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Does Independent Advice to the Board Affect CEO Compensation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2019

Tor-Erik Bakke
Affiliation:
Bakke, tbakke@uic.edu, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Business Administration
Hamed Mahmudi*
Affiliation:
Mahmudi, hmahmudi@udel.edu, University of Delaware Lerner College of Business and Economics
*
Mahmudi (corresponding author), hmahmudi@udel.edu
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Abstract

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This article investigates the role external advice plays in the board’s determination of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We show that CEO incentive pay increases with the degree of compensation consultant independence using a quasi-natural experiment provided by the creation of an independent consultant after separation from an affiliated consultant. Specifically, switching to an independent consultant significantly increases the pay–performance sensitivity and relative performance evaluation of CEO contracts. Despite the benefits of independent advice, independent consultants may not be hired due to the influence of powerful CEOs or because boards already possess adequate expertise.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019