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CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 August 2019

Peter Cziraki*
Affiliation:
Cziraki, peter.cziraki@utoronto.ca, University of Toronto Department of Economics
Moqi Groen-Xu
Affiliation:
Groen-Xu, m.xu1@lse.ac.uk, London School of Economics Department of Finance
*
Cziraki (corresponding author), peter.cziraki@utoronto.ca
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Abstract

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We study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019
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Cziraki and Groen-Xu supplementary material

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