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Global Board Reforms and the Pricing of IPOs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2021

Yangyang Chen
Affiliation:
City University of Hong Kong, Department of Accountancy ychen722@cityu.edu.hk
Abhinav Goyal
Affiliation:
Cork Business School, University College Cork abhinav.goyal@ucc.ie
Leon Zolotoy*
Affiliation:
Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne
*
l.zolotoy@mbs.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We document that global board reforms are associated with a significant reduction in the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). The effect is amplified for IPOs with greater agency problems and mitigated for IPOs certified by reputable intermediaries, IPOs with greater disclosure specificity, and IPOs in countries with better shareholder protection and stringent financial reporting regulations. Furthermore, global board reforms have led to an improvement in the long-term market performance, proceeds, and subscription level of IPOs and have enhanced board independence in the issuing firms. Our findings suggest that global board reforms have strengthened board oversight in the issuing firms, leading to less underpriced IPOs.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: PDF

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