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Analyst Coverage and Corporate Environmental Policies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2023

Chenxing Jing
Affiliation:
University of International Business and Economics chenxing.jing95@gmail.com
Kevin Keasey*
Affiliation:
Leeds University Business School
Ivan Lim
Affiliation:
Durham University Business School ivan.lim@durham.ac.uk
Bin Xu
Affiliation:
Leeds University Business School b.xu@leeds.ac.uk
*
k.keasey@lubs.leeds.ac.uk (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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Exploiting two quasi-natural experiments, we find that firms increase emissions of toxic pollution following decreases in analyst coverage. The effects are stronger for firms with low initial analyst coverage, poor corporate governance, and firms subject to less stringent monitoring by environmental regulators. Decreases in environmental-related questions raised in conference calls, an increased cost of monitoring to institutional shareholders, reductions in pollution abatement investment, and the weakening of internal governance related to environmental performance are channels through which reduced analyst coverage contributes to increases in firm pollution. Our study highlights the monitoring role analysts play in shaping corporate environmental policies.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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