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Debt Maturity and Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Default Risk Changes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 May 2013

Vidhan K. Goyal
Affiliation:
goyal@ust.hk, Department of Finance, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Wei Wang
Affiliation:
wwang@business.queensu.ca, School of Business, Queen’s University, 401 Goodes Hall, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada
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Abstract

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Asymmetric information models suggest that a borrower’s choice of debt maturity depends on its private information about its default probabilities, that is, borrowers with favorable information prefer short-term debt while those with unfavorable information prefer long-term debt. We test this implication by tracing the evolution of debt issuers’ default risk following debt issuances. We find that short-term debt issuance leads to a decline inborrowers’ asset volatility and an increase in their distance to default. The opposite is true for long-term debt issues. The results suggest that borrowers’ private information about their default risk is an important determinant of their debt maturity choices.

Information

Type
Research Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2013