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Do Private Equity Managers Raise Funds on (Sur)real Returns? Evidence from Deal-Level Data

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 September 2022

Niklas Hüther*
Affiliation:
Indiana University Kelley School of Business
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Abstract

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Recent studies on agency problems in private equity fueled the suspicion that fund managers strategically manipulate performance estimates around fundraising times. While these studies use aggregated portfolio data, this paper offers the first analysis of “window dressing” in private equity based on deal-level performance. In contrast to previous findings of a smoking gun at the fund level, I do not find any evidence of inflated performance at the deal level. Fund performance peaks are driven by a cohort effect whereby late investments are made under pressure before fundraising and have lower returns than those made earlier in the fund’s life.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: PDF

Hüther supplementary material

Internet Appendix

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