run behaviors in evolutionary coordination games with imperfect monitoring. In each time period, signals corresponding to players' underlying actions, instead of the actions themselves, are observed. A boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning process is proposed to extract information from the realized signals. We find that players' long-run behaviors depend not only on the correlations between actions and signals, but on the initial probabilities of risk-dominant and non-risk-dominant equilibria being chosen. The conditions under which risk-dominant equilibrium, non-risk-dominant equilibrium, and the coexistence of both equilibria emerges in the long run are shown. In some situations, the number of limiting distributions grows unboundedly as the population size grows to infinity.

Information

Type
Research Papers
Copyright
© Applied Probability Trust 2006