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Director Job Security and Corporate Innovation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2023

Po-Hsuan Hsu
Affiliation:
National Tsing Hua University, College of Technology Management pohsuanhsu@mx.nthu.edu.tw
Yiqing Lü
Affiliation:
New York University Shanghai yiqing.lu@nyu.edu
Hong Wu
Affiliation:
Fudan University, School of Economics hongwu@fudan.edu.cn
Yuhai Xuan*
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine
*
yuhai.xuan@uci.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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In this article, we show that firms can become conservative in innovation when their directors face job insecurity. We find that after the staggered enactment of majority voting legislation that strengthens shareholders’ power in director elections, firms produce fewer patents, particularly exploratory patents, and fewer forward citations. This effect is stronger for directors facing higher dismissal costs or threats and for firms with greater needs for board expertise and is mitigated by institutional investors’ expertise in innovation. Overall, our results suggest that heightened job insecurity induces director myopia, which leads to a reduction in investment in risky, long-term innovation projects.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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