Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-8r8nv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-09T18:37:24.715Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Bonus-Driven Repurchases

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2015

Yingmei Cheng
Affiliation:
ycheng@business.fsu.edu, College of Business, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306
Jarrad Harford*
Affiliation:
jarrad@uw.edu, Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195.
Tianming (Tim) Zhang
Affiliation:
tzhang@business.fsu.edu, College of Business, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306
*
*Corresponding author: jarrad@uw.edu
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Using a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO’s bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company’s EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.

Information

Type
Research Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2015 
Supplementary material: PDF

Cheng supplementary material

Appendix

Download Cheng supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 84.5 KB