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Analyst Coverage, Information, and Bubbles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 November 2013

Sandro C. Andrade
Affiliation:
sca@miami.edu, School of Business Administration, University of Miami, PO Box 248094, Coral Gables, FL 33124
Jiangze Bian*
Affiliation:
jiangzebian@uibe.edu.cn, School of Banking and Finance and Research Center for Applied Finance, University of International Business and Economics, 908 Boxue Building, #10, HuixinDongjie, Beijing 100029, China.
Timothy R. Burch
Affiliation:
tburch@miami.edu, School of Business Administration, University of Miami, PO Box 248094, Coral Gables, FL 33124
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Abstract

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We examine the 2007 stock market bubble in China. Using multiple measures of bubble intensity for each stock, we find significantly smaller bubbles in stocks for which there is greater analyst coverage. We further show that the abating effect of analyst coverage on bubble intensity is weaker when there is greater disagreement among analysts. This suggests that, in line with resale option theories of bubbles, one channel through which analyst coverage may mitigate bubbles is by coordinating investors’ beliefs and thus reducing its dispersion. Stock turnover provides further evidence consistent with this particular information mechanism.

Information

Type
Research Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2013