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Fintech Lending and Credit Market Competition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 May 2023

Yinxiao Chu
Affiliation:
University of International Business and Economics School of Banking and Finance chuyinxiao@uibe.edu.cn
Jianxing Wei*
Affiliation:
University of International Business and Economics School of Banking and Finance
*
jianxing.wei@uibe.edu.cn (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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This article studies how the rise of financial technology (Fintech) lending affects credit access, interest rates, and social welfare. We consider a lending competition model with two incumbent banks and a Fintech lender, which use different information and technologies to assess borrower creditworthiness. We show that Fintech lending could negatively affect high-quality borrowers’ access to credit when the Fintech lender’s screening accuracy is superior to that of the banks. Furthermore, Fintech lending may worsen the allocative efficiency of credit and reduce social welfare under some conditions. Analytical and numerical results suggest that Fintech lending mostly reduces the expected interest rates.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: PDF

Chu and Wei supplementary material

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