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The Dark Side of Executive Compensation Duration: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 November 2020

Zhi Li*
Affiliation:
Chapman University Argyros School of Business & Economics
Qiyuan Peng
Affiliation:
University of Dayton School of Business Administration qpeng1@udayton.edu
*
zli@chapman.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We find that contrary to popular belief, CEOs with long compensation duration do not make better long-term investment decisions. Using a comprehensive pay duration measure, we find that acquisitions conducted by CEOs with long compensation duration receive more negative announcement returns, and experience significantly worse post-acquisition abnormal operating and stock performance, compared with deals conducted by CEOs with short compensation duration. The negative correlation between compensation duration and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance is driven by long-term time-vesting plans, not by performance-vesting plans. The results suggest that extending CEO pay horizons without implementing performance requirements is insufficient to improve managerial long-term investment decisions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington