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Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

Charles W. Calomiris
Affiliation:
The author is Assistant Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, and a member of the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 230 S. La Salle St., Chicago, IL 60604.

Abstract

The motivation and structure of various banking insurance experiments in U.S. history are analyzed, along with their political alternative, branch banks. In both the antebellum period and in the 1920s, insurance systems that relied on self-regulation, made credible by mutual liability, were successful, while compulsory state systems were not. Branch banking increased stability and resiliency to shocks.

Information

Type
Papers Presented at the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1990

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