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Board Reforms and Dividend Policy: International Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2020

Kee-Hong Bae*
Affiliation:
York University Schulich School of Business kbae@schulich.yorku.ca
Sadok El Ghoul
Affiliation:
University of Alberta Campus Saint-Jean elghoul@ualberta.ca
Omrane Guedhami
Affiliation:
University of South Carolina Moore School of Business omrane.guedhami@moore.sc.edu
Xiaolan Zheng
Affiliation:
Nottingham University Business School China xiaolan.zheng@nottingham.edu.cn
*
kbae@schulich.yorku.ca (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We study the impact of board reforms implemented in 40 countries worldwide on corporate dividend policy. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that firms pay higher dividends following the reforms. The increase in dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with weak board governance in the pre-reform period and those in countries with strong external governance mechanisms. Our findings corroborate the dividend outcome model, which postulates that board reforms strengthen the monitoring role of the board and empower outside shareholders to force management to disgorge dividends.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© THE AUTHOR(S), 2020. PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS ON BEHALF OF THE MICHAEL G. FOSTER SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON