Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-18T21:12:47.214Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Do Classified Boards Deter Takeovers? Evidence from Merger Waves

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2023

Kose John
Affiliation:
New York University Stern School of Business kjohn@stern.nyu.edu
Dalida Kadyrzhanova*
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Board
Sangho Lee
Affiliation:
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona College of Business Administration sanghol@cpp.edu
*
dalida.kadyrzhanova@frb.gov (corresponding author)
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified boards deter takeover bids. In a stylized model, we show that when target classified boards are costly to bidders, their negative effect on takeover likelihood should be more pronounced during merger waves. Using a sample of takeover bids in the United States between 1990 and 2016, we find strong evidence supporting this prediction. The results are robust to accounting for the benefits of classified boards and controlling for other antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that classified boards effectively reduce a firm’s exposure to the takeover market.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: File

John et al. supplementary material

John et al. supplementary material
Download John et al. supplementary material(File)
File 559 KB