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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
On the last day of July 1851, Lorenza Berbineau, a Boston servant girl who accompanied the family of Francis Cabot Lowell II on their tour of Europe, “went to Hyde Park to the great Exhibition.” In breathless prose, she exalted:
It was magnificent I saw things from the United States handsome lamps machinery farming emplements…from France saw a splendid door of Malachite green also tables Chairs vases some say it is stone some say it is a Metal it was taken from a mine I saw the Horse in Bronze the wild horse there was two men tying a man on to him I saw a wrought silks & caps wrought with gold thread a great many Swiss things cut from wood…some Turkey carpets also French Tapestry Carpets there were two large Diamon I was told the man who cut it was put in Prison for 21 years for cutting it so badly…I saw some Vases made from Cannel Coal they looked like black Ebony…there was a good deal of machinery from Different parts of the world some of it was in motion I saw them make bricks they put the clay in it came out formed into brick…I was there about 3 hours to day I got very tired.1
Berbineau, From Beacon Hill.
The sense of being overwhelmed by the richness, variety and sheer volume of the Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace (there were over 100,000 objects on display) was a common reaction among visitors. Both Charles Dickens and Lewis Carroll acknowledged their “bewilderment” while James Ward described his “state of mental helplessness” in the face of such a phantasmagoria.
Petra Moser finds herself in no such state of mental helplessness. She has walked (metaphorically, of course) along the more than 20 miles of aisles and paths that traversed the exhibition grounds of Hyde Park, cataloguing and classifying the exhibits. Moreover, she has done this not just for the Crystal Palace, but also for the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia a generation later. She has meticulously catalogued almost 33,000 exhibits by industry of application, country of origin, geographical location (for more than 4,000 British and over 500 American exhibits in 1851), whether the exhibit was patented or not, and whether it received a medal from the exhibition juries. Moser's remarkable data set is rich enough to test an array of hypotheses regarding nineteenth-century technology—including the relationship between innovation and patenting, industrial and locational biases in innovation, and the political economy of patent laws. The results are suggestive and significant, the approach sophisticated and sensible, and Moser's reasoning powerful and persuasive.
The central premise of the dissertation is that the exhibits provide a more secure base for understanding the process of technical change than patent data, with their well-known biases. We should begin then by asking, what exactly do the exhibits represent? Thomas Hughes, who cut his teeth as a technological historian with the very same catalogues from the Crystal Palace, referred to it as a “census of the facts of industry…a museum for industry most representative in 1851.”2
Hughes, “Industry,” p. 3.
The interpretation of the exhibits as a stock rather than a flow measure of “economically useful innovation” is consistent with what we know about the origins of the Crystal Palace Exhibition. Prince Albert, in his famed Mansion House speech, set the agenda: “the Exhibition of 1851 is to give us a true test and a living picture of the point of development at which the whole of mankind has arrived.”3
Quoted in Davis, Great Exhibition, p. 68.
Auerbach, Great Exhibition, p. 92.
Most frequently, of course, the exhibitions provided a means for manufactures to provide examples of their product, to impress potential customers, to gain exposure, or simply for the warm feeling of gaining recognition from being identified a winner in an open competition. Unlike today, however, in neither 1851 nor 1867 was ingenuity a requirement for exhibiting. Quality of workmanship was certainly as, if not more, important. A quick glance at the judges' reports at the Centennial Exhibition confirms this. Commendations employed expressions such as “a good exhibit of its class,” or most frequently “good workmanship” (sometimes in the form of “good standard workmanship”)—only rarely was innovation or ingenuity mentioned. It is also implicit in the system of awards. In 1851 only the Council Medal (awarded to less than 1 percent of exhibits) referred to innovation, whereas the Prize Medal (awarded to 18 percent, with a further 12 percent receiving Honorable Mention) focused on “excellence in production of workmanship.”
Not all exhibits were innovative. Those that did reveal innovative technology or techniques were not always novel. The British exhibits in 1851, for example, included Naysmith's steam hammer, invented in 1839, a variety of Jacquard looms dating back to the 1790s, and models of Murdoch's locomotive (1785) and Watt's steam engine (1784), while “Sir Samuel Brown sent the iron cables he had invented as long ago as 1810, and a model of the Brighton chain pier, which he had built in 1823”5
Quoted in Hobhouse, 1851, p. 80.
Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue, vol. 1, pp. 210, 277, vol. 3, pp. 1269, 1437, 1454, 1460, 1465–66.
When exhibits were both new and innovative, they were not necessarily economically useful. The production of champagne out of rhubarb, for example, or the remarkably named Anhydrohepseterion—a device that enabled a potato to be stewed in its juice, or, my 11 year-old son's personal favorite, the penknife with 1,851 separate blades (not, oddly enough, made by the Swiss), which was declared to have no useful function whatsoever other than to amuse. Novel innovations were often no more than novelty products. Those innovations that did merit positive comment were not always perceived as of commercial use—the exhibit of the British and Foreign Bible Society included copies of the Good Book in 148 languages, in 121 of which it had never published before, many in “languages which had never previously existed in written form.” Because of an error in the allocation of space, the Bibles were exhibited in the middle of the machinery exhibit, squeezed in between a distilling apparatus and a malt machine. This did not please Lord Ashley, the President of the Society and a well-known temperance reformer.
Obviously, we should not exaggerate the frequency of novelty items. Contemporary commentators, especially those skeptical of the merits of the exhibitions, tended to poke fun at the outlandish; it is likely that these represent little more than “white noise” in the overall meaning of the exhibits. Something of the flavor of this can be gauged from the descriptions of the American exhibits at the Crystal Palace. When Walter Bagehot, the editor of the Economist, visited the Great Exhibition on its first day, he commented that Americans must be “extremely well off for soap”: their immense compartment was filled with pyramids of soap, “soap in colors, soap transparently contrived to imitate a stained glass window; soaps molded into busts, pyramids, statuettes…soaps in words, letters, in flowers and other devices.”7
ffrench, Great Exhibition, p. 239.
The stock interpretation can be carried over to the evidence on patenting contained in the exhibition catalogues, which identified those exhibits already under patent. It is also a relevant consideration when considering the different rates of patenting in certain sectors, and the issue of urban bias in exhibiting, both central themes of Moser's dissertation. Moser finds no difference in patenting rates between rural and urban exhibits, but her analysis of the location of British exhibits makes it clear that they were biased towards urban places, especially London and Birmingham. Whitney Walton finds a similar urban bias in French exhibits, with almost 60 percent drawn from the departement de Seine8
Walton, France.
Commentators in 1851, official and unofficial, were certainly concerned about selection bias in the composition of exhibits. The Commissioners of the Great Exhibition believed “the omission of Austrian machinery was due in part to protectionist suspicion”; and noted in their First Report that “the primitive state of patent law gave little protection from foreign or domestic plagiarism and many articles were withdrawn.”9
Davis, Great Exhibition, p. 155.
Great Exhibition, Official Catalogue, vol. 1, p. 20.
Quoted in ffrench, Great Exhibition, p. 251.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Moser's research concerns the issue of why inventors do and do not patent—how they choose to protect intellectual property rights. Patents require disclosure and are bounded in time. For many products, Moser suggests that secrecy may be a more attractive and effective means of protecting knowledge from prying eyes. The fundamental issue is the opacity of the production process—the limited potential for reverse-engineering. This suggests a likely difference in patenting rates between production processes (which may be opaque) and production tools (which are certainly not). There may, of course, be other factors involved in the decision to patent or not to patent—the cost (including the opportunity cost of time involved in filing and processing); the degree of sophistication of the invention or improvement; the rate of technological obsolescence and the scale of technological change; the possibility of first mover advantages; and how skill based an industry is. It is likely that the very low rates of patenting found by Moser in sectors as diverse as textiles, scientific instruments, jewelry, and foodstuffs reflect a combination of factors—limited need for intellectual property rights protection in some; different mechanisms for effective protection in others.
An important counterpart to the question of what do patents protect, is the question of what do inventors and innovators do in the absence of patent protection. Moser examines the exhibits from both Crystal Palace and Philadelphia to test the impact of patent laws on the industrial location of innovations (current and cumulative). There are two outliers in 1851—Switzerland and Denmark—small countries with no patent laws. They do not demonstrate any lower proclivity to innovate, an important finding in itself. Both economies tended to concentrate their innovative energies into foodstuffs and scientific instruments, two products that are less susceptible to reverse-engineering than, say, the production of machinery. Patent laws appear then to influence the direction of innovation (Moser considers the possibility that patent laws are themselves endogenous to the production structure, but provides good reasons to refute this). Moser emphasizes the role of secrecy as the determining factor that protects intellectual property rights in these industries. This seems more than plausible for foodstuffs (just think of the secret recipes associated with Coca-Cola and KFC), but I am less sure about scientific instruments (clocks, watches, optical instruments, barometers, etc.), a classic craft-based industry, for which the intensive employment of product-specific human capital would have reduced the need for patent protection. Moreover, the Swiss exhibited a comparative advantage in textiles in 1851 and 1867; this once again seems to be less a matter of protection via secrecy, but rather a combination of craft-skill and product differentiation in the production process. The most telling argument in favor of Moser's general proposition about the influence of patenting laws on innovation is to be found in the case of the Netherlands, which repealed its law in 1869. Between 1851 and 1875, as Moser observes, there were significant changes in the direction of Dutch industry and the emergence of such innovative food products as oleo-margarine, pioneered by van de Bergh and Jurgens.
In 300 densely packed pages, Alfonso Herranz-Loncán both deepens and widens our understanding of Spanish economic growth in the century before Franco by focusing on investment in market infrastructure. One of the significant contributions of Herranz-Loncán's thesis is that it goes beyond the limitations of the standard historical focus on railways to incorporate other sorts of infrastructure investment—roads, tramways, ports, and telegraphs, as well as such public utilities as gas, water, and electricity. He provides new estimates of investment flows and accumulated capital stock by infrastructure category; examines the geographical distribution of infrastructure investment by province; places the record of Spanish infrastructure investment in a broader European context; and analyzes the contribution of infrastructure investment, and railways in particular, to economic growth in Spain between 1850 and the Civil War. This last part leads to a re-evaluation of one of the most vital debates in recent Spanish historiography—the alleged failure of railways. The thesis is written with a sure command over sources, maturity of insight and sophistication of explanation. It demonstrates a significant investment of human capital (measured in terms of both quantity and quality) and a high social rate of return. It is a considerable accomplishment.
The thesis takes us back to the pioneering days of the New Economic History, when debates were raging over the meaning and relevance of “social savings” and over the precise nature of its relationship to the more familiar concepts of the social and private rate of return. Herranz-Loncán returns to these debates, but adds a further dimension by constructing annual series on new capital investment, retirements, renewals, and the other components necessary to produce consistent series on the gross and net capital stock of infrastructure broadly defined. As he observes, his measurements are incomplete, because there are no figures available to permit inclusion of urban (or suburban) development, but nevertheless key results emerge—most strikingly the contrast between railways and the rest of infrastructure investment. Railway capital was dominant up to 1865 or so; still accounted for the lion's share of infrastructure stocks until 1895; and then became increasingly less important as the building of new lines largely ceased while investment in other forms of infrastructure investment continued to expand. Railways did still matter to overall capital flows, of course, because of the massive scale of renewals necessary to maintain the existing capital stock (the cyclical volatility of gross investment is, for example, dominated by railways as much in the 1920s as in the 1870s). I applaud Herranz-Loncán for the effort that went into the construction of these data; they represent a significant addition to knowledge and will be extremely useful for future scholars.
Yet, despite the added richness provided by these new series, it is still railways that dominate the story—both quantitatively (especially in the nineteenth century) and analytically. So it is perhaps inevitable that the remainder of my remarks is directed at Herranz-Loncán's revisionist views concerning the role of railways in Spanish economic development.
I well remember that the very first economic history workshop I attended as a graduate student in Oxford in the late 1970s was a discussion of the social savings of Spanish railways by Antonio Gomez-Mendoza. Gomez-Mendoza produced spectacularly large numbers—between 18.5 and 23 percent of GDP in 1912 on freight alone.12
See, for example, Gomez-Mendoza, “Spain,” pp. 148–69.
Herranz-Loncán's revised estimate of the social savings from freight traffic, integrating new evidence on the opportunity costs of railway transportation and his own calculations of the marginal cost of freight carriage, is a little lower than Gomez-Mendoza's. The overall contribution of the railways is raised by extending the social savings calculation to passenger transportation—which Gomez-Mendoza treated as an entirely new commodity that would not have developed without the railways, in contrast to Herranz-Loncán, who identifies a vibrant, if limited, stagecoach sector before the railways. The additional social savings is small, but adds to the distinctiveness of the Spanish case.
The very high level of Spanish social savings from railways was achieved despite having one of the lowest ratios of ton-miles (and the lowest level of passenger-miles) relative to GDP in Europe. The answer to this apparent paradox is to found in the nature of the alternative means of transportation—the reliance on roads in a geography absent of major river systems. The social savings figure grew significantly between 1878 and 1912, due partly to the enlargement of the Spanish railway network, and partly to changes in the economics of road transport.13
The much lower social savings for freight traffic in 1878 is due to the assumption of significant seasonal underemployment of pack animals, which results in a much lower value placed on the resource cost of shipping goods by road.
Is a high (and rising) social savings figure sufficient evidence to reject accusations of failure? An argument could surely be made that a high estimate rather indicates the fundamental failure of railways to modernize the economy—in the sense that the denominator in the calculation (GDP) is not large enough. This interpretation would be consistent with Herranz-Loncán's VAR analysis of Spanish economic growth, in which he finds that infrastructure did not promote economic growth. It would be helpful to use the same panel data to create a four-sector model that would explicitly model the impact of railway infrastructure on economic growth; but it seems likely that the results would be the same. The dynamics of social savings matter most, and it was here that railways played such a weak role. It appears that the high social savings figure captures a once-and-for-all effect associated with the original construction of the system—raising Spain to a higher steady-state growth path, as it were, but not effecting a higher growth rate itself. This is, presumably, in part what critics of the social savings conclusion mean by the failure of the Spanish railways—the failure to transform.
The issue begs for a social rate of return calculation to complement the social savings figure. Herranz-Loncán provides it, calculating a very high number for both 1878 and 1912. I think it would also be instructive, if it were possible to do so, to construct the average social rate of return for different lines in different regions at different benchmarks between 1850 and 1935, from which could be inferred the marginal social rate of return on railway investment as the system expanded. My suspicion is that there would be significant divergences between the inter-urban routes that dominated early building and the inter-regional lines that came later. It seems clear from data provided by Herranz-Loncán that the density of use for railways built after 1873 was much lower than for established routes and that the private rate of return was also substantially lower. The second wave of railway building extended the network into rural and outlying areas, apparently with limited economic benefits. The calculation of social rates of return in this manner might resolve the crucial puzzle—if the social rate of return on railway investment was so high, why was the marginal impact of infrastructure investment on Spanish growth essentially zero?
It appears to me that this is a classic case of overbuilding of the railroad system—of Schumpeterian excess, with building ahead of demand unhappily unaccompanied by subsequent growth. I suspect that Herranz-Loncán would disagree with this interpretation, but I am still not quite convinced by the counter-argument. I recognize that railways were a public good in the nineteenth century and that opening up rural areas was a “good thing.” But you can, of course, have too much of a good thing, and it appears that the Spanish railway system achieved that unhappy state.
This does not necessarily make the railways a failure, however. It may well be that the fault in the Spanish economy lay elsewhere—in the failure to take up the opportunity created by the new system of transportation. Was the problem fundamentally one of agricultural stagnation and entrepreneurial intransigence? Or simply the result of a deficiency of resource endowments? Was it due to over-confidence on the part of the railway promoters when predicting future traffic? Or was it corruption and a political system manipulated by speculators? Was the railway system poorly designed? Or were railways compromised by other weaknesses in the infrastructure, such as the poor investment in secondary roads necessary to provide a full transportation network? It should be noted that the density of roads in Spain was very low relative to economic density compared to other European countries; and that communications infrastructure was also relatively weak, with poor access to a limited telegraph system and expensive rates.
The social savings method looks at roads as substitutes, whereas an infrastructure approach emphasizes that they were complements. Certainly, the locational advantages of new infrastructure investment appear not to have been fully realized for Spain. The railways may have integrated the Spanish economy, but they did not break down established regional hierarchies. There was considerable spatial auto-correlation in the rail network as it expanded over time; similarly in road infrastructure as well. Moreover, over time the distribution of roads and railways became more similar across provinces, suggesting that infrastructure investment was producing commercial momentum and geographical inertia simultaneously.
Failure in the mind of such critics of the railway system as Gabrielle Tortella covers not only the transformative power of investment, but includes also the apparent failure of the railways as private enterprises. Herranz-Loncán rightly observes, however, that Spanish railways do not look so bad when placed in a broader European context. The (average) ratio of net receipts to capital was relatively high compared to other systems, and the ratio of working expenses to traffic revenues was relatively low. But I am not yet convinced that these statistics do not simply prove that fares were relatively high on Spanish railways, due to the relatively low volume of traffic carried per mile of track, and that Spanish railways allocated fewer resources to maintenance and service. Indeed, the problems of the Spanish railways at the end of the nineteenth century would not be unfamiliar to the bosses of Amtrak or Virgin Rail at the beginning of the twenty-first, with complaints about high fares, poor quality of service, and insufficient funds to maintain the infrastructure, let alone effect capital improvements. As today, the most densely settled lines seem to be the only ones capable of achieving a reasonable rate of return on capital, whereas the less well-used lines suffer from increasing neglect.
In short, Spanish railways seem to have begun to suffer from the problems of the railway in a mature economy, long before Spain became a mature economy. The problems of the modern railroad emanate in no small part from competition provided by other more efficient, more flexible sources of transportation. But nineteenth-century Spain had no alternative source of transport—indeed inland waterway systems were so poor, that they faced no competition to speak of at all. This, of course, is why the social savings are so high. It also seems likely that this is why private returns were also relatively high, but why the overall contribution to economic growth was so low.
Herranz-Loncán places the burden of responsibility for such failures as did exist squarely on the state. It was the state's mismanagement of the auction process by which public subsidies were allocated that created a poor deal for shareholders; it was the state's corrupt system of inspections that allowed the poor quality of service; it was the state's inability or reluctance to regulate prices in an imperfectly competitive market that allowed fares to be among the highest in Europe. But if the state was responsible for the problems, was government regulation the answer? It is perhaps ironic that the state should be identified as the lost savior of railways, when the British and American cases, for example, emphasize that nationalization and public regulation exacerbated the problem. To be fair, if you go back far enough, the British case also suggests that it was private ownership and the absence of public regulation that exacerbated the problem. The lessons from the history of railways in the pioneer economies suggest that the problems of railway management have less to do with ownership or control and far more to do with the nature of the market and the peculiar nature of the railway companies—the classic decreasing cost industry with huge network effects.
The fallibility of the state also lies at the heart of Mu Li's dissertation on fiscal administration in late Qing dynasty China, which applies a game-theoretic approach to a fundamental question of Chinese economic historiography—why was there “No Great Leap Forward” in the 1850s and beyond? Essentially, Li's argument is that, as a result of repeated games over the previous two centuries, during which the primary actors in civil society—the sovereign, the local elites, and the taxpayers—rehearsed their lines, a stable equilibrium emerged. Over time, however, this equilibrium took on the characteristics of stasis, such that it could not adapt to changing circumstances. The period after 1850 saw a significant number of developments and opportunities—in particular the opening up of China to western possibilities and western challenges—that exposed the weakness of the Chinese economic and political system.
I found this a fascinating dissertation to read. It asks a fundamentally important question about Chinese economic development and it approaches it with verve. The model is well designed, the predictions and implications clearly articulated and imaginatively tested against the available, and necessarily fragmentary, evidence. Because of the inherent weakness of the historical and economic record of nineteenth-century China, the interpretation is necessarily suggestive rather than definitive. Indeed, given the fragmentary and incomplete historical record, one of the characteristics of Chinese historiography is that no-one can expect to have the last word. But Mu Li provides a fresh voice that will have to be listened to.
There are, to my mind, three areas where Li might need to pay attention as she makes the transition from dissertation to publication.
Firstly, the model. There are three primary players—the sovereign, the elites, and the taxpayers. My question concerns the depiction of the elites who are modeled, for obvious reasons of parsimony, as homogenous. But it might be asked if this represents unnecessary simplification—how far can we treat the elites of nineteenth-century China as functionally homogenous? In particular, it strikes me that there needs to be a greater distinction drawn between the impoverished rural elites and the less disadvantaged urban elites. Implicitly, such a distinction is already advanced in the thesis by the discussion of likin—tax-farming among merchants—and the emergence of guilds in chapter 2. The guilds are in effect loose combinations drawn from the ranks of the urban elites; rural elites are largely absent from these new institutional forms. Bifurcation of elites will, to be sure, make little or no difference to the outcome of the primary game, which establishes the equilibrium conditions of the mid-nineteenth century, but it would enrich the analysis of the breakdown of that equilibrium and the resulting, endogenous, institutional changes that it generated.
In particular, differentiating among the elites would help enrich the analysis of the breakdown in the implicit fiscal contract—because the rural elites were bound by the cap on land taxes established early in the eighteenth century and had developed extra-legal devices to raise money for local (not central) purposes gradually over time, as population expanded and local needs grew. The particular problem for the Chinese state in both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a consequence of the decentralization necessary to run a vast and sprawling empire. The local elites were effectively co-opted by being given control over revenue-raising; by so doing, the state sacrificed any ability to extract additional resources from local sources, especially after the land tax was frozen in 1713.
It is therefore no accident that such innovations in fiscal administration that did emerge in the nineteenth century were centered on the urban elites, for whom no such constraints applied. The added element to this is that expectations regarding fiscal limits were largely absent for commercial taxation. Li recognizes this. But the other side of the contractual relationship also needs to be explored more closely—in the form of reciprocal expectations of the merchants to the limits of state action. One of the reasons for the failure of the self-strengthening movement in the second half of the nineteenth century was (actual or feared) government predation of any profits that the new joint stock enterprises might generate. There had been, in the language of Li's approach, an insufficient number of repeated outcomes to educate the major players in this sub-game in the rules of conduct necessary to sustain a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
If we follow the logic of this distinction, the crucial period is the second quarter of the nineteenth century rather than post-1850 as Li suggests. For it was in this period that the emperor attempted to renegotiate the terms of the rural equilibrium by imposing a more rational tax code. The strategy failed. The combination of rebellions, economic depression, and the impact of price deflation on the real value of land taxes (and extra-legal assessments) destabilized the position of the sovereign. What was the response of the government to the wave of unrest? To make concessions—to lower taxes in the areas most affected by economic distress. This renegotiation of the social contract worked in completely the opposite direction sought by the Emperor a generation earlier. The whole movement can be ascribed to the pursuit of fairness in the form of increasingly harsh economic realities. But the renegotiation involved sacrifice by the sovereign (whose revenue stream was also suffering during this period) and one wonders whether these were the actions of a benevolent state wedded to concepts of fairness, a strong state using rent-seeking devices to pre-empt political opposition, or a weak state unable to marshal political or military resources to effect its goals.
Finally, the matter of Japan. The explicit comparison that is drawn by Li when discussing a possible counterfactual late Qing China is Japan under Meiji rule. Here was a state that was able to expand its fiscal reach considerably after 1868, and was therefore able to develop military security and bureaucratic strength at the same time as tax revenues were devoted to infrastructure investment, capital market subsidies, and industrial development. The Meiji dynasty overcame the fiscal constraints in an era of largely stagnant agriculture by introducing land reform, something the Qing dynasty, shackled by cultural expectations and institutional rigidities, was unable to do.
There is no doubt that Meiji Japan was not subject to fiscal restraints (or indeed the same pressures on the expenditure side) as Qing China. But I wonder if this is in itself enough. Historians have increasingly rejected the comparison of China and the West, or at least complicated the nature of that comparison. But if it is no longer appropriate to ask “Why was China not Britain (or Germany)?” is it any more reasonable to ask “Why was China not Japan?' And if we do make the comparison, we need to avoid the perils of reductionism.
There is surely more to say in a Sino-Japanese comparison than just the matter of relative fiscal success. Japan was, to begin with, a much smaller nation—about the size of a single Chinese province in 1870. The relatively small scale of population, plus the relatively compact geography of Japan, made central administration more feasible, in contrast to China where decentralization was essential to maintaining the state without an over-bloated bureaucracy. The authoritarian nature of the new regime in Japan, supported by a dominant military authority, meshed with the fundamentally hierarchical structure of society to force through changes that were all but inconceivable in China. The contrast in fiscal outcomes is a result of fundamental social, civic, and cultural contrasts rather than a reason in itself. This provides a real opportunity for Mu Li to pursue a similar institutional analysis of the political economy of fiscal administration in Japan to discern how far the underlying social and cultural forces established a shift from a pre-Meiji equilibrium to a Meiji dynamic.
One of the issues that a new institutional analysis of Japan and China would need to internalize is the difference in political agendas at the time of dynastic formation. The Qing dynasty as early as 1720 practiced concessions to placate potential political opposition in the provinces; the Meiji rulers 150 years later used power to effect the same result. And while the emperor in Japan exercised force majeur, the emperor in China in the 1860s appealed once again to the culture of Confucian purity to maintain fidelity with a social contracted renewed continuously since the early eighteenth century. In Veblen's thought-provoking “The Economic Opportunity of Japan,” the emphasis is placed on the cultural dissonance between entrepreneurial expectations and an authoritarian social system to produce a disequilibrium dynamic of rapid growth. In Qing China, by contrast, accommodationism, designed to protect the stability of the equilibrium, was the enemy of development.
I end by returning to the Great Exhibition of 1851. The Council Medal at the Crystal Palace exhibit was reserved for exhibits that demonstrated “important novelty of invention or application, either in material or process of manufacture, or originality combined with a great beauty of design.” Each of these dissertations deserves such a commendation. I applaud them all.