Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-m6dxt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-19T02:52:36.512Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Central Counterparty Default Waterfalls and Systemic Loss

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2022

Samim Ghamami
Affiliation:
University of California Berkeley Center for Risk Management Research, New York University Courant Institute, and New York University Department of Finance and Risk Engineering samim_ghamami@berkeley.edu
Mark Paddrik*
Affiliation:
U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Financial Research
Simpson Zhang
Affiliation:
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Market Risk Analysis Division Simpson.Zhang@occ.treas.gov
*
Mark.Paddrik@ofr.treasury.gov (corresponding author)
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Central counterparty (CCP) default waterfalls act as the last lines of defense in over-the-counter markets by managing and allocating resources to cover payment defaults. This article examines the impact of variations in waterfall design on financial system losses in the presence of payment network dependencies and frictions in the cleared and noncleared portion of the system. Through the development of a structural model, we draw several theoretical conclusions about the effectiveness of CCP default waterfalls under severe payment stress. These findings are empirically quantified by testing the model using supervisory data for the U.S. credit default swap market.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: File

Ghamami et al. supplementary material
Download undefined(File)
File 672.6 KB