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Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

Hsiao-Chi Chen*
Affiliation:
National Taipei University
Yunshyong Chow*
Affiliation:
Academia Sinica
*
∗ Postal address: Department of Economics, National Taipei University, 151 University Road, San-Shia, Taipei County 23741, Taiwan, R.O.C. Email address: hchen@mail.ntpu.edu.tw
∗∗ Postal address: Institute of Mathematics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan 115, R.O.C. Email address: chow@math.sinica.edu.tw
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Abstract

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In this paper we analyze players' long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imperfect monitoring in a large population. Players can observe signals corresponding to other players' unseen actions and use the proposed simple or maximum likelihood estimation algorithm to extract information from the signals. In the simple learning process we find conditions for the risk-dominant and the non-risk-dominant equilibria to emerge alone in the long run. Furthermore, we find that the two equilibria can coexist in the long run. In contrast, the coexistence of the two equilibria is the only limit distribution under the maximum likelihood estimation learning algorithm. We also analyze the long-run equilibria of other 2x2 symmetric games under imperfect monitoring.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 2008