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Bank Influence at a Discount

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2023

Hans Gersbach
Affiliation:
ETH Zurich, KOF, and CER-ETH – Center of Economic Research and CEPR hgersbach@ethz.ch
Stylianos Papageorgiou*
Affiliation:
University of Cyprus Department of Accounting and Finance
*
papageorgiou.stylianos@ucy.ac.cy (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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In a general equilibrium framework, we show that banks may “buy” political influence at a discount: They offer disproportionately small campaign contributions compared to the influence they exert, thus generating abnormal returns. We distinguish between the direct effect of contributions which, as a cost, reduce bank returns, and the indirect effect of contributions which boost returns via inducing bank-favoring policies. Therefore, abnormal returns may or may not increase with the amount of contributions, depending on which effect dominates: Stricter capital requirements decrease contributions and abnormal returns. When politicians attach more weight to households’ welfare, contributions increase and abnormal returns decrease.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington