This study of mortgage borrowing in the American West covers mortgage activity in Champaign County, Illinois, from 1836 through 1895, but emphasizes the years 1854 through 1895. This time span covers the county from the time it was a part of the American frontier until it became a developed geographic unit within the national economy. Primary concern is with the level and trend of interest rates and with sources and uses of mortgage funds.

Although the aggregate growth rate of the American economy was relatively slow between the Revolution and 1840, certain sectors did expand at a rapid rate, and from these sectors originated some of the factors responsible for the later dynamic growth of the whole system. One such sector involved the making of clocks. Never large by any measure, the clock industry was, nevertheless, a leader in the introduction of the system of interchangeable parts production and in the mass marketing of a “luxury” consumer good. The purpose of this article is to outline and to analyze the transformation of this activity from a craft to an industry and, in particular, to indicate the factors which influenced Eli Terry, the main entrepreneur of the transformation.

The use of steam power in manufacturing has long been recognized as an important part of the English industrial revolution, but in studies of the United States the role of the steam engine in manufacturing has been overshadowed by its application in railroads. This paper attempts partially to redress the balance by examining the use of stationary steam engines in America about 1840. Section I explores the characteristics of the supply of stationary engines in America, contrasting the engines used in America with those used in Britain. Section II discusses the demand for steam engines, that is, the factors underlying the choice between steam and waterpower in different industries.

This study presents three sets of data dealing with Federal Government revenues, expenditures, and financing for the period 1861–1875. These extend and augment the author's previous estimates covering the years through 1860. The first set presents expenditures classified by major function, annual, by fiscal year ending June 30. The second set consists of annual estimates of Federal revenue and expenditures on a money-flow basis comparable to the national income accounts. The two sets differ slightly in totals because of differing degrees of netting.

Criticism of the Federal Reserve Board for not advancing rates earlier in 1919 to halt a rampant inflation is seldom as severe or nearly as devastating as the criticism heaped upon it for not easing credit sooner during the sharp but brief depression episode of 1920–1921. After the collapse of prices in May 1920, the immediate goal of Federal Reserve policy was to prevent a widespread financial crisis by maintaining the liquidity of the banking system. Congress had created the Federal Reserve System for the specific purpose of preventing a recurrence of the financial panics that had plagued our pre-World War I monetary experience. In 1920 the Federal Reserve Banks succeeded in this task by making funds freely available at relatively high discount rates. Somewhat surprising is the fact that there was no liquidation of bank credit nor decline in the money supply during the first six months of the downswing. Loans at commercial banks continued to increase, and member-bank indebtedness continued to rise. The action taken by System officials probably warded off what might easily have been the worst financial catastrophe in our history. Unfortunately, the policy they pursued, though successful in preventing a banking crisis, was inimical to a quick recovery of business activity. Inventory decumulation, particularly in the agricultural sector, was hampered by a bumper harvest and a railway transportation bottleneck which was not eliminated until October.

That Japanese economic growth since the war has been spectacular is well known. Real net national income per head at the beginning of the 1960's was roughly twice that of the middle thirties, and four times the postwar low of 1946. In all sorts of ways—industrial structure, levels of regular employment, composition and level of consumption—Japan has made a decisive break from the economy of the 1930's. While the achievement is obvious, it is more difficult to know how to assess the performance, even when attention is directed solely toward the overall growth of the economy as measured by total output. What standards or measures can be applied to permit the answering of such questions as whether recent Japanese growth has been “fast” or “satisfactory”? There is a variety of ways in which this problem could be approached. One would be to compare Japanese growth with that of other countries; another would be to consider the potentialities of growth since the war and whether they have been used to maximum advantage. Here the question will be considered from an historical point of view: How does recent growth measure up against past performance of the economy?