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Financial Signalling by Committing to Cash Outflows

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Abstract

We analyze a model in which firms signal their quality by using financial policies to commit to cash outflows. Two financial policies may be used: dividend and debt-service obligations. We find sufficient conditions for the informational equilibrium to entail concommitant use of both dividends and leverage in the cost-minimizing combination of the commitment signal. In this equilibrium, better firms pay higher dividends and are more highly levered than lower quality firms.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1991

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