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Activist-Appointed Directors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 September 2021

Jun-Koo Kang*
Affiliation:
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Business School
Hyemin Kim
Affiliation:
Hanyang University School of Business Division of Finance hyeminkim@hanyang.ac.kr
Jungmin Kim
Affiliation:
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University School of Accounting and Finance jungmin.kim@polyu.edu.hk
Angie Low
Affiliation:
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Business School aaclow@ntu.edu.sg
*
jkkang@ntu.edu.sg (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington