Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T06:02:49.075Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Blockholder Scarcity, Takeovers, and Ownership Structures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Agency problems in firms are prevalent because of a scarcity of wealthy principals with corporate governance ability, whom we call “restructuring specialists.” We investigate how this scarce resource, “agency cost-free capital,” is allocated. We show that the restructuring specialists may acquire blocks only in those states of the worls in which they can increase firm value the most, which corresponds to a takeover. Firms with dispersed ownership and firms with a financial intermediary as a blockholder can coexist, although they are otherwise identical. The moderl can explain differences in corporate ownership structures and restructuring mechanisms across economies.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 2008