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Governance by One-Lot Shares

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2024

Feng Cao
Affiliation:
Hunan University Business School caofeng@hnu.edu.cn
Yuhai Xuan*
Affiliation:
University of California Irvine Paul Merage School of Business
Rongli Yuan
Affiliation:
Renmin University of China Renmin Business School yuanrongli@rmbs.ruc.edu.cn
Hong Zou
Affiliation:
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Business and Economics hongzou@hku.hk
*
yuhai.xuan@uci.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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