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Equilibrium-Informed Trading with Relative Performance Measurement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2017

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Abstract

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This article analyzes the informative trading of professional money managers within a rational-expectations equilibrium model in which managers care about their performance relative to their peer group. I find that the existence of uninformed managers causes informed managers with relative performance concerns to trade less informatively, engendering less informative prices. When managers are differentially informed, they need to forecast the average performance based on private signals, and each manager may place more weight on the private signal if the signal provides good information about the average performance. The price aggregates those signals and thus becomes more informative.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2017