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Disagreement and Scheduled Announcements: Explaining the Pre-Announcement Drift

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 September 2025

Paula Cocoma*
Affiliation:
Finance Department, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
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Abstract

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This article proposes a theoretical explanation for the positive pre-announcement drift empirically documented ahead of scheduled announcements, using the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings as a main example. The framework entails a general equilibrium model of disagreement (differences of opinion), where investors interpret a costly signal differently. Investors optimally decide to stop learning when an announcement is imminent, increasing the risk premium ahead of an announcement. The model jointly rationalizes puzzling empirical evidence by generating i) an upward drift in prices just before scheduled announcements, regardless of the announcement’s content, which coexists with ii) low volatility and iii) low trading volume.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington