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De Facto Bank Bailouts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 March 2022

Phong T. H. Ngo*
Affiliation:
The Australian National University Research School of Finance, Actuarial Studies, and Statistics
Diego L. Puente-Moncayo
Affiliation:
The Australian National University Research School of Finance, Actuarial Studies, and Statistics diego.puente@anu.edu.au
*
phong.ngo@anu.edu.au (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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The U.S. government uses its voting power to direct IMF loans to countries where U.S. banks are exposed to sovereign default (a de facto bailout). This effect is stronger in years when the costs of direct bailouts are higher and is also found among major European IMF members. We find that de facto bailouts reduce government incentives to default and that U.S. Congressional voting on IMF funding is consistent with a private interest view of government. Overall, we identify an alternative mechanism through which governments can backstop the losses of large multinational banks.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: PDF

Ngo and Puente-Moncayo supplementary material

Appendix

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