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Better Kept in the Dark? Portfolio Disclosure and Agency Problems in Mutual Funds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 January 2021

Teodor Dyakov
Affiliation:
EDHEC Business School teodor.dyakov@edhec.edu
Jarrad Harford
Affiliation:
University of Washington Foster School of Business jarrad@uw.edu
Buhui Qiu*
Affiliation:
University of Sydney Business School
*
buhui.qiu@sydney.edu.au (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We study the agency implications of increased disclosure using a regulatory change in the mutual fund industry as an experimental setting. This quasi-natural experiment mandated more frequent portfolio disclosure, which we show imposes managerial skill-reassessment risks from investors on funds with high relative performance volatility. In turn, this risk translates into greater agency costs to investors. We show that high-volatility funds, relative to low-volatility funds, responded to the increased skill-reassessment risk after regulation with an increase in management fees and a decrease in risk taking. These actions get transmitted to fund investors in the form of inferior net performance.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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