Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T01:33:49.594Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Shoe That Didn't Drop: Explaining Banking Stability During the Great Depression

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

Richard S. Grossman
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Economics, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT 06459–6067.

Abstract

This article attempts to account for the exceptional stability exhibited by the banking systems of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the Great Depression. It considers three possible explanations of stability—the structure of the commercial banking system, macroeconomic policy and performance, and lender of last resort behavior—employing data from 25 countries across Europe and North America. The results suggest that macroeconomic policy—especially exchange-rate policy—and banking structure, but not lenders of last resort, were systematically responsible for banking stability.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable