Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T02:12:17.791Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 August 2013

Emmanuel Morales-Camargo
Affiliation:
emc@uta.edu, College of Business, University of Texas at Arlington, 701 SWest St, Arlington, TX 76019
Orly Sade
Affiliation:
orlysade@mscc.huji.ac.il, Hebrew University, School of Business, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel
Charles Schnitzlein
Affiliation:
charles.schnitzlein@bus.ucf.edu, University of Central Florida, College of Business Administration, PO Box 161400, Orlando, FL 32816
Jaime F. Zender*
Affiliation:
jaime.zender@colorado.edu, University of Colorado at Boulder, Leeds School of Business, UCB 419, Boulder, CO 80309.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.

Information

Type
Research Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2013 
Supplementary material: PDF

Morales-Camargo Supplementary Material

Appendix

Download Morales-Camargo Supplementary Material(PDF)
PDF 565.1 KB