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Governance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Access

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2020

Tara Bhandari*
Affiliation:
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission bhandarit@sec.gov
Peter Iliev
Affiliation:
Pennsylvania State University Smeal College of Business pgi1@psu.edu
Jonathan Kalodimos
Affiliation:
Oregon State University College of Business jonathan.kalodimos@oregonstate.edu
*
bhandarit@sec.gov (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already-well-governed firms.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: PDF

Bhandari et al. supplementary material

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